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TREATIES AND CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
OR PRESIDENTIAL AGREEMENTS: INTERCHANGEABLE
INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY: II
MYRES S. McDOUGALt AND ASHER LANSt
VII. THE REQUIREMENTS OF A DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLIcy FOR THE
WHOLE NATION
The existence under our Constitution of the variety of interchange-
able techniques, described in the previous Sections of this article,' for
perfecting international agreements has obviously served the nation
well in the past. It may in the future, 2 if the facts of variety and inter-
changeability are fully recognized and acted upon by the public and
by all branches of the Government, provide a system for the conduct
of our foreign relations which is adequate both to cope with the im-
peratives of survival and to secure our other national interests in the
contemporary world-that is, a system whereby policy is quickly and
easily formed by democratic means for the nation as a whole, and
whereby the execution of policy is prompt and efficient, without being
subjected to the adventitious whims and disintegrating attacks of
obstructionist minority control. The flexibility and dispatch which
such a system may require are available in the President's powers
to make the initial decision as to how any particular agree-
ment is to be perfected and to make and perform, on his own
responsibility, all agreements needed to meet war and other emergen-
cies. Conversely, ample check upon any arbitrary or unwise exercise
of executive power, beyond what is imposed by public opinion and the
President's unique responsibility to the voters of the whole nation, is
insured by the fact that, without the aid of the Congress, the powers
of the President, or even of the President and the Senate, to perform
important international agreements are in the long run severely
limited. Sooner or later, and in most instances sooner, a President
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The first six Sections of this article were published in the March 1945 issue of the
Journal (54 YALE L. J. 181) and are herein cited as Part I. Sections VII and VIII were
sent to press before the San Francisco conference convened. Changes have been made
only with respect to the most important developments since that date.
For a list of the short-form citations used in this article see Part I, pp. 181-2.
1. See Part I, especially Section IV.
2. It may be assumed that practices which have their origin in the beginnings of our
national history and which have developed through 150 years in the actions of Congresses
and Presidents, consistently sustained by the courts, have their roots deep in the conditions
and "felt necessities" of our national existence and that these conditions and necessities are
not likely to change overnight.
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who is engaged in important international undertakings must secure
funds and supplementary legislation and must, therefore, submit his
negotiations to the scrutiny and approval or disapproval of a majority
of the elected representatives of the people. Full and free responsive-
ness to democratic control and to the national interest can be made
certain by use of the Congressional-Executive agreement as a func-
tional alternative to the treaty, enabling the President to go to both
houses of the Congress for confirmation of any particular agreement,
either in the first instance, or after it has become apparent that an
agreement previously submitted to the Senate will be blocked by a
minority obdurate in opposing majority will. In such a system the
survival, as a sort of constitutional vermiform appendix, of an addi-
tional undemocratic mode of validating international agreements by
the two-thirds vote of a single house, can do no harm to the national
interest, if it is agreed by all parties that this mode of validation is not
exclusive of the more democratic mode and that its continued existence
is not to be used to obfuscate issues of substantive policy by the invoca-
tion of procedural subtleties.
It is an unfortunate fact, however, that the argument is still made,
not only that the Congressional-Executive agreement is an illegitimate
offspring from the Constitution (a contention thoroughly refuted in
the preceding Sections of this article), but even that the treaty-making
procedure, despite its subjection to minority veto and its susceptibility
to control by sectional interests, is preferable to the Congressional-
Executive agreement-making procedure on grounds of policy. It may
be recalled that Professor Borchard, for example, has gone so far as to
characterize "the fashion to extol the executive agreement as an exem-
plification of -democracy as opposed to the so-called undemocratic
requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate" as "subversive propa-
ganda." 3 Just as it has been shown that there are no legal reasons for
preferring the treaty to the executive agreement, it becomes necessary,
therefore, to show, that there are likewise no policy grounds for giving
exclusiveness or even pre-eminence to the treaty. On the face of things,
it would in fact appear that exactly the opposite is true and that the
Congressional-Executive agreement is much to be preferred. It may
be agreed that it is undemocratic and undesirable for a President to
determine important aspects of our foreign policy by himself, when
conditions permit public debate and reference to the other representa-
tives of the people, and that it is maladroit statesmanship for a Presi-
dent to make important agreements without first assuring himself of
the cooperation of Congress. Surely, however, in a democratic state
whose sectional lines are obsolete in so far as over-all international
interests are concerned, any procedure which makes the perfecting of
3. Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations (1942)36 Au. J. INT. L. 275,281.
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international agreements dependent upon the minority veto of a single
house, and the less representative house at that, of a bicameral legis-
lature is an indefensible anachronism that can be tolerated only so
long as it makes no difference in the determination of policy. None of
the criteria which limit the desirability of simple Presidential agree-
ments has any application to Congressional-Executive agreements.
Contrariwise, it is believed that a thorough examination of the relevant
policy considerations will conclusively demonstrate what appears on
the surface, that the Congressional-Executive agreement is more in
accord with the basic'principles of American government and more
responsive to the national interest than is the treaty.4 Such an exami-
nation requires, first, an attempt to ascertain, and to appraise the
contemporary relevance of, the reasons the Framers might have had for
putting into the Constitution an admittedly undemocratic method for
securing the approval of international agreements; next, a summary of
the record of the Senate'in thwarting majority control and the national
interest; and, finally, an evaluation of the treaty and Congressional-
Executive agreement in the light of the accepted working principles of
democratic government, including brief consideration of some mis-
leading analogies frequently cited by the acolytes of minority control.
The Undemocratic Origins of the Treaty Clause.
"History sets us free and enables us to make up our minds dis-
passionately whether the survival which we are enforcing answers
any new purpose when it has ceased to answer the old."
MR. JUSTIcE HOLMES.$
From the fragmentary records of the debates at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 and the welter of conflicting views expressed at the
state ratifying conventions, three salient facts emerge. In the first
place, the delegates to the Convention devoted comparatively little
attention to consideration of the means by which the proposed new
federal government was to conduct its foreign policy. The question
4. The choice by a President as to whether a treaty, a Congressional-Executive agree-
ment, or a simple Presidential agreement should be utilized to handle any given diplomatic
problem is, of course, dependent upon a larger number of political and psychological vari-
ables, such as the need for support from the House of Representatives to implement the
agreement, the chances at the moment of getting a two-thirds vote of the Senate in support
of a treaty and of thus avoiding debates about procedure, the need for debate as a matter of
public education, the prevailing attitudes of Congressional leaders on questions of con-
stitutionality and policy, recent precedent with respect to similar matters, accident, or
other chance factors. Most of these variables are, however, more relevant to the imme-
diate tasks of statesmanship than to an objective appraisal of the alternative procedures as
instruments of long-term policy.
5. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921)
210, 225.
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assumed greater importance in certain state ratifying conventions, but
primarily only because certain current disputes as to foreign policy
were seized upon by the groups opposing ratification of the Constitu-
tion to bulwark their arguments., Secondly, with a few exceptions,
the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention sought to remove the
determination of foreign policy at least in the immediate future as far
as possible from popular control.7 Finally-as has previously been
demonstrated s-the language the Framers adopted clearly permits
utilization of other methods than that provided in the treaty clause for
securing validation of international agreements, thus exemplifying
their general realization that it was desirable to grant future genera-
tions ample freedom to devise appropriate instruments by which to
govern themselves. 9
The federal government created by the Articles of Confederation,
like that which had existed from the beginning of the Revolution, had
consisted merely of a unicameral legislature and of its subordinate
agents. The active control of foreign affairs had been vested in a Con-
gressional committee, working at various times through a secretary
and a directing board which, in addition to supervising the negotiation
of agreements afterwards ratified as treaties, had consummated com-
pacts with other nations on its own responsibility.0 In these early
Congresses, which, although controlling foreign policy, essentially
functioned as councils of ambassadorial delegates from a group of
federated states," no attempt was made to predicate representation
upon population; each state was entitled to one vote. The assent of
nine states was necessary to ratify treaties under the Articles of Con-
federation.
The initial references to the conduct of foreign affairs at the Con-
stitutional Convention were concerned primarily only with the in--
6. See note 40 infra.
7. See notes 28 and 29 infra.
8. See Part I, Section II.
9. See especially former delegate Abraham Baldvin's remarks in Congrezs in 1796 in
ANNALS OF CONGRESS (4th Cong., 1st Sess.) 537; see also letter from George Washington to
Patrick Henry quoted in WARREN, THE IAKING OF THE CONsITLON (1937) 728; Charles
Pinckney's speech in the South Carolina ratifying convention in 1788, 4 ELLIOT, DnoBARis,
at 261.
10. See ANDERSON, A mRicAN GOvERNMENT (193S) 38-50; Swisam, Az.sucicvz
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1943) 17-24; Guggenheimer, The Derelopment of the
Executive Departnxts, 1775-1789 in J.EsoN (ed.), EsSAVS r; T lE CoNsTIUTIoNAL
HIsToRY oF THE UNITED STATES (1889) 116-85; ROGERS, THE Armracw.N SENATE (1926)
58-9.
11. See ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 45. Article III of the Articles of Con-
federation provided that the "said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friend-
ship with each other," but Article VI forbade the individual states to send or receive min-
isters from foreign governments or without Congress's consent to enter into any "conference,
agreement, alliance, or treaty" with such governments.
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ability of the existing federal government to enforce compliance by
the states with the provisions of international agreements. Indeed the
Virginia plan of a new Constitution, drafted it is believed primarily by
Madison and presented by.Randolph during the first week of active
deliberations in May 1787, contained no reference to the location of the
power to make treaties.1 2 The New Jersey plan, also presented in the
first weeks of the Convention, allotted the power to make treaties to
the unicameral Congress it proposed to establish."
There seems to have been no further discussion of the location of
the treaty-making power until August 6,14 when the Committee on
Detail reported to the Convention the first draft of the Constitution,"5
During the preceding months the Convention had been preoccupied
with its major practical problem, that of evolving a compromise be-
tween the representation theories of the large and the small, "the com-
mercial and the non-importing" states."5 .When the Committee on
Detail reported, the compromise plan had been developed of according
the states equal representation in the Senate, and of allocating voting
power in the House of Representatives on the basis of population. The
evidence indicates that the jealousy of the small states "made it in-
dispensable to give to the senators, as representatives of states, the
power of . . . ratifying treaties." 17 But when the Committee's pro-
posal for according the Senate exclusive control of the treaty-making
power came before the Convention for debate on August 23, almost
every speaker raised objections.'" The first general set of criticisms,
based in part upon the growing realization of the importance of estab-
lishing an independent and effective Executive, was directed to the
12. The plan is reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 20-3. As to the formulation of the
Virginia plan, see 3 id. at app. A, xv, xvi, xxxii, cccviii, ccclvi, ccclxLxxviii, cccxcii, cccxcvli,
cccci. Professor Farrand points out that the written draft of the plan was in Madison's
handwriting. 1 id. at 23, n. 16.
Even granting the assumption that the proponents of the Virginia draft intended the
power to make treaties to remain in Congress, it is impossible to tell whether one or both,
and if so which, house of Congress was intended to exercise this power.
13. The New Jersey plan is reprinted in 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 242-5.
14. Charles Pinckney's plan, presented on the same date as the Virginia plan but never
debated, proposed to establish a somewhat unique bicameral legislature and also proposed
that treaties be made by two-thirds vote of both houses. See 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, at
604-9. The Hamilton plan, which was not seriously considered, suggested that treaties be
made by the Executive with consent of the Senate majority. See 1 id. at 291; FARRAND,
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) 89. A number of other delegates also thought
the Executive should be authorized to make treaties. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 297.
15. 2 id. at 177.
16. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 62 (Hamilton or Madison); MCLAUGHLIN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY, cc. 13-15; FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) c. 7.
17. William Davie, who had been a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, speaking
before the North Carolina ratifying convention. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 120.
18. See Edmund Randolph's remarks quoted in 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 393.
[Vol, 54: 534
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exclusion of the President; 19 the second group of objections was based
upon the omission of the House from the treaty-maldng process. :3
Accordingly, the treaty clause 'was remitted to the Committee on Un-
finished Business, which proposed, on September 4, 1787, that "the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have
power to make treaties . . ." but that consent of two-thirds of the
Senate be required.
21
Twice the Pennsylvania delegates proposed that the House be asso-
ciated with the Senate in the ratification of treaties; both times the
proposal was defeated, with their state casting the only affirmative
ballot.22 While it was subsequently stated that exclusion of the House
was necessary to retain the adherence of the small states to the union,
-2 3
relatively few suggestions of this character were made at the Conven-
tion itself.2 4 However, the debates at both the Philadelphia and the
state conventions, as well as the subsequent comments of delegates,
clearly reveal that a compelling reason for exclusion of the House was
the belief that it was not suited to participate in the task then con-
templated for the Senate, that of participating equally with the President
in the detailed negotiation of treaties.25 As a sheer question of expediency,
it was felt that the House was too large to maintain the secrecy and
dispatch deemed requisite in negotiation. This point was emphasized
by Washington, by Hamilton and Jay in The Federalist, and by a great
number of delegates to the conventions. :G Thus Major Pierce Butler,
19. 2 id. at 392-4.
20. 2 id. at 394.
21. 2 id. at 498-9.
22. 2 id. at 392-4, 538. However, on the first vote on this question, the North Carolina
delegation vras evenly divided. A number of individual delegates from other states also
favored the Pennsylvania proposal.
23. See [Congressman Sol] BLOoI!, Tim TREATY- MAxING POWER (1944) 10; sp,-ch
cited supra note 17.
24. Butsee2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, at393.
25. The testimony of delegates to the Constitutional Convention clearly indicates the
intention of the draftsmen that the Senate participate equally with the President in the step-
by-step negotiation of treaties. See Hamilton's remarks in TaE FEDEmIST, No. 75;
Gen. Pinckney's remarks to the South Carolina ratifying convention, 3 FA,%nnA , REcon s,
at 250; Rufus King's speech in the Senate on Jan. 12, 118, 3 id. at 424. Madizon even
suggested that the Senate be permitted to make treaties of peace without the PrecIdent.
See 2 id. at 393-5.
Congress had actually superintended the negotiation of treaties under the Articl-s of
Confederation. See BEIs, A DIPLOsATIC HisToRY OF THE UNITED STATES (1942 ed.) 73-SO.
The circumstances under which President Washington found it necesmry to terminate the
practice of continuous consultation have been discussed in Part I, Section I. S-e a1o
HAYDEN, THE SENAT E AND TREATIES, 1789-1S17 (1920) cc. 1-2.
26. Thus Washington stated in a message to the House of Reprezentatives in 1796:
"The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of
making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate . .. ." 5 Atz-
NALs OF CONG. 760. The fluctuating membership of the House was another commonly
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who had been a member of the South Carolina contingent at the Phil-
adelphia gathering, declared at his state's ratifying convention:
"The House of Representatives was then named; but an insur-
mountable objection was made to this proposition-which was,
that -negotiations always required the greatest secrecy, which could
not be expected in a large body." 2
Another decisive reason for exclusion of the House, stemming from the
delegates' general distrust of democracy,2" was that the Representatives
were to be elected by direct suffrage, whereas the President was to be
chosen by the Electoral College and the Senate was to be chosen by the
state legislatures, and was expected by some to become a "second House
of Lords." 29 But this evidence does not prove that the Constitutional
Convention wished wholly to exclude the House from participation in
the control of the foreign relations of the United States. As Professor
Wright has stated, it proves only "that the Convention wished to make
it possible for the President to make treaties without submission to
the House." "
In determining the type of Senatorial majority which should be re-
quired to permit ratification of treaties, the Constitutional Convention
moved with a great deal of uncertainty. As previously indicated, the
Report of the Committee on Unfinished Business had proposed that a
two-thirds vote should be necessary." However, on September 7, the
stated reason for its exclusion from the treaty-making process and was especially emphasized
in THE FEDERALIST. For statements of delegates and contemporaries as to these and other
factors see 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 538; 3 id. at 250, 424; CRANDALL, TREATIES, at 61;
2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 505; 4 id. at 280; THE FEDERALIST, No. 64 (Jay) and No. 75 (Hamil-
ton).
27. Quoted in BLOOM, op. cit. supra note 23, at 12.
28. The most persuasive statement of the reasons for keeping the treaty power out of
popular control was made by Jay in THE FEDERALIST, No. 64. The record of the debates at
the Constitutional Convention are replete with statements indicative of the anti-Democratic
feelings of many of the delegates. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 426-8; ROGERS, TUE
AMERICAN SENATE (1926) 17-18. For discussions of this aspect of the Constitution by
recent scholars see BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TIl
UNITED STATES (1935 ed.); SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1922)
c. 4; ROGERS, supra at 17-18.
29. Delegate Dickinson, who introduced the resolution providing for indirect designa-
tion of Senators, quoted in ROGERS, op. cit. supra note 28, at 17-18. Gouverneur Morris
hoped "that the Senate will show us the might of aristocracy." Quoted in FORD, THI: RIss
AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1898) 53. Under Article I, Section 3, paragraph 1
of the Constitution, the Senators were to be selected by the state legislatures; it was not
until 1913 that the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted providing for direct election of the
members of the upper house. The expectations of the draftsmen as to the manner in which
the Electoral College would screen out popular sentiment in the selection of the President
are outlined in Part I, Section IV.
30. Wright, The United States and International Agreements (1944) 38 AM. J. INT, L.
341,350. See Part I, Section III, for fuller discussion.
31. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 498.
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Convention adopted Madison's proposal that treaties of peace should
require assent of a mere majority of the Senate; 32 the very next day,
the amendment was struck out by exactly the same margin by which
it had previously been adopted! , On September 8, the Convention
also considered a variety of proposals for changing the general require-
ments for treaty approval, defeating, inter alia, suggestions that assent
of two-thirds of the whole Senate or two-thirds of an enlarged quorum
be required.34 The shaky, foundations of the present two-thirds rule
are best indicated by the fact that Roger Sherman's motion during the
last week of the Convention that treaties require only approval of
"a majority of the whole number" (of the Senate) was defeated only
by a 6-5 vote.35 Thereafter, the delegates, evidently "growing tired," 1
finally accepted the two-thirds rule.Y As Professor Fleming has ob-
served:
"The change of one state delegation, probably of one man in a
divided .delegation, would have given us this provision instead of
the two-thirds vote, and we should have revered that arrangement
as an expression of the Convention's great wisdom instead of
looking up to its inspired action in fixing the higher majority." -
Historians have expounded a variety of theses to explain the ultimate
retention of the two-thirds rule. Thus Mr. Charles Warren has sug-
gested that the Southern states insisted upon this undemocratic limita-
tion to prevent the New England and Middle Atlantic states from
surrendering their claim to navigate the Mississippi to its mouth."
Mr. Varren's thesis as to the intention of the Framers is primarily
based on excerpts from the debates at ratifying conventions 11 and
32. 2 id. at 540. The Convention, however, rejected another proposal by Madizon
-that affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senate would suffice to make a treaty of pvace
"without concurrence of the President." 2 id. at 540-1.
33. 2 id. at 544.
34. 2 id. at 549.
35. Ibid.
36. FARRAND, THm FRAmoxG o THm CoNSTrruTION (1913) 171.
37. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, at 550.
38. FLE.rNG, THE TREATY VETO OF THE A- Rnciau SENATE (1930) 306. Ale, ander
Hamilton, the only New York delegate then in attendance at the se-ions, did not vote on
any of these proposals dealing with the Senatorial vote. As previously indicated (supra,
note 14), Hamilton had indicated his belief that majority approval by the Senate should
suffice.
39. Warren, The Mississippi Rirer and the Treaty Clause of the Constitulion (1934) 2
GFO. WAsH. L. REv. 271.
40. Unquestionably a large number of delegates to the ratifying conventions coming
from the western portions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania argued that even
the two-thirds rule was insufficient protection against the possibility of cezsion of diputed
land to the Indians or surrender of navigation rights on the lower Miezissippi. S- MCMA.s-
TER AND STONE (eds.), PEmmsmv.IA A.,D THE FEDErLL Cornvm "rION (1S) 476; 3 ELLIor,
DEBATES, at 151-2, 239-40, 311-2, 333-66. BEtaS, Pi=CiEy's TRETY (1926) 173. But
19451
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other extrinsic material as to the importance of the dispute over navi-
gation of the Mississippi; the records of the Constitutional Convention
are inconclusive as to the validity of this interpretation. 4 Moreover, it
is difficult to reconcile this thesis with the position taken by Madison
and Jefferson in the mid-1790s-when interest in navigation of the
Mississippi had greatly increased-that commercial arrangements
with other nations should be made only by both houses of Congress and
by majority vote.42 Other writers have suggested that the desire of the
New England states to ensure protection of their claim to fishing rights
off the Newfoundland coast or of those states with unsettled western
frontiers to prevent ratification of over-generous Indian treaties were
sectional interests which impelled retention of the two-thirds rule. 3
More recently Professor Borchard has made the wholly novel sugges-
tion that the "desire of the small states to prevent imposition of treaties
by a mere majority" was an important factor underlying the two-
thirds requirement. 44 For these suggestions the records of the Federal
Convention are devoid of supporting evidence.
An instructive yardstick of the plausibility of the speculations that
the Convention was motivated by an insistence on protection of small
few delegates from these portions of the country were present at the Constitutional Con-
vention.
George Washington commented on these Cassandrish objections made at the ratifying
conventions in unwontedly strong language:
"... every art that could inflame the p~sions or touch the interests of men
has been essayed. The ignorant have been told that should the proposed Govern-
ment obtain, their lands would be taken from them and their property disposed of.
And all ranks are informed that the prohibition of the navigation of the Mississippi
(their favorite object) will be a certain consequence .... "
Washington to General Lincoln, April 2, 1788, quoted in Warren, supra note 39, at 297.
41. The only delegate who is reported in Farrand's records of the debates at the Con-
stitutional Convention as directly discussing the relation of the Mississippi and fisheries
convention to the treaties clause is Gouverneur Morris, and it is difficult to tell whether le
thought the two-thirds requirement would in the long run afford more or less protection
to these sectional interests. See 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, at 548. There was, however, further
discussion of these sectional interests during the protracted debate on the basis of representa-
tion in Congress.
Subsequently Delegate Williamson of North Carolina recollected that protection of the
right to navigate the Mississippi had been presented as one reason for insistence on a two-
thirds requirement. 3 id. at 306-7; 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1905)
677--8. George Mason (who campaigned against adoption of the Constitution) subsequently
asserted that the desire to protect the fisheries also impelled adoption of the two-thirds rule.
3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 604.
42. See Part I, pp. 236, 238-9.
43. See McClendon, Origin of the Two-Thirds Rule in Senate Action Upon Treaties
(1931) 36 Am. HIST. REv. 768; WHITAKER, THE SPANISH-AmERICAN FRONTIER, 1783-1795
(1927) 123-6; Tansill, The Treaty-Making Powers of the Senate (1924) 18 AM. J. INT. L. 459.
44. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 666. It is a little hard to see why, in a body
where the states %Were qually represented, the small states needed protection against a
"mere majority" any more than did their larger neighbors.
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states or protection of sectional interests against the possibility of
untoward action by an inconsiderate majority may be furnished by
the record of votes on Roger Sherman's proposal to permit assent to
treaties by a majority veto; 15 for every one of the five states which
supported the majority vote proposal should, in light of one or another
of these theories, have "protected" itself by holding out for a two-
thirds requirement. Connecticut (which sponsored the proposal) and
Delaware, two of the most active states in the small-state bloc,' voted
in favor of rule by a "mere majority," as did Massachusetts, which
had the largest interest in the fisheries question. South Carolina and
Georgia, both possessing frontier areas with unascertained Indian
frontiers and interests in navigation of the Mississippi, supported the
proposal for majority control, whereas New Hampshire and Maryland,
which had no western lands, took the opposite position. ! 7
In all this darkness, it is obviously difficult to assay the exact extent
to which transient sectional considerations may have been persuasive
in the framing of the treaty-making clause. There is, however, one
conclusion it seems safe to draw, and that is the conclusion of Mr. War-
ren that no justification of the two-thirds rule was ever put forth in
terms of political principle. 41 Mr. Warren has recently stated:
"You will search the debates on the Constitution relative to the
insertion of the two-thirds clause, and you will search them in vain
to find any political theory on which the two-thirds clause vms
founded." 49
He adds,
"In other words, there being in the debate no suggestion that
this two-thirds provision was based on any political theory of gov-
ernment, and no suggestion as to underlying reasons based on
political conditions except that of Gerry [protection of fisheries]-
you are left entirely free to adopt your own theory as to why it was
put in, because no citations of Madison's Debates will stand up as
a foundation for the argument either for or against it. I have seen
many statements in books and articles and so forth that the two-
thirds provision was based on this or that theory, or on this or that
theory of government, but you will find no such in Madison's
Debates." -1
45. 2 FAR-AND, REcoRDs, at 549.
46. See IADISON, DEBATES, at 101-2.
47. See Warren, supra note 39, at 285, 287, 291,295.
48. Warren, supra note 39, at 272. In his concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
19 How. 393, 526 (U. S. 1857), Mr. Justice Catron said: "The Constitution was framcd in
reference to facts then existing or likely to arise: the instrument looked to no theorie3 of
Government."
49. Judiciary Committee Hearings at 81.
50. Id. at S6.
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Despite Mr. Warren's caution, it seems safe also to infer that one
contributing factor to the rigidity of the clause may have been a desire
of the delegates-doubtless in a temporary mood of isolationism en-
gendered by surviving war-weariness-to minimize the number of
treaties that the new government might make. 1 Thus Gouverneur
Morris declared that "In general he was not solicitous to multiply and
facilitate treaties," 12 and James Madison concluded that "it had been
too easy .".. to make treaties" under the existing government. 1 It
only adds to the paradox and to the mystery of "real intent" to recall
that at the same time these draftsmen inserted language into the Con
stitution capable of being construed, as Madison and Jefferson were
shortly to argue, to authorize the consummation of agreements by
means less difficult than the treaty-making procedure.4
The Contemporary Irrelevance of Disputes Far Off and Long Ago.
The hard-headed statesmen who met at Philadelphia in 1787 were
concerned with the practical problem of devising a scheme of govern-
ment that could unify a disorganized country. Coming from states
separated by difficult physical barriers,"6 jealous of their own govern-
mental prerogatives,"6 and with economies which in many cases had
not yet developed a substantial degree of interdependence, they neces-
sarily 'vrote a Constitution which was "a bundle of compromises." 67
51. See HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY TEe SENATE (1933) 10-11; FOSTER, PRACTICE
OF DIPLOACY (1906) 263.
52. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, at 393. See also Rufus King's remarks in the United States
Senate on Jan. 12, 1818. 3 id. at 424.
53. 2 id. at 548. By 1787, the United States during eleven years of independence
had entered into the enormous total of fifteen treaties. 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, at ix. For
contemporaneous statements, akin to those of Morris and Madison, see 4 VRITINGS OF
SAMUEL ADAMS (Cushing, ed., 1908) 281; 8 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS (C. F. Adams, ed., 1853)
37; 2 ROWLAND, LIFE OF GEORGE MASON (1892) 47.
54. See Part I, Section III. See also 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 488, 580, 625, 778 (4th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1796). During the same debate, Congressman Holland of North Carolina,
who had been a delegate to the ratifying convention in his state, said that the Constitution
had been adopted therein only on the express understanding that the treaty-making power
was restricted in the case of commercial agreements by the grant of authority to Congress
to control foreign commerce. Id. at 546.
55. In 1787 it took four days to travel from Boston to New York City or Albany, five
days to Philadelphia or Maine, seven days to Baltimore, eleven to Pittsburgh or North
Carolina, eighteen to Georgia. See STALEY, WORLD ECONOMY IN TRANSITION (1939) 11-12,
. 56. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, at 120; letters by George Washington, quoted in Warren,
supra note 39, at 271,297.
57. 1 BEARD, RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1927) 317. The authors further c ar-
acterized the Constitution, as "a mosaic of second choices." Ibid. Professor Farrand has
commented: "Our Constitution was a practical piece of work for very practical purposes.
It arose from the necessity of existing conditions. It was designed to meet certain specific
needs." Farrand, The Federal Constitution and the Defects of the Confederation (1908) 2
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 532, 543.
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The great aim of the Framers-"to make our states one as to all
foreign concerns" ',-has become increasingly important in the past
150 years. There is no longer any political necessity to hamper its
complete attainment by deference to a minority veto by one house of
the Congress over international agreements. The geographical isola-
tion, the jealousies, and the separatist movements of 1787 are now of
significance only to historians or to those who seek to convert the Con-
stitution into a Procustean bed. "The dead cannot bind the living."
Even if it be assumed, contrary to the known facts, that there was no
confusion among the Framers about the treaty-making clause, we are
unworthy of our heritage as free Americans unless we are willing to
reassay its utility in light of the political and economic necessities and
ideas of our own time. Long ago Jefferson wrote:
"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence,
and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom
more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amend-
ment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it.
It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but
without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience
in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they
would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. . . . Let
us . . . avail ourselves of our reason and experience, to correct the
crude essays of our first and unexperienced, although wise, vir-
tuous, and well-meaning councils." 11
Considered in this spirit, the most significant fact about the motives
which are supposed to have impelled the Framers to exclude the House
of Representatives from the treaty-making process and to require the
Senate to give its consent by a two-thirds majority is that none of them
have any validity today; most indeed were outmoded within fifty years
after the drafting of the Constitution.
1. The Exclusion of the House. Three of the four possible reasons for
establishing a procedure whereby international agreements could be
made without reference to the House--the necessity for secrecy and
speed, the short term of its members, and the fluctuating membership
of the body-are admitted to be without significance even by so stal-
wart a critic of "recent trends" as Professor Borchard. 9 The increase
58. Letter from Jefferson to Washington, Aug. 14, 1737, quoted in VARrEN, THE
MAKING OF THE CONS'rrUTION (1937) 451.
59. Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, IS WNr os oF Tao!s JEF r=Eon
(Library ed. 1904) 40-2.
60. Borchard, Executire Agreements, at 666; see also BLOOU, op. cil. supra note 23,
at 10-13.
The suggestion by Professor Borchard, in Execulire Agreemenis at 633, that a majority
vote of both houses might be more difficult to obtain than a two-thirds vote of the Senate
is not only inconsistent with his major position as to the desirability of maling it difficult
to effect international agreements, but is a dubious prophecy, based on questionable history.
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in the size of the Senate to a point where it includes almost twice as
many members as did the House in 1789 and the abrogation by George
Washington of the Senate's role as an executive council guiding the
conduct of negotiations have invalidated these considerations.
It is equally difficult to see how it can reasonably be asserted in 1945
that the fourth alleged reason-the jealousy of the small states and
their resistance to an electoral system based on population-has not
also lost its meaning. The jealousies born of quondam new independ-
ence have been merged by a century and a half of national history into a
realization of the basic and irrevocable mutuality of international
interests. The small states as such have no group interest in foreign
affairs distinguishable from those of their larger neighbors. The in-
terests of Delaware, for example, would be difficult to distinguish from
those of Pennsylvania, and the interests of Nevada from those of
California.6 1 The Nazi-Japanese aggressors threatened the freedom
and safety of all Americans, and not merely those living in the "large"
states.
2. The Two-Thirds Rule. If, as distinguished scholars have con-
cluded, transient sectional economic interests, and particularly the
Mississippi Valley controversy, were among the principal reasons for
the original inclusion of a two-thirds requirement in the treaty clause,
these specific problems have long since been settled. The more signif-
icant fact is that the United States-which in 1787 was a loose con-
federation of states, rife with sectional secession movements 01-has
with the passage of time become welded into a unified nation, the
separate geographical regions of which are increasingly interdependent
upon each other and upon the welfare of the whole nation for the
achievement of all of the values of their people. While there are un-
doubtedly economic and social questions upon which sectional points
of view may conflict, it is difficult to see how these can safely be al-
lowed to prevent the integration of a foreign policy in the interest of
the whole nation. As Mr. Justice Field said sixty years ago:
"For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we
are but one people, one nation, one power." 63
61. What is said with respect to sectionalism in the discussion of the two.thirds rule
below is obviously equally applicable to the "small" states.
It is not without relevance that Professor Borchard has himself suggested, in attempting
to refute figures "designed to show that a small minority of Senators from the populous
states could block a large majority of Senators from the less populous states [sic]," that
"Senators rarely cast their votes according to the size of their states." Borchard, The Two-
Thirds Rule as to Tratlies: A Change Opposed (1945) 3 EcoN. COUNCIL PAPERS, No. 8, p. 5.
62. See WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1937) 3-54.
63. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 606 (1889). In Cohenrs v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 413-4 (U. S. 1821), Chief Justice Marshall took the same position:
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It may be worthwhile to explore in some detail just what is involved
in the suggestion that there are still sectional interests in the country
that deserve special protection from the formulation of foreign policy
for the whole nation by majority willY4 The first difficult question is
whether all sectional interests or just some sectional interests are to
be given this special protection. If all sectional interests, however
short-run or however dangerous to the rest of the country, are to be
protected, the result is complete disintegration of national policy. As
Gouverneur Morris long ago warned the Constitutional Convention,
there "can be no end of demands for sicurity if every particular interest
is to be entitled to it." 11 If only some sectional interests are to be pro-
tected, the problem is to achieve a criterion of selection. The only
defensible criterion, other than sheer power, is the public interest,
which again comes back to the national interest. If the alternative of
sheer power is adopted,66 what begins as mere protection of sectional
interests is transmuted into determination of national policy without
appropriate regard for the national interest. It is obvious that a nega-
tive decision on behalf of a single section may have the effect of pre-
cluding a positive policy on behalf of the whole nation; in most in-
stances, we either join a particular international organization or enter
into a particular agreement or we do not. Those proponents of a
minority veto for sectional interests who have a real regard for the
national interest are therefore confronted with an irremovable dilemma.
A second question, which takes the sting from this dilemma for those
who have a real regard for sectional interests, is why it should be
assumed that sectional interests require any more protection from
governmental action which includes the making of an international
agreement than from governmental action which does not. The events
that make up our "foreign affairs" or "foreign relations," the domain
in which international agreement operates, and our "domestic affairs"
are but interdependent, and often indistinguishable, parts of the total
process of institutional activities by which the people of the United
"In war we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all com-
mercial regulations, we are one and the same people. . . . America has chosen to
be . . . a nation."
See also Theodore Roosevelt's remarks: "...little permanent good can be done by any
party which worships the States' rights fetish or which fails to regard the State, lile the
county or the municipality, as merely a convenient unit for local self-government, while in
all national matters, of importance to the wbole people, the nation is to be supreme over
state, country, and town alike." ROOSEVELT, AtrronmiGorra (1925) 397.
64. This appears to be the real meaning of Professor Borchard's suggetion that "the
desire of the small states to prevent imposition of treaties by a mere majority"- still "retains
its cogency." It has been seen that a "small" state, as such, requires no more protection
from a majority than a "large" state.
65. 1 FARRAND, REcoRDs, at 604.
66. It needs no emphasis that the use of sectional power, without regard for the national
interest, could lead to destruction of the nation.
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States pursue all their valus.6 'The effects of "foreign policy" and of
"domestic policy" on any problem of importance are today hopelessly
intermingled. It is a fundamental principle of our government that a
simple majority of both houses of the Congress should suffice for deci-
sion on "domestic matters"-as, for example, the regulation of trans-
portation and the development of drainage basins-which have at
least as great an import for peculiar sectional interests as intergovern-
mental agreements. Were this not the case, the Federal Government
would soon be reduced to impotence, and a state of anarchy akin to
that which existed in the 1780s would prevail. Just how is it that sec-
tional interests require that the making of policy for international
agreements be distinguished from the making of policy for domestic
affairs, and justify an exceptional, undemocratic majority for the
former only? In defending retention of the present treaty clause,
Professor Borchard has recently suggested that "The westein states,
for example, would hardly expose themselves to a mere majority vote
on oriental immigration." "I But, as everyone knows, the western states
are in fact exposed to this "danger" in the form of general immigration
statutes every time the Congress meets.
One may even question the major premise that there are in this
country any sectional interests in international affairs that in the long
run differ from the interests of the whole nation. Any one section of the
country is as much interested as any other in the preservation of our
national independence from external encroachment and in the estab-
lishment of a community order capable of preventing crises from aris-
ing that may precipitate attacks upon our security; when our security
system breaks down, every section of the country is put to work, and
men are drafted from every section of the country, to repair the breach.
Any one section of the country is as much interested as any other in the
maintenance of full production, employment, and consumption and in
preventing world-wide economic depression, with its consequent im-
poverishment of our national standard of living. Even where some one
section of the country is more interested than any other section in the
price of a particular commodity, the price of that commodity is de-
pendent upon all the factors which make up demand, and these factors
in turn are ultimately dependent, if the commodity is of any impor-
tance, upon the whole economy of the nation. What can thus be shown
of the interdependence of all our sections with respect to security and
economic prosperity in the formulation and effects of foreign policy
could equally well be shown with respect to all our other major in-
terests. For the long-run achievement of its total values in our inter-
67. Compare the views of Jessup in Judiciary Committee Hearings at 122.
68. Should Treaties Be Ratified by a Majority of Both Houses? (1944) 10 TowN MEETING
BULLETIN, No. 25, p. 13.
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national affairs, any one section of our country is wholly dependent
upon a similar achievement by every other section.
It should need no argument, finally, that, even if there are in this
country sectional interests in international affairs that conflict with
the over-all national interest, it is the national interest-as determined
by national vote, without undue loading of the votes of any section or
minority-that must prevail. Even if the transient interests of some
particular section do not depend upon the long-term interests of the
nation, the nation can only weigh such interests from a national point
of view, without giving them special priority by the two-thirds rule or
otherwise, over the equal interests of other sections. The simple fact
is that a foreign policy for the whole nation must be determined in the
interests of the whole nation and not in terms of a short-run interest
of one of its parts. Under contemporary world conditions, any other
choice can only mean national suicide.
Similar disposition can be made of the other major factor which is
believed to have contributed to the two-thirds rule, the desire of the
Framers in 1787 19 to minimize the international contacts of the emer-
gent Republic. The pervasiveness of this motive is indicated by John
Adams' contemporaneous suggestion that the foreign service be
abolished completely or greatly reduced in size.70 This short-lived
isolationist agoraphobia was undoubtedly bred in large measure--
compare the fears and policies of another new State, Soviet Russia,
during the 1920s-by a desire to prevent the great powers of Europe
from interfering in the domestic politics of the then weak nation.7
Even as applied to their own age, the transient belief of the Framers
in 1787 that it was possible for the United States to live apart from the
rest of the world was tinged with a large measure of wilful amnesia
and was soon to be thoroughly belied by the trend of events. It has
been our habit, perhaps in an excess of national pride, to gloss over the
fact that the Revolution itself was part of a general war, in which
France, Spain, and the Netherlands joined in fighting against the
English, and in which the free use of British sea power was hindered
by the League of Armed Neutrality, comprising six other continental
States. 72 During the course of the Revolution, moreover, the Con-
tinental Congress consummated a full-fledged alliance with France 13
and sought to make additional alliances with Spain, the Netherlands,
69. Seesupra, p. 544.
70. See 8 WoRKs OF JoHw ADA.xs (C. F. Adams, ed., 1853) 37.
71. The consideration the Framers gave to this problem is indicated by Tm: Frursu.-
isT, Nos. 5 and 68; see BAILEY, DIPLOI.ATIc HISTORY, at 57-8, 73-SO, for evidence as to the
validity of these fears.
72. See 1 MoRIsoN AND COMIAGER, TmE GRowTr OF THE AmrICAN REiru c
(3d ed. 1942) 218; BEtas, A DimLOm.tATIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1942 ed.) 29-44.
73. 2 MMLER, TREATIES, at 35.
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Prussia, Austria and other States. 74 Indeed, the preliminary peace
agreement with England contained a clause tha a permanent treaty
would not go into effect until the cessation of hostilities between
England and France; 11 the definitive treaties between the belliger-
ents were all signed on the same day.
7
Nor was the nascent Republic able to steer clear of the "vicissitudes"
of European politics. Nine years after the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, we were engaged in an undeclared naval war with France; 71 in
1801, Jefferson initiated a naval war with Tripoli; 78 a scant 11 years
later, we were engaged in a second full-fledged war with England. 79
Indeed, our early statesmen realized, shortly after the formation of
the Union, the futility of any simplified notion that the United States
could or should forever abjure "entangling alliances." In his Farewell
Address, Washington, while advising against the formation of perma-
nent alliances, indicated the desirability of respecting the existing
commitments to France.8" He concluded his discussion of the subject
with the oft-forgotten reminder: "Taking care always to keep ourselves
by suitable establishments on respectable defensive posture, we may
safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." 81
A similar practical empiricism guided Jefferson. In letters to friends
during the early 1800s he warned that the United States could not
permit Napoleon to dominate Europe and that we might have to send
an army overseas if this contingency seemed likely to eventuate.82 Such
declarations of policy, to which were coupled a frank acknowledgment
of his error in previously believing that the United States could remain
at peace whatever the trend of politics elsewhere,83 were climaxed in
74. See BEmIS, op. cit. supra note 72, at 34, 41-2. See also the "Act Separate and
Secret," annexed to the Franco-American Alliance Treaty of February 6, 1778 to permit
Spanish accession thereto, which was ratified by the Continental Congress. 2 MILLER,
TREATIES, at 47.
75. 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at 96.
76. See BEMIS, op. cit. supra note 72, at 60-2; see also 2 MILLER, TREATIES, at 112.
77. See 1 STAT. 561 (1798); 1 STAT. 572 (1798); 1 STAT. 574 (1798); 1 STAT. 709 (1799);
ALLEN, OUR NAVAL WAR WITH FRANCE (1909).
78. See 3 MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF TEE UNITED STATES (1928) 201
el seg.; 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 326; 2 STAT. 129 (1802).
79. Recent historians have swung away from the view of the 1920s that the War of 1812
was entirely or primarily caused by a desire to conquer Canada, and returned to the older
thesis that the casus belli was in large measure grievances resulting from British maritime
policy during the Napoleonic wars. See Goodman, The Origins of the War of 1812: A Stin-ey
of Changing Interpretations (1941) 28 MIss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 171; BURT, THE UNITED
STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND BRITISH NORTH AMERICA (1940) cc. 11-13.
80. 1 RIcHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 213,221-3.
81. Id.at:223.
82. Letter to General Kosciusko, Feb. 26, 1810, 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
(Library ed. 1904) 365-9; letter to Thomas Leiper, Jan. 1, 1814, 14 id. at 41, 43-5; see also
letter tA Rnhprt Livingston, quoted in LIPPMANN, U. S. FOREIGN POLICY (1943) 63-4.
83. "1 had [in 1804] persuaded myself that a nation, distant as we are from the conten-
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1823 when Jefferson advised President Monroe to make "a concert, by
agreement" with England to prevent Spain or the Holy Alliance from
interfering in Latin America.
S4
Confronted then with the practical necessity of shifting alignments
expeditiously in a kaleidoscopic world, the early Presidents soon found
it impossible, as has previously been indicated, to continue to treat the
Senate as an active advisory council in the conduct of international
affairs and the negotiation of treaties. The belief that the government
under the Articles of Confederation had consummated too many
treaties was discarded at the same time as the Senate's function was
transmuted from an executive to a legislative role, by men who had
been leading participants at the Constitutional Convention."
It needs no elaborate demonstration that, however wise the Fathers'
original desires "to live alone and like it" may have been in 1789, in the
age of the robot bomb and world economic interdependence, isolation-
ism is bankrupt as a guide to policy. Even persons who disagree vio-
lently as to the nature of the foreign policy to be pursued by the United
States agree on this.-" Having engaged in two World Wars in 25 years,
the United- States is not likely to decline once again to participate in
making the political and economic decisions -which can help prevent the
recurrence of such wars.
It is sometimes suggested that, though the "originating causes" of
tions of Europe, avoiding all offences to other powers, and not over-hasty in rezenting offence
from them, doing justice to all, faithfully fulfilling the duties of neutrality, p?rforming all
offices of amity, and administering to their interests by the benefits of our commerce, that
such a nation, I say, might expect to live in peace, and consider itself merely as a member of
the great family of mankind; that in such case it might devote itself to whatever it could
best produce, secure of a peaceable exchange of surplus for what could be more advanta-
geously furnished by others, as takes place between one county and another in France. But
experience has shown that continued peace depends not merely on our own justice and
prudence, but on that of others also." Letter to Say, March 2, 1815. 14 WnrTInGs or
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Library ed. 1904) 258-9.
84. The quoted phrase was originally used in Monroe's letter to Jefferson and Madizon,
Oct. 17, 1823, requesting advice as to whether to accept the English Prime Minister Can-
ning's suggestion to issue a joint declaration against European intervention in Latin Amer-
ica. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE (Hamilton, ed., 1902) 323-S. Jefferson's answer, the
burden of which is contained in the instant text, is reprinted in 1S WrzITINs or Triomts
JEFFERSON (Library ed. 1904) 477-80; Madison's answer is reprinted in 6 "Ynxz.s;Gs Or
JAuEs MONROE (Hamilton, ed., 1902) 394. However, Monroe, on the advice of his Sceretary
of State, John Quincy Adams, decided to issue the announcement on his own. See Pcnrj.n.s,
HANDS OFF: A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DocTmxxm (1941) 41-50. Yet it was clear that, as a
practical matter, we had entered into an unstated partial alliance with England to protect
Latin America. See LIppN N, op. cit. supra note 82, at 16-20.
85. President Washington and Edmund Randolph, who was Secretary of State in 1794,
when the Senate's role began to be actively transmuted, had both been delegates to the Con-
stitutional Convention.
86. See BEARD, THE OPEN DOOR AT HOur. (1934) c. 12; Vandenberg, I.t's Try to Pre-
rent WorM War III, Saturday Evening Post, March 17, 1945, p. 17.
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the treaty-making procedure have disappeared, there are "many new
reasons," 87 such as "the recent unprecedented inflation of executive
power" m or the dangers of "secret diplomacy," 19 which justify its
retention. These arguments appear to be rooted in a simple failure to
differentiate between the two principal classes of executive agree-
ments: those perfected by the President on his own responsibility, and
those made in pursuance of Congressional authorization. The Con-
stitution of the United States is, fortunately, sufficiently flexible that
it presents no necessity for choosing- between the Scylla of a foreign
policy dominated by a Senatorial minority and the Chaiybdis of simple
Presidential agreements. It offers a third and thoroughly democratic
alternative: the Congressional-Executive agreement, eliminating both
the possibility of arbitrary, injudicious or secret action and the dis-
integrating effects of minority obstructionism. In view of this alterna-
tive, it is clear that those who seek to stigmatize the executive agree-
ment by vague reference to the dangers of unchecked executive power 01
or to "secret diplomacy" 91 are invoking the flimsiest of bogeymen in
their attempt to perpetuate minority control. 2 No one believes that
87. Borchard, Book Review (1944) 4LAWYERS GUILD REv. 59, 60.
88. See Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 666-7; GIBSON, Tur ROAD TO FOREIGN
POLICY (1944) c. 12.
89. See MATEWS, AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1938) 545-6; Borchard,
Executit,e Agreements, at 677-8.
90. Moreover, it should be noted that the recent "inflation of executive power" in the
field of foreign relations has been an inevitable product of the war. Independent action by
the President and widespread delegation of power to the President have been found through-
out our history to be indispensable to the successful prosecution of war. See RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926); BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE Exa-
CUTIVE (1921).
91. Even as applied to direct Presidential agreements, the possibilities of "secret
diplomacy" are greatly exaggerated. The necessity for securing the consent of Congress in
order to secure needed funds is an effective check on the executive's ability to make impor-
tant commitments. Professor Borchard cites, inter alia, the secret clause attached to the
Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 and various recent military defehse and armistice agree-
ments. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 677-8. In the case of the first-named "agree-
ment," neither of the participants, as has previously been in~licated, considered that
anything more than an exchange of diplomatic views had taken place. The agreement, more-
over, was a desperate effort by the United States to preserve the status quo in China, at a
time when its energies were unavoidably centered in other directions. See GRISWOLD, FAR
EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1941) cc. 5, 6. As to defense agreements, the basic
nature of the Canadian-American defense arrangement of 1940 was publicly revealed. See
N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1940, p. 1, col. 3, and Aug. 20, 1940, p. 1, col. 1; (1940) 3 DEr'T oF
STATE BULL., No. 61, p. 154. No person concerned with the security of this continent could
reasonably expect that the details of the military arrangements should have been publicized
for the edification of the German and Japanese general staffs. Similarly, it would be un-
reasonable to expect that armistice or other military agreements made with regard to active
war zones during the continuance of combat should be publicly disclosed.
92. There have been several occasions when secret clauses were included in treaties
although only one (with the Creek Indians in 1790) has survived the Senate. See 1 MILLER,
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secret agreements-except to the extent necessitated by war-time
exigencies-are desirable, but debate in the House of Representatives
can only be an additional safeguard afid provide public education of
the highest value.
The atrophy, finally, of two major assumptions, under which the
Framers labored in creating the treaty-making procedure, conclusively
removes the last possible defense of minority control. The Framers
assumed, in the first place, as several times pointed out, that the
Senate would participate equally with the President in the active di-
rection of all negotiations and all aspects of foreign policy; 13 under
these conditions, the possibilities of conflict were greatly ameliorated.
Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration made great strides towards
cooperation with Congress, best evidenced by the slate of delegates to
the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations.94 But no admin-
istration since the time of George Washington has been able to make
the Senate a full partner; it is nothing short of fantastic to assume that
the control of foreign relations could in fact be shared equally by 97
men. The Framers assumed, in the second place, that a government of
national union, such as that which was in control of the executive
branch in Vashington's first term, would be the general rule. But under
current and probable future conditions, as former Senator Gillette has
pointed out, it is tempting fate a trifle overmuch to allow a minority,
a third plus one of the Senate, to dominate foreign policy.05 Indeed,
when the House is recognized, as it must be today, as an active par-
ticipant in foreign policy, and when most important decisions must be
made by the whole Congress, there is, as Madison pointed out long
ago, no reason at all for requiring an additional two-thirds vote of the
Senate.96
The Record of Minority Control Examined.
In a recent article opposing amendment of the Constitution to
eliminate the two-thirds rule for the approval of treaties, Professor
TREATIES, at 20. However, the proceedings of the Senate when considering treaties in e ecu-
tive session were long conducted in secrecy. See HOLT, TmATIEs DEFEATrD nD rn Sn A'xnA
(1933) passim. The Senate rules still permit secret sessions. Senate Standing Rules, Nos.
=V-=71V1, SEN. Doc. No. 25S, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 39-42. These are some-
times still held. See ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 782-3. As the Framers of the
Constitution recognized, the possibilities of secret treatment are obviously greatly reduced
when the House joins in the process.
93. See Part I, pp. 207-3, 304. See also supra pp. 539-540.
94. Similarly, Congressmen were members of the United States delegations to the
Chapultepec Conference, the Bretton Woods MAonetary Conference, and the 1944 Philadel-
phia International Labor Organization Conference.
95. S9 CONG. REC. 10597 (1943).
96. 6 VRITINGS OF J.WES MADISON (Hunt, ed., 1906) 146.
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Borchard has taken the position that "it is not possible to prove that
the Senatorial check has not on the -vhole operated to the country's
advantage." 17 Unless the people of the United States are prepared to
reject democracy as a governmental philosophy, it is patent that this
double-negative formulation of the issues represents an unpersuasive
attempt to shift the burden of proof. In a democracy the retention of
minority control over any aspect of legislation-domestic or inter-
national-would appear prima facie to be an aberration justifiable
only by the presence of special factors making majority control dan-
gerous or unwise. The burden of proof is upon the acolytes of con-
tinued minority control to demonstrate that the interests of the Amer-
ican people would be so adversely affected by elimination of the
two-thirds rule in the making of treaties that its retention, however
repugnant on grounds of principle, is pragmatically justifiable.
When we turn to the record of exercise of the Senatorial prerogative,
the extraordinary burden of proof confronting defenders of the two-
thirds rule readily becomes apparent. Professor Borchard's argument
for the retention of minority control is largely based upon a summary
by Professor Dangerfield that, up to 1928, only 15 treaties had been
"rejected by the Senate." 58 This figure includes, however, only those
treaties which the Senate returned to the President as rejected by
formal vote. 9 It fails to include treaties defeated because of the failure
of the Senate to take final action thereon, or even treaties which were
not returned to the President after final rejection. 0 Professor Danger-
97. Borchard, Against the Proposed Amendment as to the Ratification of Treaties (1944)
30 A. B. A. J. 608, 609.
98. Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 664. Professor Borchard mentions that the
Senate had failed to act on many treaties, but apparently does not regard this as actual
rejection. See id. at 664, n. 2.
It is scarcely necessary to insist that the Senate must stamp the word "rejected" on
treaties before one can conclude that it has prevented their ratification. A persuasive
analogy to the Senate's veto by inaction is furnished by consideration of the dual devices
available to the President for forestalling adoption of disliked legislation. Under Article I,
Section 7 of the Constitution, the President may either veto bills formally or, assuming they
are adopted within ten days of the close of a Congressional session, merely fail to sign them.
Although the President takes no affirmative action in the latter case, it is perfectly clear
that he has equally effectively prevented enactment of the legislation in question; this is
well indicated by the popular description of the process as the "pocket veto." See ANDER-
SON, AMERICAN (JVERNMENT (1938) 570-1.
99. DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE (1933) 256.
100. Under this classification, a treaty which repeatedly fails to secure a two-thirds
majority, but which is never ordered returned to the President is presumably regarded as
residing in a perpetual state of immanent being. This contingency has occurred with some
frequency, since under the Senate rules a majority vote is required to secure the return of a
treaty to the President. The simple majority which desires to secure passage of a treaty,
but is not able to do so, will often seek to deny the recalcitrant minority the satisfaction of a
formal concession of defeat embodied in resubmittal to the President. See 2 HAYNEs, TiuE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 603-4.
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field frankly admits that, in both these latter contingencies, the "trea-
ties were, in truth, rejected by the Senate, or at least defeated by it." 101
The technical formula by which disapprobation is affected is, of course,
relevant only to file clerks; official State Department figures indicate
that, up to March 1944, 104 treaties had actually been finally defeated
by the Senate. 102 Moreover, at least 57 treaties had been modified so
seriously that they never came into effect. 10 3
Unquestionably, the Senate's amendment of treaties negotiated
by the Executive has sometimes resulted in the devisal of newm agree- "
ments which protected the interests of the United States more effec-
tively than those originally submitted. Thus the amendments to the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900, by causing deletion of the provisions
precluding fortification of the canal area, permitted construction of the
Panama Canal under more favorable conditions than would otherwise
have been possible. 104 In any situation reference of an important inter-
101. DANGERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 99, at 215.
102. List prepared by Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, in March
1944, and submitted to the House Committee on the.Judiciary by Congresman Priest,
Jadiciary Committee Hearings at 8-10. The total of 104 comprises 19 treaties listed as finally
rejected by the Senate, and 85 defeated by the failure of that body to take any final action.
Of the 85, all but four had been before the Senate for at least six years. See id. at 9.
In addition, the treaty of amity and commerce with Turkey, which failed of concent
because the vote on Jan. 18, 1927 was only 50 to 34 in its favor, was withdrawn by Prezident
Roosevelt in 1934. See 2 HAYNES, op. cit. supra note 100, at 659, n. 2; id. at 637, n. 4. The
treaties formally rejected since 1928, the date with which Professor Dangerfield's study con-
cludes, include the St. Lawrence waterway agreement in 1933, a Norwegian claims conven-
tion in 1940, and the Lithuanian consular treaty in the same year. See Judiciary Committee
Hearings at 10. Dangerfield listed 47 treaties as having been defeated by Senatorial inaction
up to 1928. The Legislative Reference Service lists 65 treaties as having been defeated by
this pocket process up to 1929, and 20 in the ensuing period. See id. at 8-9.
In general, it is the policy of the State Department-from whose public reports the
Legislative Reference Service derived its material-to include in the list of treaties "on
which no final action was taken by the Senate," only agreements which have reasonably
definitely become obsolete because of expiration of the time prescribed for ratification in
their text, or for other reasons. See DEP'T OF STATE, Lisor OF Tn Tlws SuBMlrr TO THlE
SENATE, 1789-1934 (1935) 2.
103. This figure is based on a study which goes only as far as 1932; apparently, there is
no more recent inclusive study available. See DEP'T OF STATE, LisT oF UNFERFECED
TREATIES (1932).
104. This treaty was intended to supplement the mid-nineteenth century Clayton-
Bulwer convention between Great Britain and the United States stipulating the conditions
under which either p3ower could construct a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. For details
as to the differences between the original draft of the treaty and that negotiated and ratified
after the Senate's amendments see 3 MOoRE, DIGEST, at 211 el seg.; Fon IGNI R ATION;S:
1901 at 245 et seq.
The action of the Senate in refusing to consent to various extradition treaties until
clauses conceivably relating to political crimes were deleted also seems in accord with the
American tradition of protecting individual civil liberties. However, the evidence indicates
the same modification would have been obtained if consent by majority rule had been the
governing standard. See DAxGERFiELD, op. cit. supra note 99, at 128-30.
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national agreement to Congress has the undoubted advantage of
stimulating public discussion of the issues involved and permits the
Executive's judgment to be questioned and checked by independent
critics, but these benefits can be fully realized without permitting a
minority in one house to exert a final veto power.
Except as an essay in temerariousness, an attempt to pass an over-all
summary judgment upon the Senate's interferences with treaties
negotiated by the Executive is a bootless task requiring infinite inquiry
into unascertainable causes and choices between much disputed pol-
icies."°5 Even the most cursory summary of the records permits, how-
ever, certain relevant general conclusions.
1. Limitations of the Quantitative Approach. In the first place, mere
quantitative totals give a grossly inadequate picture of the significance
of Senatorial interference or of the dangers of the two-thirds rule. 10 A
great many treaties which various national administrations had
105. But Woodrow Wilson concluded that the treaty-making clause was better described
as the "treaty-marring power." Former Republican Secretary of State John Hay termed
the treaty clause "the irreparable mistake of the Constitutional Convention." Both quoted
in Senator Gillette's speech, 89 CONG. REc. 3813, 3815 (1943). In 1933 Professor Holt of
Johns Hopkins University concluded the most extensive study of the Senate's relation to
the treaty process yet made with the following comment on the American people:
"They saw that the exercise of that power had produced such bitter conflicts
between the President and the Senate and had so increased the opportunities for
political warfare unconnected with the merits of the question that many treaties
had been lost. They knew that the ratification of nearly every important treaty had
been endangered by a constitutional system which, instead of permitting a decision
solely on the merits of the question, produces impotence and friction. They
realized that if no disaster had resulted it was due partly to good fortune and chiefly
to the relative unimportance of foreign relations in the history of the United States
so that few treaties fiad contained vital issues. They also realized that, if the United
States was to play the part in world affairs demanded by its interests and its
strength, a deadlock between the President and the Senate over a treaty involving
a really critical foreign problem may end in ruin."
HOLT, TREATIEs DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933) 307.
106. An excellent example of the limitations of the purely quantitative approach is the
article by McClendon, The Two-Thirds Rule in Senate Action upon Treaties, 178P-1901
(1932) 26 Am. J. INT. L. 37, cited by advocates of continued minority control as proving
"the negligible part played by the two-thirds rule in the defeat of treaties." See Borchard,
Executive Agreements, at 665, n. 5. To cite only the more obvious weaknesses in McClendon's
article, considered as a general study of the effects of minority control: (1) no mention is
made of the necessity of resorting to the Congressional-Executive agreement to annex
Hawaii and Texas because of the inability to secure the requisite vote of approval for trea-
ties, or of the use of such agreements to circumvent the two-thirds rule in the making of
reciprocal trade agreements; (2) no mention is made of treaties withheld because of the
probability that Senatorial consent would not be forthcoming; (3) the author limits his
study to the period prior to 1901 while in the subsequent period, the two-thirds rule was
responsible for the defeat of three important treaties-the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the
protocol providing for American adherence to the World Court, and the St. Lawrence Water-
way Treaty of 1932.
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previously negotiated or which they have desired to effect have never
been submitted for approval because of the well-founded belief that
Senatorial consent would not be forthcoming."' As will be indicated
in more detail below, the long shadow of minority control has been
particularly potent in discouraging the use of treaties providing for
arbitration of international disputes and for commercial reciprocity.c
3
Professor Poole has written:
"Most of the cramping effect of the present Constitutional ar-
rangement upon our international conduct arises from mere
apprehension on the part of the Executive-from the brooding
sense of irrational restraint which settles upon the mind of succes-
sive Secretaries." 101
And, at another place:
". .. The record [of Senate votes] does not show from what wise
measures the President or his Secretary of State has been estopped
by perhaps unfounded fear of what a few senators might do, nor
is it demonstrable into what brusque and harmful actions the
spectre on Capitol Hill has frightened them. In the light of my
own reading and my own experience in Washington, I am confident
that both misfortunes have frequently befallen." 110
Furthermore, the sting has been taken out of minority control on
numerous occasions because of the resourcefulness of the Executive in
effectuating foreign policy through executive agreements rather than
through treaties. The most famous examples, as we have indicated,
are the joint resolutions authorizing the annexation of Texas and
Hawaii; 1 in both cases, it was believed by the Presidents making
the choice of procedure that a treaty would not receive the requisite
two-thirds vote in the Senate. Similarly, although both President
icKinley and President Theodore Roosevelt found it impossible to se-
cure consent of two-thirds of the Senate to ratification of any of the
107. A first-hand statement of the effect of fear of the Senate in deterring treaties is con-
tained in Secretary of State John Hay's letter to Henry Adams of Aug. 5, 1S99. 3 L=-rmns
OF JOHN HAY AND EXTACTS FROm DIARY (1908) 156. See also DNGmnrIEL- , op. cit. supra
note 99, at 255; Poole, Cooperation Abroad Through OrganiatLion at Home (1931) 156 An-
.vALS 136.
108. See infra, pp. 558-63.
109. Poole, supra note 107, at 137. See also FLE MING THE Tm..%T VrTO O THE A-21=1-
CAN SENATE (1930) 266-8.
110. Poole, Structural Improvenents in the Administration of Foreign Affai#rs (1933) 72
PRoc. As. PHIL. Soc. 77, S0. (The authoris a former State Department official.)
111. See Part I, Section IV. The actual vote in the Senate on the joint resolution vith
respect to Hawaii was 42-21, but counting pairs and those not voting, a recent icholar haa
concluded that the "actual division of the Senate . . . was substantially less than the
two-to-one vote required to give consent to a treaty." MCCLURE, E.xEcuTnt- AGrp=-
mENTs, at 68; see 31 CoNc,. REc. 6712 (1893). Clearly, President McKinley vas convinced
the two-thirds approval would not be forthcoming. See Part I, p. 226.
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reciprocity treaties authorized by the Tariff Act of 1897, it was possible
to consummate a substantial number of reciprocity agreements under
the same act." 2 The-Dominican Customs Treaty of 1905 was blocked
by the Democratic minority in the Senate, totaling exactly three
votes more than a third of the Senate." 3 Theodore Roosevelt pro-
ceeded to institute the agreement on his own authority; the Senate
consented to the treaty in 1907, when three Democrats deserted the
previously solid party" ranks." 4 On other occasions, treaties of crucial
importance were adopted by the narrowest of margins, and then only
after the exertion of great executive pressure. Thus the Jay-Grenville
Treaty of 1795-failure to ratify which might have eventuated in a
renewal of warfare with England and which guaranteed American
territorial integrity in the Northwest-was adopted by an exact 2-1
vote in the Senate,"' as was the Treaty of Paris terminating the 1898
war with Spain and ensuring American possession of Puerto Rico and
the Philippine Islands."'
2. Death by Senate. In the second place, the Senate has most con-
sistently exercised its veto powers in dealing with two important
categories of agreements.1"7 The first category subsumes treaties for
the pacific settlement of international disputes; for fifty years the
Senate has interfered with the negotiation of agreements providing for
arbitration of justiciable international controversies to which the
United States might become a party. Cut from the same pattern, of
112. See McCLuRE, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, at 87-9; HOLT, op. cit. supra note 105, at
195-202. It is clear that Roosevelt soon abandoned the notion of securing ratification of the
eleven reciprocal trade treatiei sponsored by McKinley, on the advice of Senator Aldrich
and Speaker Cannon that the high protectionist clique in the Senate would block approval.
See PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1931) 414-5; STEPIIENSON, NELSON W. ALDRICH
(1930) 176-80.
113. See HOLT, op. cit. supra note 105, at 220.
114. Id.at228.
115. HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817 (1920) 83, and c. 4 generally. For
a balanced statement of the crisis in Anglo-American relations existing prior to ratification
of the treat, and of the concessions made by the two signatories see BEMIs, A DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1942 ed.) 99-105.
116. See HOLT, op. cit. supra note 105, c. 8. President McKinley used the promise of
patronage and other weapons to enlist the support of recalcitrant Republicans. See [Senator]
PETTIGREW, IMPERIAL WASHINGTON (1922) 202; 1 LODGE (ed.), SELECTIONS FROM TilE
CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT LODGE (1925) 390. Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan, the Democratic presidential nominee in 1896 and 1900, used his
influence with a number of Democratic and Populist Senators to induce them to vote for the
treaty. PETTIGREW, supra, 270-1; 2 [Senator George] HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY
YEARS (1903) 322-3; HIBBEN, THE PEERLESS LEADER: WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN (1929)
222.
117. See Fleming, The Role of the Senate in Treaty Making: A Survey of Four Decades
(1934) 28 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 583, at 596, n. 9; see also DANGERFIELD, TREATIES DEFEATED
BY THE SENATE (1933) passim.
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course, was the action of the Senate in refusing to consent to American
membership in the League of Nations. The second major exercise of
the veto power has been with respect to agreements for tariff reduction;
two-thirds of the reciprocal trade treaties referred to the Senate have
failed of passage. S
The appraisal any observer puts upon the Senate's conduct depends,
of course, upon his judgment as to the type of foreign policy the United
States should pursue. Professor Fleming has summarized the issues
succinctly:
"To those who believe that a policy of national isolation can and
should be maintained, the record of the Senate is not disturbing;
it is highly praiseworthy. To others who are convinced that a pro-
gressively developing machine civilization requires strong and effec-
tive international controls, the negations of the Senate are much
more destructive than conservative." 119
At this moment of impending decision, it is instructive to examine
in some detail the procedures by which the Senate and the minority
veto power have contributed to maintaining "a policy of national
isolation." The narration may appropriately begin in the 1890s.1-
Previously the United States had taken the lead in the promotion of
the arbitration of international disputes. 12 1 Since 1794 there had been a
consistent acquiescence by the Senate in the power of the Executive to
submit international disputes to arbitral tribunals, set up pursuant to
treaties, without securing the consent of the Senate to each specific
reference. 122 In addition, many claims against foreign governments
had been submitted to arbitration by direct Presidential agreement.
123
118. Fleming, loc. cit. supra note 117; see also FLEMIN!G, TnE TREATY VETO OF Tun.
A.mERmcAN SENATE (1930) 72-5; LAUGHLINAND WILLIs, REcIPRocITY (1903) 9, 75-85.
119. Fleming, The Role of the Senate in Treaty Making: A Surrey of Foir Decades (1934)
2S Am. POL. Sci. REv. 583.
120. The action of the Senate in connection with arbitration treaties is di&cused in vary-
ing detail in Fleming, supra note 119, at 584-5, 587-9; FLEmNG, TaE UNITED STATES AND
THE WORLD CouRT (1945) 20-3; cc. 3-8; Moore, Fifty Years of Inlermatioral Law (1937) 50
HARv. L. Rzv. 395, 408-12; HOLT, op. cit. supra note 105, at 153-62, 204-12, 230-5; DA;-
GERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 99, at 175, 185-9, 215-9, 260-6; FLE!IING, THE TM-xTV VETO
OF THE AMERICAN SENATE (1930) cc. 5, 9, 10.
121. See HOLT, op. cit. supra note 105, at 154-5; Moore, Supra note 120; DANGEMrIELD,
op. cit. supra note 99, at 260.
122. Thus under Article VII of the Jay Treaty with England of 1794, a large variety of
claims of British and American citizens against the governments of the two countries had
been referred to arbitration. The terms of the various submissions were set by the diplomatic
officers of the two governments. Similarly, under the Anglo.American treaty of February
1353, "all claims" of citizens of either country against the government of the other ariing
subsequent to the Treaty of Ghent terminating the War of 1812 were referred to a mined
commission. See loore, supra note 120, at 409.
123. See Part I, Section IV. Perhaps the most important example was the Spanish-
American Claims Commission set up by exchange of notes in 1871. See Moore, supra note
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Apparently desirous of effectuating this "leading feature of our foreign
policy," 124 the Senate and the House adopted a resolution in 1890
urging the negotiation of general arbitration treaties.121 In 1897,
partly because of the necessity for hastily improvising arbitral machin-
ery during the recently terminated dispute over the Venezuelan border,
the Democratic President Cleveland negotiated a treaty with Great
Britain providing for arbitration of territorial and pecuniary con-
troversies. 12 In submitting the treaty to the Senate, President Cleve-
land declared:
"The example set and the lesson furnished by the successful
operation of this treaty are sure to be felt and taken to heart
sooner or later by the other nations, and will mark the beginning of
a new epoch in civilization." 12
Two months later, the next President, the Republican William Mc-
Kinley, in his inaugural address called for "the early action of the
Senate thereon, not merely as a matter of policy, but as a duty to
mankind." 12s The Senate first proceeded to add a series of exclu-
sionary clauses to the treaty and then voted "that no arbitration
should proceed until the comprornis, the detailed agreement whereby
every special arbitral tribunal is set up, should have been approved
by two-thirds of the Senate." 129 Finally, after sixteen amendments
had been adopted and in the face of apparently overwhelming popular
support,3 0 the arbitration treaty failed-of adoption since it merely
received a vote of 43 yeas to 26 nays.131
Writing immediately after amendments completely changing the
substance of the proposed treaty had been followed by rejection by
minority veto-a rejection which forestalled the possibilities of nego-
tiating similar arbitration treaties with other nations 3 --former
Secretary of State Olney attributed the defeat of the treaty primarily
to the determination of a few Senators to protect their personal preroga-
tives at all costs and to show "to the world the greatness of the Sen-
120, at 408-9. As pointed out in Part I, there is no difference in principle between submis.
sion by executive agreement of claims against, and claims in favor of, the United States.
124. The description is quoted from President McKinley's inaugural address in 1897.
125. 21 CONG. REc. 2986 (1890); 7 MOORE, DIGEST, at 74.
126. The proposed treaty and some of the preceding correspondence are reprinted in
FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1896 at 222-40.
127. 9 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 747.
128. See note 121 supra.
129. Fleming, The Role of the Senate in Treaty Making: A Survey of Four Decades (1934)
28 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 583,584.
130. See HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933) 156-7; Blake, The Olney.
Pauncefote Treaty of 1897 (1945) 50 Ax. HIST. REv. 228, 237. Blake's article is the most
complete history of the negotiation of the treaty and of the controversy in the Senate.
131. 31 SEN. EXEC. J. 104 (1897).
132. See 7 MOORE, DIGEST. at 78.
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ate." 133 Mfore dangerously premonitory of things to come was Olney's
remark, addressed to the procedure whereby the proposed treaty had
first been rendered devoid of purpose by amendments accepted by
majority vote, that the agreement was "done to its death not by open
enemies but by professed friends." 134-
In ensuing years, this pattern was repeated, with minor variations.
Within five years of the Hague Conference of 1899, thirty-three arbitra-
tion treaties were signed by the nations of the world. Reluctant to see
the United States abandon its traditional policy, Secretary of State
John Hay drafted treaties with five governments, basically modeled
on the Anglo-French agreement of October 14, 1903, but containing a
series of exclusionary clauses akin to those the Senate had insisted
upon seven years before.1 3  In the event that the first treaties were
approved, it was the intention of the administration to negotiate with
other governments.' These "brave, new hopes" never came to
fruition. The Senate proceeded to amend the terms of the proposed
treaties to require that every proposal for an arbitral reference would
have to be submitted for its consideration; otherwise phrased, the
Senate agreed to agree to arbitrate, whenever it decided to do so.'
This retrogression from a genuine arbitral agreement into pious double-
talk impelled President Theodore Roosevelt to refuse to attempt re-
negotiation of the treaties as amended by the Senate: ". . . we had
better abandon the whole business rather than give the impression of
trickiness and insincerity which would be produced by solemnly
promulgating a sham." 133
Subsequent national administrations found it possible to secure
consent to the ratification of general arbitration treaties only by re-
taining the clause that the terms of each reference would have to be
approved in advance by the Senate.33 Even President Taft's mild
proposal, apparently strongly backed by public opinion,' to establish
Joint High Commissions of Inquiry, convenable at the request of
either party, which were to be empowered to send matters on for
133. Quoted in HOLT, op. cit. supra note 130, at 159. The excerpt is taken from a letter
written to Henry White, vith the request that it be shown to officers of the Britkh govern-
ment. Id. at 15S. See also id. at 156-62; Blake, supra note 130, at 240-2; Low, The 01-
igarchy of the Senate (1902) 174 No. Am. REv. 231.
134. Quoted in HOLT, op. cit. supra note 130, at 160.
135. FLE,.ING, THE TREATY' VETo OF Tnr AnERICJA SENATE (1930) 86.
136. 2 JOHNSON, AIERICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (1916) 364-6.
137. Compare Theodore Roosevelt's letter to Senator Lodge, 2 LODGE, op. cit. sf pra
note 116, at 110, 111; Moore, supra note 120, at 408-9.
138. 2 LODGE, op. cit. supra note 116, at 111.
139. This vras true of the Root treaties of 1908-1909 and the Kellogg Treaties of 1923-
1929. See FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 135, at 89-90,112-5.
140. See FLEMING, THE TREATY VETO OF THE A=nRIctr; SE,,ATE (1930) 92. Sc alzo the
Senatorial admissions of the popularity of the treaties. 48 CoNG. REc. 1335, 2593, 2065,
2944 (1912): 2 LODGE, op. cit. supra note 116, at 419.
19451
HeinOnline  -- 54 Yale L.J. 561 1944-1945
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
arbitration only upon the consent of two of the three American mem-
bers and provided Senate approval was obtained, was modified into
meaninglessness; 141 the President thereupon abandoned these treaties
too.142 Thus was frustrated at its inception President Taft's plan for
securing adoption of treaties between the United States and the other
major powers, and, following this example, between the majority of
the European states, so that cooling-off periods could be provided to
help turn the resolution of future conflicts into peaceful channels. 14
Professor John Bassett Moore has summarized the situation in the
following pungent language: "The result is that, so far as the United
States is concerned, it is in practice now more difficult to secure in-
ternational arbitration than it was in the early days of our independ-
ence." 144
Less subject to criticism is the Senate's record in dealing with treaties
referring specific disputes to arbitration. In the case of the Canadian-
American fisheries dispute, however, the Senate by a strictly partisan
vote defeated in 1888 a treaty negotiated by a Democratic adminis-
tration providing for, what is now and was then generally described as,
a fair compromise of the conflicting claims. 45 An attempt to secfire
settlement of this dispute by a treaty negotiated in Theodore Roose-
141. See FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 140, at 98. These amendments were added by a
largely partisan vote, with the majority composed of 36 of the 39 Democrats voting, and
only six of the 43 Republicans. See HOLT, op. cit. supra note 105, at 234. The majority
report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had declared that the treaties, as nego-
tiated, were unconstitutional, since only the Senate could determine whether a dispute was
arbitrable. See FLEMING, supra, at 93. This contention in effect concluded that almost every
President since and including George Washington had acted unconstitutionally, since al-
most all had referred disputes to arbitration or diplomatic settlement on their own initiative.
For a persuasive statement of the value of this type of arbitral agreement and of the
flaws in the arguments of the Foreign Relations Committee see Taft, The Dawn of World
Peace, Woman's Home Companion, November 1911.
142. FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 140, at 101.
143. Professor Borchard has recently sought to dismiss these treaties defeated or amended
to death as unimportant, because they were "abstract agreements." Borchard, The Two-
Thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change Opposed (1945) 3 ECON. COUNCIL PAPERS, No. 8, p. 8.
It is curious that Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and
Coolidge and their respective Secretaries of State should have put themselves to so much
effort on a matter of no importance. See also Moore, supra note 120.
By the same logic, any agreement providing for arbitration or mediation of disputes
between employer and union, or parties to a contract, could be dismissed as trivial since
prior to the actual emergence of controversies, the problem is "abstract." But the very
function of a general arbitral agreement is to provide machinery whereby settlement of
future controversies may be expedited and the parties accustomed to peaceful negotiation.
144. MOORE, TEE PRINCIPLES oF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1918) 331.
145. See DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE (1933) 242-4; FLEMING, Op. Cit.
supra note 140, at 68-72; BAILEY, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, at 439; HOLT, op. cit. supra note
105, at 144 et seq. As to the vote in the Senate see 26 SEN. EXEC. J. 333 (1888); DUNNING,
THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES (1914) 280.
One of the Republican Senators commented on the opposition to the treaty succinctly,
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velt's administration was delayed in the Senate for two years, and then
amended to the point where the President declined to resubmit it to
the British. 4 ' Theodore Roosevelt attributed the death of the treaty
to the pressure exerted by the fishermen of Gloucester, Massachusetts,
acting through Senator Lodge. 47 It was not until 1909 that it was
possible to adopt a treaty providing for arbitration of the contro-
versy145 The Treaty of 1912, based on the arbitrator's award, em-
bodied provisions not substantially dissimilar from those rejected
twenty-four years before.
3. Versailles and After. It is common knowledge that a Senate
minority turned again to obstructionist tactics to thwart the will of a
Congressional and popular majority in dealing death to the Treaty of
Versailles. Professor Borchard has recently sought not only to con-
done this action but to clothe it with the public interest by insisting
that "the Treaty deserved defeat because it was not a treaty of peace
but a declaration of war," and by suggesting that "even at the time,
informed students realized that it was likely to prove a charter for the
production of conflict and war." "I
For our present purposes, the merits or demerits of every particular
section of the much maligned peace agreements of 1919 are irrelevant.
It is interesting, however, to contrast with Professor Borchard's
hyperbolic animadversions the recent careful summary of President
Seymour:
"As we look back at [the Versailles Treaty], with the advantage
of twenty-five years' perspective, it is clear that most of the dia-
tribes against the injustice and unisdom of that treaty and the
others which formed the settlement of 1919 have small foundation
in fact; on the contrary, the treaties created ample opportunity to
accomplish recovery in the economic sense and maintain peace in
the political, if only those who followed had been able to capitalize
it." 150
"We cannot allow the Democrats to take credit for settling so important a dispute." Quoted
in Shippee, Thoras Frands Bayard in 8 BE*les, A IERIQCA SECETAIES OF STAT'E (1923) 45,
63.
146. See HOLT, TREATIEs DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933) 199-201.
147. 2 LODGE, SELECTIONS FROU THE CORRESPONnDENCE OF TniODooE RooscTI-LT ium
HENRY CABOT LODGE (1925) at 175.
148. During the interregnum, a "mere" executive agreement regulated the rights of the
parties. This agreement-kept in force by five Presidents-is another intereting com-
mentary on Professor Borchard's contention (Fxcecutie Agreernents, at 678), refuted in
Part I, Section VI, that executive agreements are "unsafe," since subject to free termination
by any successor of the President initially responsible for them.
149. See Borchard, Executive Agreements, at 665. Note the interesting list of authorities
cited in support of this interpretation by Professor Borchard. Id. at 665, n. 4.
150. Seymour, Versailles in Perspectire (1943) 19 V.x. Q. REv. 4S1,433.
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Similarly, another recent authoritative study, Professor Birdsall's
Versailles Twenty Years After, concludes that the Treaty constituted
"a realistic concession to French needs without violating the Fourteen
Points in any important particular." "I Since without some conces-
sions agreement between the Allies would have been impossible, Pro-
fessor Borchard-unless he is to retire into the scholar's traditional
ivory tower-must be either urging that a completely Carthaginian
peace would have been preferable 12 or else lending his approval to
the American defection which by precipitating the "Anglo-French
duel . . . reduced Europe to the chaos from which Hitler emerged to
produce new chaos . ," 15.
The crucial problem in 1919 and 1920 was, as it is now, that of in-
augurating a world security organization with the United States as an
active participant. It is, of course, impossible to reweave the threads
of history and tell how different the history of the 1920s and the 1930s
would have been if the United States had signed the Treaty and joined
the League. To quote Professor Birdsall again:'
"It is vitally important to distinguish between the treaty as a
written constitution and as a policy in action. Students of constitu-
tional law have long since learned to distinguish between the inten-
tions of founding fathers, as expressed in the verbal niceties of a
constitutional document on the one hand, and the practical appli-
cation of organic law to a constantly changing society on the other
hand. Students of international politics, more partitularly stu-
dents of international law, have on the whole been less discriminat-
ing. The history of the Treaty of Versailles would have been very
different if the United States had ratified it, since the treaty
itself was largely shaped on the assumption that it would have
behind it both the authority of the United States and the impartial
influence of the United States as a constantly moderating influence
in its enforcement." 164
What is important today is the method by which the United States'
adherence to world organization was prevented. Professor Borchard
151. BIRDsALL, VERSAILLES TWENTY YEARS AFTER (1941) 296. See also Albrecht-
Carril, Versailles Twenty Years After (1940) 55 POL. ScI. Q. 1, 23, concluding that, if the
Treaty caused "certain grievances, on the other hand it redressed greater ones; this is espe-
cially true of the territorial settlements." The same view is taken by Professor Hoffman of
Fordham University. HOFFMAN, DURABLE PEACE (1944) 5. See also FRAsER, GERMANY
BETWEEN Two WARS (1945) c. 3.
152. Both Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge-two of the irreconcilable
foes of the Treaty of Versailles-urged dismemberment of Germany and imposition of
crushing reparations. See NEvINs, HENRY WHITE: THIRTY YEARS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
(1930) 252-3, 360; TUmLTY, WOODROW WVILSON As I KNEW Himx (1921) 340; SCuRIFT-
GIESSER, THE GENTLEMAN FROM MAsSAcIuSETIs: HENRY CABOT LODGE (1944) 293, 302-3.
153. BIRDSALL, op. cit. supra note 151, at 297. For detailed discussion see WOLFERS,
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANcE BETWE.EN Two WARS (1939).
154. BIRDSALL, op. cit. supra note 151, at 296-7.
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maintains that "The real cause of the Treaty's defeat was that Presi-
dent Wilson requested Democratic Senators not to accept the Lodge
reservations." 15 The assumptions in this suggestion about historical
causation in general and about this specific event need no detailed
comment. It would be just about as realistic to attempt to describe a
bull-fight and to leave out either the bulls or the picadors and the
matadors. Today one can say in retrospect that President Wilson
probably erred in advising his friends among the Democratic Senators
in 1920 to vote against ratification of the Treaty, even crippled as it
was by the Lodge reservations. But, at the very least, a coordinate
factor in defeating the Treaty was the part played by Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, some of his partisan colleagues, and a small coterie of
irreconcilable Senators of both parties, determined upon enforcing an
isolationist policy upon the United States.' The tactics used by these
groups have great significance today both as a general indication of
the dangers attendant upon the two-thirds rule and as a warning to
those engaged in making the present peace agreements.
Until the very last moment, President Wilson and his supporters
made efforts to come to a compromise with opponents of the Treaty.
Thus the revised draft of the Covenant of the League prepared by
Wilson in April 1919, after his trip to the United States, embodied
almost all of the concrete proposals for change previously made by the
Republican leaders-Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes, William
Howard Taft, and Senator Lodge himselLfY 7 But this was unavailing.
As Lodge himself had told his political confidents his aim was to de-
feat the Covenant, in the face of its support by 80% of the American
people, by devising a continuous series of reservations, "but to throw
on the President the onus of its rejection." 11S
The tactic used by Senator Lodge was to continue to devise a series
of amendments to the Covenant and the Treaty. Under the Senate
rules a majority vote is all that is needed to amend a treaty. Thus
Lodge was able to secure adoption of these amendments by a majority
composed of (a) irreconcilable 'opponents of the Treaty seeking to
destroy its attractiveness to advocates of international cooperation,
(b) political foes of Wilson, and (c) whatever members of the admitted
majority favoring the Treaty could be lured into supporting any
particular reservation, in the vain idealistic hope that some foes of the
155. Borchard, Executive Agreemcnts, at 665; see also Borchard, supra note 143, at 4.
156. There is evidence that Lodge basically sympathized with the League, but oppoaed
the Covenant for partisan reasons. See Professor Bailey's report of an interview %ith Sena-
tor Borah in 1937. BAILEy, DIrLOSIATiC HIsToRY, at 669. See also 2 Jrssue, ELTUU Root
(1938) 403-3; speech by Lodge in 1916, quoted in Berdahl, The L-radership of the Uritel
States in th7e Postwar World (1944) 33 Au. POL. Sci. REV. 235, 236; NEvnls, op. cit. supra
note 152, at 451.
157. See ScmauTaFI-ssER, op. cit. supra note 152, at 325.
158. Quoted in HowxmzD (ed.), A-IERICAN FOREIGN RLmAwIONs: (1923) 272.
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Treaty could eventually be conciliated. These hopes were frustrated,
as the minority, to quote Republican Senator Nelson, continued to
grope "around to find objections to defeat the Treaty." 19 On Lodge's
methods we have first-hand testimony of one of his colleagues, Senator
Watson of Indiana:
"We had not been in the contest ten days before Senator Lodge
called-me over the telephone and asked me to take dinner with him
that evening. . . .At that Sunday evening dinner he said to me
that, while Senator Curtis was the regular whip and would have
charge of all matters pertaining to the ordinary routine of legisla-
tion, yet he wanted me as his special representative to have charge
of the organization in the Senate in the League of Nations fight.
He asked me to keep 'mum' on this assignment and to report to
nobody but him, to which I readily agreed. My service having
been largely in the House up to that time, I had never had to deal
with a treaty concerning which there was any conflict and knew
little or nothing of the procedure in such cases. 'Senator,' I said to
him, 'I don't see how we are ever going to defeat this proposition.
It appears to me that eighty percent of the people are for it. Fully
that percentage of the preachers are right now advocating it,
churches are very largely favoring it, all the people who have been
burdened and oppressed by this awful tragedy of war and who
imagine this opens a way to world peace are for it, and I don't see
how it is possible to defeat it.'
"He turned to me and said: 'Ah, my dear James, I do not pro-
pose to try to beat it by direct frontal attack, but by the indirect
method of reservations.'
" 'What do you mean by that?' I asked. 'Illustrate it to me.'
"He then went on to explain how, for instance, we would demand
a reservation on the subject of submitting to our government the
assumption of a mandate over Armenia, or any other foreign coun-
try. 'We can debate that for days and hold up the dangers that it
will involve and the responsibilities we will assume if we pursue
that course, and we can thoroughly satisfy the country that that
would be a most abhorrent policy for us to adopt. .... .
"Senator Lodge then went on for two hours to explain other
reservations and went into the details of situations that would be
thus evolved, until I became thoroughly satisfied that the treaty
could be beaten in that way . ,, 160
The last attempt to work out a compromise on Lodge's reservations
was thwarted when Lodge and his colleague Senator New turned
159., 58 CONG. REc. 3404 (1919).
160. WATSON, As I KNEw THEM (1936) 190-1; see also SCHRIFTGIrESSER, op. cilt. supra
note 152, at 335, 366; Darling, Who Kept the United States Out of the League qf Nations?
(1929) 10 CAN. HIST. REv. 196.
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recalcitrant and backtracked on the previously tentatively accepted
agreement. 161
The tragic denouement was that the desires of an oven,helming
majority of the American people,0 - as even the opponents of the
Treaty admitted, were frustrated by the adroit tactics of the minority.
Even the irreconcilable Senator M\oses of New Hampshire aftervards
admitted that, but for the delays permitted under the Senate rules and
carefully taken advantage of, "the Versailles Treaty would have been
ratified without reservations." '- No one has ever denied that a sub-
stantial majority of the Senate wished to see the Treaty adopted. Yet,
just as in the case of previous agreements providing for international
cooperation, the minority was able to prevail because the two-thirds
rule prevented devisal of an acceptable compromise. 10
Concurrently with the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles, a treaty
had been negotiated whereby the United States and Great Britain
bound themselves to come immediately to the aid of France in the
event of an unprovoked aggression by Germany. It was in reliance on
this treaty that the French abandoned their most extreme demands in
the Treaty of Versailles. 165 President Wilson submitted the treaty to
the Senate in July 1919, but it was never reported from the Committee
on Foreign Relations.'", Clearly the inability to secure a two-thirds
vote in favor of the League Covenant or the Treaty of Versailles ren-
dered futile any hope of securing this type of majority for the guaranty
treaty. The significance of this Senate-enforced withdrawal from
participation in preventing a recrudescence of German militarism ", is
indicated by Sumner W7elles' recent testimony that the outbreak of the
war in 1939 might have been averted if there had been assurance of
United States intervention.163
The issues of international cooperation were next joined in a signifi-
cant manner in connection with the question of American membership
in the World Court. The Republican successors of Wilson, Presidents
Coolidge and Harding and Secretar, of State Hughes, urged that the
United States should adhere to the Court. The platforms of both
161. Darling, supra note 160, at 200-6,208.
162. See WATSON, loc. cit. supra note 160; LoDGE, THE SE.ATE , w Tun Lr,%Guc or
NATioxs (1925) 147. Senator Harding told Senator Borah: "Bill, I'd like to get in the fight
against this League of Nations, but the people of my state are all for it, I'm afraid." Join-
soN, BORAH OF IDAHo (1936) 232-3.
163. Quoted in BAILEY, DIPLOuATIC HISTORY, at 670.
164. Seesuprapp. 560-3.
165. See BYRDSALL, op. cit. supra note 151, at 297; BoNSAL, U Nx sum BuszzTss
(1944) 188. Bonsal's book was avarded the 1944 Pulitzer prize in the field of American
history.
166. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1945, p. 13, col. S.
167. See Vandenberg, supra note 86, at 17; LIPi,.wN, op. cit. supra note 32, cc. 6-7.
168. See WELLES, THE T=im FOR DEcISION (1944) 77,119.
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parties in the 1924 election contained provisions in favor of joining the
Court. On March 3, 1925, the House of Representatives adopted a
resolution recommending adherence by a vote of 303 to 28.119 But,
when the issue came before the Senate in 1926, it was impossible to
secure the requisite two-thirds vote, except by including five reserva-
tions. All proved acceptable to the other members of the Court, except
the fifth which in effect precluded the Court from giving any advisory
opinion on any subject as to which the United States had or claimed an
interest, without its consent.' A constructive commentary on, the
validity of this super-cautious reservation-and the view of certain
Senators that their prerogatives were matters of world importance-
is furnished by the fact that not asingle other nation found it necessary
to request a similar reservation.' No wit daunted by this record,
strenuous efforts were made under the sponsorship of Presidents
Coolidge and Hoover to devise a formula which without unduly in-
sulting the rest of the world could secure the approval of two-thirds
of the Senate. A series of compromise reservations were thereupon
drafted by the distinguished elder statesman Elihu Root. However,
when the question of adherence came before the Senate again, this
time under the sponsorship of President Roosevelt, it failed of adop-
tion on January 29, 1935, since the majority of 52 yeas to 36 nays was
short of the necessary two-thirds.1
72
It cannot be denied, of course, that an international tribunal-while
of great assistance in preventing the accumulation of unsettled griev-
ances between nations, leading to increasing tension and resentment,
and accustoming the public to peaceful settlement of international
disputes-is not by itself capable of averting wars. However, the
Senatorial debate on the World Court, as everyone knew, actually
involved the basic dispute over American cooperation to further world
peace. To the world at large the refusal of the Senate minority to
permit adherence by the United States to the World Court was evi-
dence that the United States, while doubtless disapproving of war,
could be relied upon not to take any significant steps toward inter-
governmental cooperation to prevent large-scale aggressions.'"
169. For the general background see BAILEY, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, at 710; FLEING,
TEE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT (1945).
170. For the text of the reservations see HUDSON, TEE WORLD COURT 1921-1938 (1938)
248-9.
171. See Fleming, The Role of the Senate in Treaty Making: A Survey of Four Decades
(1939) 28 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 583, at 587-9.
172. Professor Bailey has recently concluded that American public opinion was dis-
tinctly favorable to adherence to the World Court. BAILEY, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, at 717.
However, a last minute propaganda campaign initiated by William Randolph Hearst and
Father Coughlin, which brought a flood of telegrams, resulted in a defection of enough
members previously intending to vote for adherence to the Court to prevent obtainance of
the two-thirds vote.
173. It should also be noted that on Jan. 19, 1932, after delaying action for three years,
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4. Thle Merits of Treaties and How Miwrity Contro! Operates.
"I do not think so meanly of any of my colleagues in this body
as to believe that ihey would be actuated by any such despicable
motives, but I cannot close my eyes to the records of our national
history."
SENATOR GILLETTE of Iowa, December 13, 1943Y'
It has been urged, with repetitiveness suggesting seriousness, that "a
treaty should be convincing enough to command a two-third vote" 1 5
and that "the necessity of obtaining a two-thirds vote assures a good
treaty rather than the hasty or emotional consideration which a bare
majority might reflect." 171 Wholly apart from its departure from basic
democratic principles, it may be noted that this suggestion proceeds
on the assumption that the individual members of the Senate in deal-
ing with foreign policy are entirely governed by honest convictions as
to the long-term best interests of the whole United States, and are in
no significant degree motivated by political or party considerations,
fear of local pressure groups, or antipathy to the incumbent Executive.
There is no need to exaggerate the extent to which Senators, like other
people, may respond to treaties from considerations other than their
merits, but, as former Senator Gillette has recently pointed out, "the
records of our national history" unfortunately furnish too much reason
to believe that small groups "motivated by partisan antagonisms,
political prejudices, or personal antagonism and illwill against an Exec-
utive" can, if minority control continues, thwart "all the efforts of
our executive department and the will and wish of two-thirds of this
body, less one." 177 There are, in addition, a number of peculiarities in
the organization of the Senate that facilitate the task of a minority in
stalemating the majority.
"Politics stops at the water front" is an appealing slogan, but ac-
quaintance with the diplomatic history of the United States, as Pro-
fessor Haynes has said, provides "little justification" for the belief that
"treaty-making will be handled as a non-partisan matter." 173 Indeed,
the Senate vitiated the general treaty of inter-American arbitration by adding rewervations
providing that no agreement involving the United States could be submitted until the
particular compromis had been approved by two-thirds vote of the Senate, and that in any
case no controversies which arose under preexisting treaties could be submitted for arbitra-
tion. See Fleming, supra note 171, at 590.
174. 89 CONG. REc. 10597 (1943).
175. See Borchard, FxecuaireAgreements, at 667.
176. See Borchard, The Two-Thirds Ride as to Treaties: A Change Opposed (1943) 3
Ecox. CoUNcIL PARERS, No. 8, p. 5. See also Borchard, Book Review (1944) 4 LAY,rrs
GUILD REv. 59.
177. 89 CONG. REc. 10597 (1943).
178. 2 HAi-NES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (1938) 630; see also Senator John
Sharp Williams' comments, 62 CONG. Rnc. 3855 (1922):
"If a Republican President had sent the Versailles Treaty to this body, three-
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before the end of George Washington's tenure of office, the sanguine
expectation of the Framers that debate on foreign policy would be
conducted on a non-partisan basis had been thoroughly dispelled.
The voting on Jay's treaty with England in 1795 was conducted on a
strictly party basis.' The 1824 treaty with Great Britain for suppres-
sion of the slave trade was amended to death in the Senate, in large
measure because of the opposition of Senators hostile to Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams, the heir presumptive to the Presidency."'
We have already referred to the unusual concatenation of political
motives which defeated the 1844 treaty for the annexation of Texas. 1 I
The theme of partisan opposition to treaties, although by no means
invariably present, has recufred in more recent years with discon-
certing frequency. As previously explained the almost unanimous
opposition of the Democratic minority-which prevented a two-thirds
majority-forced Theodore Roosevelt to initiate the Santo Domingo
fourths of you on the Republican side would have voted for it, including the Senator
from Massachusetts (Mr. Lodge). And if Mr. Wilson had sent these treaties [the
Washington Conference Treaties] to this body, two-thirds of you Democrats
would have voted for it, including the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. Hitchcock)
and the Senator from Montana (Mr. Walsh) .... is it not about time we stopped
our partisanship at the coast line?"
In 1943, Senator Gillette said:
"The historical evidence . . . certainly should convince us that our Chief
Executives have been given much cause for being sceptical and reluctant in the
matter of laying international pacts before the Senate for ratification as treaties."
89 CONG. REc. 10600 (1943); see also 1 BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (rev. ed.
1913) 122. The best generalized sources of information are the discussions of the fate of
particular agreements in HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933); FLEmING, TH
TREATY VETO OF THE AMERICAN SENATE (1930); and DANGERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 145.
179. Those who were to emerge the following year as the Federalists supported the treaty
throughout; the Anti-Federalists were in opposition. See HAYDEN, TiE SENATE AND
TREATIES, 1789-1817 (1920) c. 4, especially at 83; HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at 17-18.
180. Senator Van Buren of New York, an opponent of Adams and of the treaty and a
future President of the United States, regarded the Senate's amendments as a means of
defeating the treaty. VAN BurREN. AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1920) 203. John C. Calhoun and the
British charg6 Addington were only two of the many contemporary observers who also re-
garded political considerations as the principal reason for the opposition to the original
treaty. See 6 MEMOIRs OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (C. F. Adams, ed., 1875) 338-9, 348-50
HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at 48-9. It has since been asserted that the principal reason
for opposition was the fact that the treaty proposed to give British vessels the reciprocal
right to search American ships off the American coast to take off slaves. But the House of
Representatives, after receipt of a report stating that a mutual right of search was indis.
pensable to stop the slave trade [H. R. RP. No. 92, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882) ], had
adopted a resolution the previous year by a vote of 131 to 9 urging the President to negotiate
treaties with the European powers for suppression of the slave trade. 40 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS, 1147-55 (1823). The Senate amendments contained the absurd proposal that Amer-
ican vessels be permitted to search British ships in the West Indies for slaves, but that the
British have no reciprocal right as to American vessels. FLEMING, op. cil. supra note 178,
at 55.
181. See Part I, Section IV, pp. 263-4.
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customs receivership in 1905 by direct Presidential agreement.'5 2
Perhaps the most convincing single piece of testimony as to the im-
portance of partisanship is furnished by the speeches of former Presi-
dent Taft during the 1920 Presidential campaign. On the grounds that,
even if in supporting the Democratic aspirant the country unmis-
takably indicated its support for the League, Republican "senatorial
recalcitrance" was not likely to abate, Taft urged that the only way to
ensure the United States' entrance into the League of Nations was to
elect Harding, the Republican candidate. 1 3 A substantial number of
the Democratic Senators assumed a comparable attitude of intran-
sigence in 1922 in dealing with the treaties signed at the Washington
Conference.'I 4
Extrinsic considerations other than partisan politics have also been
important. On too many occasions, personal antipathy-sometimes
based, to quote former Senator Gillette again, on "resentments which
found their genesis in campaign contentions, patronage distribution, or
equally unworthy situations" ',-have been conjoined with, or have
operated apart from, partisan considerations in creating opposition to
treaties. It is perhaps ungracious to do more than refer in a footnote
to a few situations 'where such factors have been important, although
clearly on occasion they have played havoc with our foreign policy. '
Former Secretary of State Richard Olney once attributed a substantial
amount of Senate opposition to or alteration of treaties to the simple
desire "of humiliating the executive and of showing to the world the
182. See HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at 215-22. In 1905, the Democratic party caucus
adopted a resolution providing that "if two-thirds of this caucus shall vote in favor of the
foregoing resolution [against consent to the proposed treaty] it shall be the duty of every
Democratic Senator to vote against the ratification of the said treaty." 40 CoNG. REc. 2054
(1906).
183. ROGERS, THE AzM ac.x SENATE (1926) 77-8. It should be noted that Taft ad-
vocated ratification of the Treaty. For further commentary on the partisan nature of a
portion of the opposition to ratification of the Treaty of Versailles see Holt, Boo! Review
(1945) 50 A.P. HIsT. REv. 361 el scq.
The contention that the results of the 1920 election demonstrate the opposition of the
American public to the League, which, as previously indicated, is contrary to the con-
temporaneous impression of its Senatorial opponents, is further refuted by the fact that a
large group of distinguished Republicans took the position that the merits of the League
and World Court were not at issue during the campaign. Harding's own public statements
were equivocal in the extreme. See FLEMING, THE UNITED STA'rES AND THE WORLD COURT"
(1945) 34-S.
184. See the criticism by John Sharp Williams, Democratic Senator from Misizzippi, in
62 CoNG. REc. 3855-6 (1922), quoted in part in note 178 supra.
185. 89 CONG. REc. 10597 (1943).
186. See, e.g., 2 JoH-soN-z, AmERicA's FOREIGN RELATIONS (1916) 78; remarks of Sanator
Stephens of Mississippi, 67 CONG. REc. 2799-801 (1926); Senator Copeland's viewz as to the
reasons for opposition to the Isle of Pines Treaty, DA.NGERFIELD, op. cit. supra note 145,
at 141, n. 56. See also 58 CONG. REc. 8077, 8126 (1919); B.ALEY, DIrLO=TIC HIsTonY,
at 669.
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greatness of the Senate." 187 Other experienced statesmen such as
Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay have on occasion made similar
comments.' This type of motivation has been particularly present
in the case of general arbitration treaties."' As Professor Fleming has
pointed out, the insistence upon personal prerogative is particularly
dangerous in the case of multilateral agreements, ivhich by their
very nature must be compromises between the view of nations with
divergent interests and political heritages.19 Here the attempt to
insist that the agreement, to quote Olney's phrase, bear the "Senate
brand" "I' chn only result in precluding effective cooperation by the
United States in international organization.
It is also known that, on a number of occasions not always involving
matters of minor importance, a "microscopic" group of Senators has
been able to block a treaty to protect some parochial interest. This
seems, for example, to have been the case with the Isle of Pines Treaty,
ratification of which was delayed from 1903 to 1924, and the Canadian
fisheries treaty of 1905.192
The way has been sinplified for minority control to achieve these
results by a number of the features of the Senate's ordinary procedure.
Perhaps the most important is the amendment to the Senate rules
adopted in 1868, providing that treaties could be amended by majority
vote."'93 The perverse uses to which this can be put, when coupled with
a two-thirds rule for final approval, have been well described by Pro-
fessor Holt:
"The effect of this change was to increase still further the power
of those opposing a treaty, for under it amendments could be in-
187. Quoted from his letter to the American minister in London, with reference to the
Senate action on the 1897 arbitration treaty. HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at, 159-60.
188. See Theodore Roosevelt's views as to the reasons for alteration of the 1904-05
arbitration treaties, HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at 207; John Hay's statements, quoted in
2 HAYNES, op. cit. supra note 178, at 657, and in 2 THAYER, LIFE AND LETTERS or JOHN HAY
(1915) 392-3; Grover Cleveland's views, ROGERS, THE AMERICAN SENATE (1926), at 250-1.
189. With reference to the 1904-05 arbitration treaties, Senator Orville Platt, a Con-
necticut Republican, commented: "But it does not do the Senate or the country any good
to be continually looking to see if in some unimportant particular the Executive has not
gone too far. I have known people so jealous of their own rights, and so fearful of inter-
ference therewith that they made their whole lives miserable, forfeiting the respect of every-
one who knew them. I feel that the Senate is acting like such individuals." COOLIDGE,VAX
OLD-FASHIONED SENATOR, ORVILLE H. PLATT (1910) 481.
190.. FLEMING, The Role of the Senate in Treaty Making: A Survey of Four Decades (1934)
28 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 583,596.
191. HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at 159.
192. See DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE (1933) 135-43; HOLT, op. cit. supra
note 178, at 199-201. Even President Theodore Roosevelt attributed the defeat of the
fisheries treaty to "Gloucester's attitude." Ibid.
193. Rule XXXVII, par. 1, reprinted in SEN. Doc. No. 258, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936)
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serted or reservations added by an ordinary majority vote. A
small group of senators wishing to defeat a treaty, but not numer-
ous enough to do so, could henceforth achieve their purpose by an
indirect method. By joining with others, who favored the treaty
only with changes, they could force amendments which would
make the treaty uiacceptable to some who had favored it in its
original form. These new opponents, added to the few who had op-
posed the treaty in any form but who helped to make the changes
in it, might constitute more than one-third of the Senate. Thus the
treaty would be defeated. This was exactly the method used in
defeating the Versailles treaty in 1919." "
The powers of the minority have also been assisted by the ability of a
small group of Senators to conduct long-drawn out filibusters; 105 even
those who favor a particular treaty may be loathe to vote for closure
in order to retain the right to block by the sheer volume of their orator3
other measures they dislike. Likewise, particularly in the case of
treaties of less urgency, the undefinable but pervasive doctrine of
"senatorial courtesy" "I has permitted a small coterie to dominate the
entire body.
No one would be so naive as to assert that all danger of the frustra-
tion of international undertakings by such extraneous factors as the
desire to promote party interests or personal antipathy to a particular
President is eliminated when domestic validation is sought by majority
vote of both houses of the Congress. Such problems are ineradicable
from the activities of man. It should be obvious, however, that there is
less chance that opposition based purely or primarily on political
motives-which relatively infrequently enlists all members of the
party opposed to an incumbent President-can be successful when the
'two-thirds rule is not applicable. 97
194. HOLT, op. cit. supra note 178, at 120. See also ANDERSON, AUEIcAN GovEn,"n_ NT
(1938) 783.
195. See DANGERFIELD, op. Cit. supra note 192, at 140-1. The most succezful filibuster
in connection with foreign affairs was the action of eleven Senators in March 1917, prevent-
ing a vote on the Armed Ship Bill. See ROGERS, op. Cit. supra note 188, at 176-7. However,
closure was applied in the debate on the covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 and the
vote on adherence to the World Court in 1935.
196. See FLEMING, Tan TR.ArY VETo OF TnE A mRucAN SENATE (1930) 287.
197. Two recent comments by Professor Borchard are interesting. "It is stated," he
vrites, "in some quarters that majority control by House and Senate means in fact Eecu-
tive control, since the President can exert patronage and other pressures on a bare majority
if necessary. The two-thirds rule places the Senate in an independent position beyond preci-
dential control even if his Party should command a bare majority." Borchard, supra note
176, at 5. He adds, "Majority control might possibly be considered if this were a parlia-
mentary government, in which the Administration could be removed if it incurred the dis-
pleasure of the people. "Ihe proposed Amendment includes no such proviso, and is therefore
inadequate." Id. at 6.
One can only wonder why this does not apply equally to domestic affairs and be amazed
at the general distrust of our democratic, legislative xway. There seems to be no recognition
1945l
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The Non-Democracy of the Two-Thirds Rule and Some Irrelevant Anal-
ogies.
"When any number of men have ... consented to make one
community or government . . . the majority have a right to act
and conclude the rest."
JOHN LociE. 93
It is improbable that any responsible citizen would be so callous in
1945 as to deny that, as an abstract proposition, majority rule is "the
central axiom" of democracy.199 In etymology and by long tradition,
democracy "means government by the people"; in lieu of breaking
heads, counting heads is the most practical way yet discovered for
securing compromise of conflicting views and desires."' That each is
"to count for one and nobody for more than one" 201 is, likewise, an
indispensable rule in such counting, if minorities are not ultimately to
rule majorities and whole peoples. "The first principle of republican-
ism," wrote Thomas Jefferson, is "to consider the will of the society
announced by the majority of a single vote, as sacred as if unanimous."
This, he continued, "is the first of all lessons in importance, yet the
last which is thoroughly learned." 202
While a democratic constitution, such as our own, must embody full
protection of personal liberties and civil rights,20 3 there is nothing in the
broadest reach of these guaranties-as the whole history of our Con-
gress's legislation with, respect to "domestic" affairs demonstrates-
that precludes a representative assembly of the people from making
its decisions by majority vote,20 4 or that requires that a minority be
by Professor Borchard that a rule which makes the view of a minority third plus one prevail,
when views conflict as to foreign policy, gives that minority the positive power to shape the
nation's foreign policy. Inaction may on occasion have stronger effects than action.
198. Quoted in KENDALL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTmINE OF MAJORITY RULE (1941)
112.
199. BARKER, REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT (1942) 69.
200. Id. at 35. See also Penniman, Thomas Paine-Democrat (1943) 27 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 244,252.
201. Jeremy Bentham, quoted in [former Congressman] T. V. SmITH, THE PROmiSE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1936) 53.
"Perhaps no convention of our day is more acceptable to both the political scientist and
the man on the street than the employment of the simple-majority device to determine the
will of a group." Heinberg, History of the Majority Principle (1926) 20 All. POL. Scl. REv. 52.
202. Quoted by Mims, THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE (1941) frontispiece. See also
Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 321,323.
203. Note the exaggerated fears of Senator Willis as to what might happen if the one-
third veto were abolished. (1944) 10 TowN MEETING BULLETIN, No. 28, p. 7.
204. "So. long as the American republic was preoccupied with guaranteeing essential
functional freedoms like freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association,
freedom of the ballot, the minority found adequate guarantees for its natural rights in the
principle of majority rule itself. To the extent that the individual and the minority were
free at all times to engage in all legitimate activities by way of building up a new majority,
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allowed to frustrate the achievement of majority will, after fair de-
bate, in matters affecting the economic welfare and physical safety
of the nation. 215 Indeed, the principle of majority rule is something
more than an article of democratic faith, fully consistent with civil
liberties; it embodies in fact the only practical procedure by which a
representative system of government, which must act, can act effec-
tively. 1 For the existence of a minority veto power must mean ulti-
mately either that the government is rendered impotent or that the
majority is forced to acquiesce in the will of the minority. No verbal
evasion can obscure the fact that one of the two groups, either the
majority or the minority, must have its way.? r7 "There could be but
one of two rules adopted in all governments," commented Mr. Justice
Story, "either that the majority should govern or the minority should
govern." 20 The pivotal objection, therefore, to requiring that inter-
national agreements made by the United States must be approved by
two-thirds of the Senate is, as Senator Fulbright has observed, that
such a requirement gives "too much power to too few men." =D
The full extent to which the principle of majority rule has been em-
bodied in the Government of the United States has recently been the
subject of authoritative summary:
"All of the provisions of the Constitution were adopted by
majority vote in the convention, and the Constitution itself was
ratified by majority vote in the State conventions.
"The Constitution contemplates that Congress may enact laws
by majority vote; that the President and Vice President may be
elected by majority vote; that the Supreme Court and inferior
courts may render judgment by majority vote; that a majority of
the States represented in the House may elect a President when the
there was no inherent conflict between the principle of majority rule, prolirly enforced,
and the principle of minority rights. To the extent that the power of the majority was
restrained by the very principle of majority rule from tampering with these fundamental
political prerogatives of the minority, both the majority and the minority found ample
accommodations in the democratic process." Mnss, op. cit. suipra note 202, at 13.
205. "The Virginians were ransacking the dictionary for adjectives in support of the
proposition that constituent power resides at all times in the hands of a majority of the
-living community.
"To this extent George Mason and James Wilson and John Quincy Adams were ex-
pounding a theory of popular sovereignty with which Rousseau would have found himself in
substantial agreement-a theory of sovereignty which declares that in the last rezort the
only limitation on the power of the existing majority is the principle of majority rule itzelf,
as guaranteeing the eternal right of the individual and the minority to wor: openly at all
times toward the formation of a new majority." Musns, op. di. supra note 202, at 33.
206. A useful distinction between democratic philosophy and procedure is developcd in
KENDALL, op. cit. supra note 198.
207. Id.at2l.
208. 1 STORY, COMIIENTARIES ON THE CoNsrrrtrrxoN (5th ed. 1S91) 651.
209. (1944) 10 TowN MIEETiNG BULLETIN. No. 25, p. 7 .
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electors fail; that Congress may annul treaties by majority vote;
that Congress by majority vote may permit a State to make a com-
pact with a foreign power; that in case of a vacancy in the office of
President and Vice President the Congress may by majority vote
name the acting President; that the Senate by majority vote may
approve or reject all nominations to Federal office; and that the
House by majority vote may impeach any person holding Federal
office." 210
The obvious question is why, if all of these important governmental
acts have required or require only a simple majority, should the legisla-
tive approval of international agreements be distinguished, by requiring
an exceptional majority of tvo-thirds? Clearly it is impossible, as has
been pointed out above in the discussion of sectional interests, to state
any over-all distinction in terms of importance 211 between the matters
dealt with in the domestic and international activities of the Federal
Government, if indeed it is still possible in 1945 to distinguish the
ramifications of "domestic" and "international" problems. Legislation
directed primarily to internal affairs and governmental activity di-
rected primarily to international affairs may have the same immediate
effects upon the daily life of the people of the nation. The most impor-
tant single aspect of our foreign policy, the power to declare war, is in
all cases confided to the majority of Congress, in collaboration with
the President. Indeed, as pointed out in Section III of this article, the
powers of the Congress to enact legislation-with respect to tariffs,
immigration, maritime affairs, and so on-are broad enough, certainly
when supplemented by the independent powers of the President, to
cover regulation of all important aspects of our relations with other
peoples and governments. The question may still be asked, by what
principle of democracy is it necessary to superimpose upon this regula-
tion a veto by a minority third of the Senate whenever, and only when-
ever, the full implementation of the policy of the Congress requires the
negotiation of an intergovernmental agreement?
The arguments of the proponents of minority control fall generally
into two categories. The first theme-presented with Spenglerian over-
210. BLOOM, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER (1944) 17.
211. The more important a governmental act is, the more necessary it would appear, in a
democratic state, to subject it to majority rather than minority control. Compare former
Assistant Secretary of State Berle's statement of the reason for putting the proposed St.
Lawrence agreement in the form of a Congressional-Executive agreement rather than of a
treaty: "I propose to close this phase of the subject by saying that it did seem that in an
issue of this size and of this importance, it was hardly fair to place in the hands of the minor-
ity of one house the ultimate decision on a measure of very great importance to the entire
country. For that reason the agreement form was selected, and it is in that form that it is
here." Hearings before the Committee of the House on Rivers and Harbors on the Improvement
of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)
pt. 1, p. 45.
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tones-is that the majority cannot be trusted to control foreign policy
and must be saved from itself. Professor Harry Elmer Barnes has
summarized this attitude in the bathetic language that ". . . the
Senate's treaty power [i.e., the two-thirds rule] is probably the last re-
maining bulwark of our national safety-even more, perhaps, than our
armed forces-and it should be fought for and maintained at all
costs." 212 Besides approving this statement,21  Professor Borchard
has added a more explicit declaration of distrust in democratic control:
"This talk of leadership of the United States is an extremely
deceptive way of losing our lives. We're among the most naive
people in the world in foreign affairs. We don't understand foreign
affairs, and to trust the leadership to people who do not under-
stand is exceedingly dangerous." 21
If Professor Borchard is right in his assertion that the American people
"don't understand foreign affairs," this unwsdom presumably per-
meates the whole nation to an equal extent. It is somewhat difficult to
see why a Senator who casts a negative vote should a priori be con-
sidered twice as intelligent and be given twice as much influence as one
who casts an affirmative vote.21 5 The defense of the two-thirds rule-
on grounds beyond prerogative--must reduce itself ultimately to an
assertion that a chosen minority knows better "than the majority of
the American people what is good for us." 210 The argument has been
made since the Middle Ages that the will of the wiser rather than the
more numerous should prevail, 217 but until we are furnished i.th the
212. Barnes, Book Review, The Progressive, March 20, 1944, p. 10, col. 2.
213. See Borchard, E:xecufire Agreements, at 683; Borchard, Book Review (1944) 4
LAWYERS Gun REV. 59, 61-2.
214. (1944) 10 TowN MEETuIN BULLETiN,, No. 25, p. 16. Contrast Senator Fulbright's
remarks in the same debate.
215. Thus, see Professor Borchard's admission and retraction later in the came debate:
"Man: The question is for Professor Borchard. Is it assumed that the majority
of the elected Senators and Representatives are not qualified to ratify a treaty?
"Dr. Borchard: No, it's not assumed that they're not qualified. They are, But
it isn't in the Constitution now, and there are very good reasons why the Constitu-
tion shouldn't be changed." Id. at 18.
The only reason stated for retention of the two-thirds rule is the need for protection of the
small states (id. at 21), a shopworn slogan, which is not only, as has b-een shown above en -
tirely irrelevant, but which was never even raised in this context at the Constitutional Con-
vention.
216. Remarks of Senator Fulbright, id. at 6. Senator Fulbright is, of course, heaping
scorn upon the notion.
217. See Barker, op. cit. supra note 199, at 65.
"By what criterion are we to measure the value of any particular will of a major-
ity? . . . Who is the final judge, superior to the decision of the majority, who will apply the
criterion of value to its will? If, when the judge is found and the criterion applied, the will of
the majority is discovered to possess less value, and the will of the minority greater, must
the will of the minority prevail? To ask these two questions is to realize at once that the
1945]
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formula for the selection of the elite, we are entitled to doubt that the
minority has any unique monopoly of wisdom. Government by a self-
designated elite-like that of benevolent despotism or of Plato's
philosopher kings-may be a good form of government for some peo-
ples, but it is not the American way.218 Certainly the historical record
of minority veto power, epitomized in the preceding Sections, indicates
that the "two-thirds rule is "the last remaining bulwark" of nothing
more sacred than the politics of obstructionism and of an isolationist
foreign policy.
The second theme, no less ingenious, is that a minority veto in the
Senate is more likely to produce a result in accord with popular opinion
than a majority vote in both houses. Thus, Professor Herbert Wright
in a recent article, while declaring his allegiance to Senator Pepper's
contention 219 that the vote on treaties (or any form of international
agreements) "should be as broadly representative of the popular will
as the machinery of our government can make it," concludes:
"But this desideratum is more apt to be attained under the two-
thirds vote of the Senate than under a simple majority of both
houses of the Congress. It might be an easy matter for a party to
muster an ordinary majority vote for a measure, although the
majority of the people of the United States might be opposed to
such measure. In the case of ordinary legislation, there is a remedy
for such flaunting of the public will at the polls every two years,
but no such remedy is available in the case of treaties with other
nations. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult to se-
cure a two-thirds vote of the Senate on a treaty, unless that two-
thirds vote represented at least a majority of the people." 220
It scarcely needs emphasis that this argument is nothing more nor less
than an attack on the general doctrine of majority rule and on the prin-
ciples of representative government; for if "a party" can "muster an
ordinary majority vote" for an international agreement, although a
majority of the people are opposed to the measure, the same result can
obtain in the case of domestic legislation. Unless we are prepared to
importation of the idea of quality, over and above the idea of quantity, and as something
separate from the idea ofguantity, may involve the destruction of the majority principle, and,
pro tanto, the negation of democracy. To enthrone a super-judge who may in turn enthrone
a minority is to abandon democratic institutions." Id. at 66.
218. In reply to those who besought him to use his influence to block ratification of the
admittedly majority-supported treaty of Paris in 1899, William Jennings Bryan said: "If
people are against us minority of Senate cannot save us. [Telegram, Jan. 11, 899.] ... we
ought not to succeed unless we do have the people with us." [Letter, Jan. 13, 1899.] Quoted
in HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE SENATE (1933) 177, n. 33.
219. Compare Pepper, A Summons Against the "Kiss of Death," N. Y. Times Magazine,
Dec. 12, 1943, p. 5, col. 1.
220. Wright, The Two-Thirds Vole of the Senate in Tieaty-Making (1944) 38 Am, . J. INT.
L. 643, 644-5.
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initiate government by continuous referendum, it is impossible to
avoid the contingency that the Congressional division on any particular
measure may be different from that in the country as a whole. But
this is no valid reason for retaining a veto power in a minority of one
house of Congress. The chances are certainly something more than
even that the majority in both houses will more nearly reflect the
views of the majority of the whole country. There is no evidence what-
ever for an inference that the majority in both houses is less likely to
be "broadly representative of the popular will" than is one-third plus
one of Senate, or any other Congressional minority.2 2 In 1935, to take
a specific example, the Senate failed to approve adherence to the World
Court by a vote of 52 ayes to 36 noes, after the House had recom-
mended adherence by 302 to 26. It may at least be questioned whether
the two-thirds rule here subserved "the popular will." 222
One may, wonder, further, why the remedy for possible "flaunting of
the popular will" is any less available in the case of an act of Congress
authorizing an international agreement, than in the case of any other
statute. The members of Congress continue to stand for re-election,
even after authorizing or sanctioning international agreements. More-
over, since there are on the whole fewer important international agree-
ments than domestic statutes, it is reasonable to assume that the people
when they go to the polls may more closely bear in mind the attitudes
of their Congressmen upon such agreements. If, moreover, direct
response to the popular will is the agreed desideratum, it seems difficult
to justify or to prefer a process of approving international agreements
which excludes the House of Representatives, the agency of the Gov-
ernment which meets the test of the polls most often.
223
For a minor variation on these unpersuasive themes there is the
"extraordinary situation" argument. Thus, Professor Borchard writes
that "The argument for 'democracy' is equally invalid" because "All
constitutions require for important acts a decisive majority;" 221 and
Professor Herbert Wright insists that "it is true that, in general, a
221. Some of the critics of the minority veto have pushed statistics to the extent of Eug-
gesting that it is mathematically possible for 17 Senators representing 8% of the population
to block ratification of a treaty. The assumptions underlying the mathematics-that a
minimum quorum of 49 is present, which however, includes the Senators from all the smallest
states, all of whom vote against the treaty-are obviously a little strained. Nevertheless,
it is true, as Senator Fulbright remarked, that "a small group of men, reprevanting rela-
tively few people, can nullify the efforts of the majority to create by treaty a more £table
and peaceful international order." (1944) 10 Towx IMEEMnG BULaETvn, No. 25, p. 5.
222. For arguments that it would be democratic, as well as constitutional, for the United
States to join the Permanent Court by joint resolution of both houses, see Mathews, Th~e
Joint Resolution Afetlwd (1938) 32 Am. 3. IJr. L. 349; Garner, Acts and Joint ResOltitions of
Congress as Substitutesfor Treaties (1935) 29 id. at 482.
223. Compare the recent report of the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary on H. J. Res. 320, H. R. REP. No. 2061, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
224. Borchard, ExecutireAgreements, at 671.
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majority vote is requisite for democratic rule, but this does not pre-
clude the settlement of extraordinary matters of a fundamental nature
by more than a majority vote." 225 Professor Borchard elaborates:
"Impeachment requires two-thirds of the Senate, and ratification of
constitutional Amendments, three-quarters of the states. We hang
capital offenders only by a unanimous vote of a jury." 25 More re-
cently he has written that "A treaty is something quite different from a
statute. A treaty binds the nation and cannot be changed by an act of
legislation. A statute can be. . . . A treaty is the practical equivalent
of a constitutional Amendment." 22I
The relevant question about these alleged analogies is, admitting
that democratic government may have some procedures that require a
vote of more than one-half plus one, whether or not the policy which is
thought to require an exceptional majority with respect to each of
these analogies applies also to the authorizing or sanctioning of inter-
national agreements. On the face of things, it is not a little strange that
these particular analogies should be thought to be more relevant than
all of the other governmental acts, listed above, which taken together
permit the over-all summary that :'operation of the Government by
majority vote is the general rule of the Constitution." 225 Professor
Borchard's "numerous acts" requiring a two-thirds vote total four.
Two-conviction by the Senate of an impeached federal officer 219 and
the expulsion of members-are patently quasi-criminal proceedings,
where the general presumption requiring guilt to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt prevails. These examples are relevant to the instant
problem only on the assumption that there is a presumption, as strong
as the presumption of innocence, against making international agree-
ments and in favor of inaction. 20 It would appear that the fact today
is the exact opposite.23 ' The other two examples-the passage of
225. Wright, supra note 220, at 644.
226. Borchard, Executire Agreements, at 671. The irreverent may wonder why, on
grounds of comparable policy, it is not added that in most secret fraternities two blackballs
prevent election.
227. Borchard, The Two-Thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change Opposed (1945) 3 EcoN.
COuNciL PAPERS, No. 8, p. 6. See also Borchard, Against the Proposed Amendment as to
the Ratification of Treaties (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 608, 609.
228. BLOOM, op. cit. supra note 210, at 17.
229. However, the House may impeach a federal officer by majority vote, U. S. CONST.
Art. I, § 2.
230. The examples might also be relevant on the assumption that there is some mys-
terious affinity between the ratification of treaties and criminal law.
231. It may bear further emphasis that a negative, mnnority vote rejecting an interna-
tional agreement establishes a foreign policy for the United States with effects just as posi-
tive and observable, however different, as an affirmative, majority vote approving an agree-
ment. In every case a choice must be made between alternative policies and the choice may
be just as irreversible, in terms of its effects on the United States, when an agreement is
rejected as when it is approved. The real question of who shall have the power to decide,
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legislation over a Presidential veto and the removal of political dis-
abilities imposed by conviction in the federal courts-deal with con-
flicts between Congress and the coordinate branches of the Govern-
ment. But the process of making an international agreement involves
cooperation with a coordinate branch, the Executive. Professor
Borchard's bland statement that a treaty "cannot be changed by an
act of legislation" is refuted by the half-score or more Supreme Court
decisions holding that the status of a treaty as "the law of the land" is
-terminated by adoption of a joint resolution of denunciation or even
inclusion of inconsistent provisions in a later statute.232 One is at some
loss to comprehend the meaning of the climactic statement that a
treaty has "the force of an Amendment." 233 There are a number of
decisions holding that treaties may be enforced only when they com-
ply with the provisions and limitations of the Constitution. 34 The
Supreme Court has never held that the treaty-making power includes
the power to change any of the traditional guaranties of the Constitu-
tion, and there are compelling reasons why it should not so hold. It
seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the treaty-making power is
subject to exactly the same restrictions in this respect as the power of
Congress to enact legislation. If a treaty is "the practical equivalent of
a constitutional Amendment," so also is every statute ever enacted.
As a final argument in defense of the two-thirds rule, Professor
Borchard asserts that "In all constitutions of which I am aware, im-
portant decisions must be made by two-thirds or greater majority." 211
the minority or the majority, cannot be concealed behind vague allusions to "well con-
sidered" action. One may with equal relevance demand that the inaction propozed by a
minority be "well considered" before it is imposed upon the majority. In thee dayo of
continuous communication, public consideration of public issues proceeds at a rapid pace,
and, under contemporary world conditions, too long a pause to enable a minority to attempt
to persuade the majority may result in total paralysis.
232. See Part I, Section VI, for further development and citation of the relevant dci-
sions.
233. Borchard, The Two-Thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change Opposc d (1945) 3 Eco:;.
COUNCIL PAPERS, No. 8, p. 7.
234. See Part I, pp. 284-6. Since the decision in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
312 U. S. 100 (1941). it has been clear that the doctrine of Miszouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416
(1918), that the power to make treaties was not limited by the Tenth Amendment applies
equally to the power of Congress to make statutes. It also seems clear that the Fifth Amsnd-
ment is as much a limitation on the treaty-making as on the legislative power-that is, that
treaties containing provisions in contravention of the Amendment could not be enforced in
the courts. See cases cited Part I, Section VI.
235. Borchard, Tue Two-Thirds Rule as to Treaties: A Change Opposed (1945) 3 Eco!N.
CoUNcIL PAPERS, No. 8, p. 9.
Professor Borchard also cites to support the desirability of a two-thirds rule in the
Senate the fact that it is proposed that the General Assembly of the United Nations Security
Organization act on important matters by two-thirds vote. We should have Euppoecd that
after 156 years of national unity, the mutuality of interests and degree of underetanding
between the states of the United States were somewhat closer than now prevails between,
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In the context, it might be supposed that this statement bears some
relation to the process by which other nations ratify treaties. Refer-
ence to an authoritative source indicates that in only two nations has
it been deemed necessary to require more than a majority vote for
treaty-making-Liberia and Guatemala. 26 We assume that in the
making of international agreements, as in other aspects of statesman-
ship, the United States wishes t6 be more and not less democratic
than other governments.
VIII. INTERCHANGEABLE PROCEDURES AND PATTERNS OF POST-WAR
ORGANIZATION
"If we are to measure up to the task of peace with the same
stature as we have measured up to the task of war, we must see
that the institutions of peace rest firmly on the soJid foundations
of international political and economic cooperation. The corner-
stone for international political cooperation is the Dumbarton
Oaks proposal for a permanent United Nations. International
political relations will be friendly and constructive, however, only
if solutions are found to the difficult economic problems we face
today. The cornerstone for international economic cooperation is
the Bretton Woods. proposal for an international monetary fund
and an international bank for reconstruction and development."
President Roosevelt's Message to Congress of February 12, 1945
During the first World War, the statesmen of the Allied powers
refrained from proposing plans for the prevention of future conflicts
until after the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, the Versailles peace-
makers have been criticized because of the extent of their preoccupa-
tion with political problems and their relative lack of concern with the
problem of reviving world trade on a stable basis and promoting closer
international economic integration.' Both errors are being avoided by
the statesmen of the United Nations. While our armies are still locked
in battle on a dozen far-flung fronts, the operational blueprints for a
general security organization-the so-called United Nations Charter-
and for a series of agencies to deal with specific economic problems of a
transitional or a long-run nature have already been drafted or pro-
say, Ethiopia and Colombia, or China and the United States. It is somewhat surprising
that we are not also referred to the Senate of the former Kifigdom of Poland, where every
individual member possessed an absolute veto on all proposed action.
236. Guatemala requires consent of two-thirds of each house (WILCOX, RATIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS (1935) 87-8), and Liberia of two-thirds of the Senate (id. at
89-90).
1. See KEYNES, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE (1920); STRAIGHT, MAKE
TnIs TiE LAST WAR (1943) 294,295; SALTER, ALLIED SHIPPING CONTROL (1921) 220-1.
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jected. It is as yet too early to tell what specific form many of these
emergent instrumentalities of international cooperation will take. But
few doubt that the people of the United States want their government
to participate actively in the affairs of these agencies, just as it is al-
ready participating in some twenty-five international organizations,2 in
addition to the many war-time United Nations organizations.
From the standpoint of constitutional power, it is clear that the
United States may signify its adherence to such organizations by either
treaty or Congressional-Executive agreement. The convention estab-
lishing an international organization is fundamentally nothing more
than an agreement between a large number of States to cooperate in
promoting commonly-desired ends. The number of signatories to an
agreement has, of course, no effect upon the constitutional mode by
which validation may be secured under the Constitution of the United
States. In point of fact, as has already been pointed out, the executive
agreement has almost always been the instrument utilized for effecting
the United States' adherence to international organizations. 3 This
procedure was the basis by which this government joined the Inter-
national Labor Organization, the Pan-American Union, the Universal
Postal Union, the recently organized United Nations Relief and Re-
habilitations Administration, and many other similar groups. In at
least one case, that of the International Labor Organization, the Presi-
dent negotiated an agreement of adherence, pursuant to authorization
embodied in a joint resolution, after a treaty had failed of adoption.4
It is equally clear that, beyond the question of mere formal entry
into an organization, the United States may approve the substantive
provisions-delineating functions, granting powers, prescribing respon-
sibilities, outlining procedures, establishing legal capacity, and so on-
of the various organizations now being proposed and may commit
itself to observe the terms of these agreements by either treaty or
Congressional-Executive agreement, and in some instances also by
direct Presidential agreement. All of the proposals thus far made are
both appropriate subjects for international negotiation and are easily
within the scope of the combined powers of the Congress and the
President. This may be demonstrated by brief reference to the two
most important and comprehensive sets of agreements, the Bretton
Voods monetary agreements and the proposed security agreements.
2. See SCEMECREBIER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH THE UNITED STATE-S
PARTIcIPATES (1935).
3. See Part I, Section IV.
4. See Part I, pp. 270-1.
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The Bretton Woods Monetary Agreements-An Essay in International
Economic Cooperation.
The interdependence of the economic objectives of the United States
and of the other United Nations is rapidly becoming a matter of com-
mon knowledge.5 In his message asking Congressional approval of the
Bretton Woods agreements, the late President Roosevelt gave realistic
emphasis to this critical fact:
"What we need and what they need correspond-expanded
production, employment, exchange, and consumption-in other
words, more goods produced, more jobs, more trade, and a higher
standard of living for us all. To the people of the United States
this means real peacetime employment for those . . . returning
from the war and for those at home whose wartime work has
ended. It also means orders and profits to our industries and fair
prices to our farmers. We shall need prosperous markets in the
world to insure our own prosperity, and we shall need the goods
the world can sell us. For all these purposes, as well as for a peace
that will endure, we need the partnership of the United Nations." 0
Since the first common problem confronting the United Nations is
that of providing assistance in giving relief and facilitating rehabilita-
tion in war-devastated areas, it was appropriate that the first of the
new international economic organizations to be set on a going basis
was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
The variety and importance of the other problems which in an in-
creasingly interdependent planetary economy require joint action is
indicated by a mere listing of a number of the already projected or
contemplated organizations in this field: the provisional Civil Aeronau-
tics Council,7 the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,
agencies to promote orderly marketing of raw materials and commodi-
ties, and.multi-national shipping, radio, petroleum, and wire communi-
cations councils.8
5. See, e.g., HANSEN, AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1945); Rostow,
American Security and Foreign Economic Policy (1945) 34 YALE REV. 495; BROWN, TuH
FUTuRE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1943) pt. 3; STALEY, WORLD ECONOMY
IN TRANSITION (1939).
6. International Monetary Fund, Message from the President of the United Slates,
Transmitting Recommendation for the Passage of Legislation Dealing with the Subscription of
the United States to the International Monetary Fund, and Our Membership itn Such Fund,
H. R. Doc. No. 70, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 2.
Bills approving American adherence to the Fund and Bank have been introduced in
both houses of Congress. See H. R. 2211 and S. 540, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). H. R.
2211 was recently approved by an overnvhelming majority.
7. International Conference on Civil Aviation, Final Act (1945). For a brief descrip-
tion see Van Zandt, The Chicago Civil Aviation Conference (1945) 20 FOREIGN POLICY RE-
PORTS 290, 294-5.
8. See generally Message from the President, cited supra note 6, at 4-5; N. Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1945, p. 1, col. 3.
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However, the linchpins of the program for international economic
cooperation are the interrelated agreements for establishment of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development.' Since the last war the flow of goods from
country to country has been hampered by the pursuit of autarchic
financial policies and a race of competitive monetary depreciation,
predicated on what has been characterized as the "beggar my neigh-
bor" school of economics. The International Monetary Fund seeks to
"promote stability of exchange rates without running the risks involved
in a rigid fixity of rates." 10 It provides machinery whereby the initial
post-war structure of currency ratios may be established by consulta-
tion between the powers and whereby rates may be adjusted when
necessary because of fundamental disequilibrium. By promoting
stability of the exchanges and requiring regular consultation about
monetary policies it will result in increasing the flow of useful trade
across national boundaries. From the standpoint of the United States,
this charter of international monetary peace presages an ex\ pansion in
export trade."
The aim of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment is to promote the reconstruction of devastated areas and assist
in the industrialization and development of the resources of backward
areas. Essentially, the Bank will be a mutual insurance and guarantee
agency, facilitating lending by existing private and public agencies, but
where necessary making loans itself.12 At the same time as the Bank
thus aids in the achievement of higher standards of living in devastated
or retarded areas, it will stimulate employment in the capital-exporting
countries such as the United States.13
9. See INTERNATIONAL MorNETvY FunD AND ITERAT oAL Biu FOR RIcC:z-
STRUcTION AD DEVELOPUENT (U. S. Treas. Dept. 1944); for a convenient Eummary rae
Brellon Woods Monetary Conference-Plans and Achevements (1944) 20 ForeaIon POLIcy
REPORTS 138. See also HANSEN, op. cit. supra note S, cc. 2,4; Rostow, supra, noteS,at49-1,513.
10. See HANSEN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 49-50.
11. See generally BROWN, TnE INTERNATIONrAL GOLD STAIARD (1940); Morgenthau,
Bretton Woods and International Cooperation (1945) 23 FoRaEIN AFFAirs 132; N'hite, The
Monetary Fund: Some Criticisms Examined (1945) 23 FOREIGN AFFAIns 195; HATsr1:, op.
cit. supra note 5, cc. 4-8.
12. There is an instructive analogy between the propozed Bank's functions and tazks
in stimulating international commerce and the functions and tools used by the National
Housing Administration and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in stimulating private
residential construction and domestic trade generally. See HANSEN, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 35.
13. See HANSEN, op. cit. supra note 5, cc. 4-5; STALEY, WORLD ECONoMc D-.or-
MENT (1944); CONDLIFFE, AGENDA FOR A PosT-WAR WORLD (1942) c. 8. The common
assertion that by promoting industrialization of now backward areas, the United States
would frustrate its own industries is completely refuted by an examination of trade figures.
In the immediate pre-war years, the United States' chief customers were Great Britain and
Canada, both great industrial nations. (Our trade with Germany and Japan was curtail
by political considerations.) In Europe, the largest volume of trade tool: place between the
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Even most of those financial groups which are critical of specific
details of the Fund are united in agreeing as to the necessity of estab-
lishing a Development Bank and of establishing some sort of interna-
tional monetary agency, to prevent stagnation of world trade and a
revival of the chaotic financial conditions of the 1930s.14 The merits of
the specific agreements'are not, of course, relevant to the question of
constitutional power, bdit the fact that the agreements as actually
drawn at Bretton Woods represent the consensus of opinion of leading
experts of 44 nations, without whose cooperation financial stability is a
delusive dream, suggests that they are well designed-and perhaps the
only agreements obtainable-to implement appropriate national pur-
poses.
Under the clear constitutional mandates and the well-established
precedents described in the earlier Sections of this article, it is plain
that the United States may join the Bretton Woods-or any other
similar international financial organizations-through either a treaty or
a Congressional-Executive agreement. No one questions that the
subject matters of the Bretton Woods agreements are appropriate for
international negotiation, and the specific powers of Congress with
respect to these subject matters stem directly from Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution, which provides in part that:
"Congress shall have power . . . to coin money, regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights
and measures . . . to borrow money on the credit of the United
States . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations."
1. The Monetary Power. An intricate network of intermeshing
legiglation has been built upon the monetary and currency powers of
Congress. 5 It has long been recognized that Congress's monetary
powers subsumed control over the relations between domestic and
most heavily industrialized States. In fact, the industrialization of a nation has always
tended to expand its imports. See STALEY, supra, c. 8; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, EUROPE'S
TRADE (1941) passim, especially p. 49 and table 4, p. 16; LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE NET-
WORK OF WORLD TRADE (1942) passim, especially p. 19.
14. See Williams, International Monetary Plans After Bretton Woods (1944) 23 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 38; Viner, Two Plans for International Monetary Stabilization (1943) 33 YALE REV.
77; AmERICAN BANKERS Ass'N, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION
THROUGH AMENDMENTS TO BRETTON WOODS PROPOSALS (1945); NEW YORE STATE BANKERS
ASS'N, BRETTON WOODS PROPOSALS (1945). A special subcommittee of the Committee for
Economic Development recently recommended Congressional approval of the Fund and
Bank, with one minor modification of the Articles of Agreement. See N. Y. Times, March 20,
1945, p. 1. See also Steiner, Book Review (1944) 54 YALE L. J. 178.
15. See generally 12 U. S. C. §§ 21 et seq. (1940); 31 U. S. C. §§ 311 et seq. (1940). For
general discussion of the monetary power and a summary of older legislation in the field see
WILIs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 394-407.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the great case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 315 (U. S. 1824) is indicative of the broad compass of these powers.
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foreign currency. For example, the counterfeiting statutes extend to
protection of currencies of foreign governments. 10 As long ago as 1897
Congress recognized that the stability, of the dollar was affected by the
behavior of other monetary units. By an act adopted in that year it
was provided that the President could nominate delegates to any
international conference designed to work out rules of monetary
parity. 7 A series of statutes enacted in 1933 and subsequent years
have directly authorized the President and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to undertake credit operations and enter into agreements with
other nations for the purpose of maintaining the ratio of the dollar to
other currencies, at a basis which will protect the foreign commerce of
the United States. 8 In 1935, the general Export-Import Bank was
established with authority, among other things, to loan money to
foreign governments or central banks to help stabilize their currencies. 1
In point of fact, economists have long recognized that Congress can-
not exercise its powers to deal with problems of domestic currency issue
and of domestic banking regulation without affecting international
financial policy and the foreign relations of the United States. Con-
versely, it is impossible to deal with problems of international finance
without affecting the domestic monetary and banking situation. Per-
haps the most dramatic demonstration of the interdependence of the
two aspects of the financial policy is furnished by the Gold Reserve
Act of 1934. The majority of the provisions of the Act deal with ques-
tions of primary domestic import, such as reserve ratios, the issuance
of bank notes, and the redemption of circulating media; but Section 10
thereof authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to deal in gold and
foreign exchange "for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value of
the dollar." 20 A fund of two billion dollars was created for this purpose.
The first currency stabilization agreements made by the United
States were those negotiated with a number of South American coun-
tries during the first World War, by virtue of authority conferred upon
the President in the Second Liberty Loan Act.21 More enduring in
16. See United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560 (U. S. 1850); United States v. Ariona,
120 U. S. 479 (1887).
17. 29 STAT. 624 (1S97), 31 U. S. C. §§ 311, ,312 (1940). Of courze, the contemplated
conferences were directed toward the problems of monetary bimetallism, but the principle of
international monetary cooperation ,as clearly envisioned.
18. See, e.g., 48 STAT. 51 (1933), 31 U. S. C. § 314 (1940); 43 STAT. 337 (1934), 31
U. S. C. § 440 (1940); 4S STAT. 1178 (1934), 31 U. S. C. § 443 (1940).
19. 49 STAT. 4 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 713b (1940). Two previous banks had been estab-
lished by executive order authorized by legislation in 1933 to handle trade transactions vith
the USSR and to extend credits to Cuba to help support that nation's currency. See Dir-
TRICH, WoRLD TRADE (1939) 74-5. In addition to the stabilization of foreign currencies,
the Export-Import Bank grants long term credits to promote American export-. Sca id.
at 193-8, and the Annual Reports of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.
20. 43 STAT. 341 (1934), 31 U.S. C. § 822a (1940).
21. 40 STaT. 966 (1918).
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effect was the eight-power silver agreement. negotiated by the United
States during the London Economic Conference of 1933,22 in effectua-
tion of the policies enunciated in Title 3 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1933.21 Probably the closest analogue to the proposed
International Monetary Fund is the series of stabilization agreements
negotiated pursuant to the Gold Standard Act of 1934, and its succes-
sors. 24 The most impqrtant of these compacts is the Franco-American-'
British oral agreement of 1936, to which Belgium, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands later adhered; 25 in subsequent years, similar agree-
ments were negotiated with five other nations. 2 These agreements
provided for cooperation between the fiscal agencies of the signatories
in order to stabilize the gold ratios of their currencies. The Franco-
British-American agreement also provided for loans of gold or foreign
exchange between the various stabilization funds when necessary to
prevent excess fluctuations. Another interesting precedent is the
Chinese-American agreement of 1942 whereby the United States
created an open-end credit of $500,000,000 to help stabilize the Chinese
currency.
2
From the legal standpoint the most significant fact about these
stabilization arrangements is that every one of them was effected by
Congressional-Executive agreement. In fact there is no known instance
when an international monetary arrangement to which the United
States was a party was validated by the treaty process.
2 1
2. The Foreign Commerce Power. To the extent that the proposed
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
Monetary Fund seek to promote the foreign commerce of the United
States by helping to create a new and better integrated world economy,
22. U.S. ExEc. AGREEM'T SER., No. 63 (1933); see also President Roosevelt's proclama-
tion, 48 STAT. 1723 (1933).
23. 48 STAT. 51 el seg. (1933). This part of the Act was not invalidated by the decision
in Butler v. United States, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
24. 48 STAT. 341 (1934), as extended by 50 STAT. 4 (1937), 53 STAT. 998 (1939), 55 STAT.
395 (1941), and-57 STAT. 68 (1943), 31 U. S. C. § 822a (Supp. IV, 1941-45).
25. See (1936) 22 FED. RESERVE BULL. 759, and Part I, p. 280.
26. See U. S. TREASURY DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
FOR 1938 (1939) 21, 268 (Brazil), REPORT FOR 1941 (1942) 52, 358 (China), and REI'ORTFOR
1942 (1943) 42, 291-2 (Mexico, Ecuador, and Iceland).
In 1941, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau agreed not to consummate any addi-
tional stabilization agreements without consulting the Congressional Money and Banking
Committees. See Nussbaum, International Monetary Agreements (1944) 38 AmI. J. INT. L.
242,251, n. 56.
27. See 56 STAT. 82 (1942); 6 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. No. 144, p. 263. An earlier stabili-
zation loan to China was made in 1941. See note 26 supra.
28. An inter-American bank agreement was drafted in 1942, presumably intended for
ratification by the United States as a treaty, but was never ratified by any of the signatories.
See Nussbaum, International Monetary Agreements (1944) 38 AM. J. INT. L. 242, 252.
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to replace the economy which has been broken into isolated trade areas
since 1930, our participation represents merely an extension of tradi-
tional Congressional powers.23
We have already discussed in some detail the extent and frequency
with which Congress's powers in the field of foreign commerce have
been used throughout our national history to authorize agreements
with other nations.13 The earliest agreements in this field-dealing
with reciprocal trade and navigation arrangements-were enacted at
the very beginning of the nineteenth century.3' The reciprocal trade
agreements program initiated in the 1890s under the administrations of
Harrison and McKinley and brought to fruition in 1934 and subsequent
years by Secretary of State Hull, with the full cooperation of Congress,
works on the premise that the interests of the United States are best
subserved by permitting growth of our imports concomitant with an
expansion of export trade. 32 The late President Roosevelt announced
shortly before his death that he would seek legislation permitting ex-
tension of the Hull program of general tariff reduction in the post-war
years.3 3 President Truman has urged prompt action on the program,
and Congress has recently enacted legislation extending and expand-
ing the powers of the President to lower tariff rates by agreements ith
other nations.
NWPhether or not one approves of the details of specific reciprocity
agreements, it is clear that the foreign commerce of the United States
can expand only if the economies of other nations operate at high levels
of productivity. During the 1920s and 1930s artificial stimulants were
given to our export industries, to offset the heavy balance of exports of
29. The close relation between the Bretton Woods proposals and American foreign
trade was explained by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau in the following words:
"What are the fundamental conditions under which the commerce among the
nations can once more flourish?
"First, there must be a reasonably stable standard of international exchange
to which all countries can adhere without sacrificing the freedom of action neccs-
sa-y to meet their internal economic problems.
"This is the alternative to the desperate tactics of the past-competitive cur-
rency depreciation, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple
currency practices, and unnecessary exchange restrictions-by which governments
vainly sought to maintain employment and uphold living standards. In the final
analysis, these tactics only succeeded in contributing to world-wide depreczion and
even war. The International Monetary Fund agreed upon at Bretton Woods will
help remedy this situation."
Closing address to the Bretton Woods Conference, July 22, 1944, reported in I.;TrE-.ATxO:;,,L
MoxETARY FUND AND INTERNATIox.iL BAxi FOR RECONSTRUcTIoz am DEsVELOsUsrr-
(U. S. Treas. Dep't 1944) iv-v.
30. See Part I, Section IV.
31. 3 STAT. 224 (1815); 4 STAT. 2 (1824); 4 ST.T. 30S (1828); 4 STAT. 419 (1830); c=e
also 3 M1ILER, TREATIES, at 521.
32. See Part I, pp. 273-5.
33. See N.Y. Times, March 27, 1945, p. 1, co.3.
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goods over imports by imports of gold and by sales of foreign bonds
with over-all interest requirements exceeding the reasonable ability of
the borrowers to defray. The Bank proposes to replace these dubious
expedients by a carefully devised long-run program for building up the
economies of nations which are chronic debtors on international ac-
count.
4
In recent years, the Congressional power to regulate foreign com-
merce has often been used to assist in the industrialization of other
countries or in the stabilization of the currencies of other governments.
Thus the Export-Import Bank, whose functions in this field have
previously been outlined, had, up until March 1944, made 120 loans to
28 foreign governments to facilitate exports of American capital goods
or agricultural products. One of the most important of these loans was
that authorized by the Hull-Aranha agreement of 1942, whereby funds
were provided to finance exports necessary for the industrialization of
Brazil. 5 The UNRRA agreement, adherence to which was authorized
by Congressional joint resolution and appropriation acts, has estab-
lished a source of funds to assist in providing relief and minimal re-
habilitation to war-torn areas." Similarly, the Foreign Economic
Administration and its predecessor organizations have entered into
numerous developmental contracts with South American nations,
usually through the media of the Rubber or Metals Reserves Corpora-
tions, or some other instrumentality of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation.
On policy grounds there are a number of important reasons, in addi-
tion to the general considerations discussed in Section VII of this
article, why the question of adherence to the Bretton Woods organiza-
tions should be determined by majority vote of both houses. In the
first place, the relationship between the proposed international mone-
tary organizations and domestic monetary legislation is so intimate
that it is appropriate to utilize the same legislative procedure in both
situations. It would be almost grotesque statesmanship to exclude the
House, which under the Constitution 11 and governmental practice
plays a major role in controlling internal financial policy, from par-
ticipation in control of the United States' policy with regard to inter-
national finance. In the second place, the necessity of implementing
American membership by appropriations of the prescribed national
34. Ibid; see also Bryce, International Aspects of an Investment Program in HARRIS
(ed.), POSTWAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (1943) 361-75; NATHAN, MOBILIZING FOR ABuND-
AlICE (1944).
35. See Dep't of State, Press Release, March 11, 1939; see generally testimony of War-
ren Pierson, Hearings before Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives on
the Foreign Economic Administration Appropriation Bill for 1945, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
36. See Part I, p. 273.
37. Thus under the Constitution revenue bills must originate in the House. U. S.
CONST. Art. 1, § 7, cl. 1.
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quota will require House action on the agreements in any case. Since
the House is not likely to vote appropriations if it does not approve of
the purposes of the proposed international organization, the possible
breach of faith with other nations embodied in failure to provide funds
is most likely to be avoided if the House participates in the initial
decision as to United States membership. 3 In the third place, full
participation by the United States in the Fund and the Bank may
entail conflict with existing statutory provisions. For example, the
Johnson Act of 1934 11 precludes American citizens and corporations
from loaning money to foreign governments which are in default to the
United States.40 It may be assumed that the Bank and Fund will make
loans to nations in default to the United States. Since the Fund and
Bank are international organizations, they are not of course subject to
the provisions of domestic legislation. However, a due respect for the
prerogatives of the whole Congress makes it desirable to effectuate
American participation in an international organization which vill use
American-contributed funds contrary to established legislative policy
in a manner where the voice of the whole Congress may be heard.
Moreover, in the interests of economy, it is contemplated that a sub-
stantial portion of the Stabilization Fund established by the Gold
Reserve Act of 1934 will be transferred by the Treasury to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, as a portion of the agreed American quota.4
It is not only appropriate, but probably constitutionally requisite, that
a transfer of funds from an agency and a function established by act of
Congress to a new agency, carrying on a related but distinguishable
function, should be authorized by vote of both houses.
412
In summary, ample precedents of law and important policy con-
siderations sustain the conclusion that the adherence of the United
States to the International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development should and may be effected
by the 'democratic procedure of a majority vote of both houses of
Congress. The whole Congress, which had and used the power to
38. The House of Representatives has always taken the position that it need not ap-
propriate funds called for by a treaty approved by Senate and President unlez3 it approved
of its objects. See Part I, p. 306 and p. 336, n. 126.
39. 48 STAT. 574 (1934), 31 U. S. C. § 804a (1940). The Export-Import Bank Act, 49
STAT. 4 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 713b (1940), also prohibits loans to foreign governments (or
their central banks) which are in default to the United States.
40. Among the nations thus locked in chancery are Russia (because of the dispute as to
the Czarist and Kerensky indebtedness), most of our allies in the first World War (as a
result of the Hoover moratorium of 1931 and the subsequent defaults on war indebtednE3),
and many Latin American states (in default on private account).
41. See § 3(a) of H. R. 2211 and of S. 540,79th Cong., lstSess. (1945).
42. While it is true that in case of inconsistency between the pro,isions of a treaty and
a statute the most recent instrument pre-ails, we know of no case in which it has been held
that an appropriations provision in a statute can be altered by a later treaty dealing with
the same or a related subject matter.
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make war in 1941, has and can use the power in 1945 to assist in bind-
ing the wounds of war and to ordain a charter of economic peace,
which will protect the exchange stability of the dollar and promote the
foreign commerce of the United States.
The Proposed Security Agreements-Cooperation to Prevent War.
The history of the world in the two decades between the first and
second World Wars has led most observers to conclude that the future
maintenance of international peace depends both upon the establish-
ment of an enduring alliance between the major members of the United
Nations and upon the creation of some type of organization capable of
directing sanctions against would-be aggressors with a minimum of
delay. It has become increasingly clear that in the international
sphere, as well as within any single nation, the only ultimate guarantee
that society possesses against recurrent outbreaks of lawlessness and
violence is the presence of effective law-enforcing agencies. It is also
generally agreed that an international agency which is to be charged
with the task of preventing aggression and averting violence between
nations must be able to perform a number of functions and must have
at its disposal a considerable variety of weapons. The prime function
presently proposed for an international security organization is indeed
not so much that of curbing aggression by force, as it is that of con-
certing efforts to adjust conflicts between nations by peaceful means
and of providing a forum for the amicable readjustment of international
agreements in response to changes in economic and social conditions
and to the shifting balance of political and military power. It is recog-
nized, however, that such an organization, to be effective, must be
able to direct the immediate imposition of diplomatic and economic
and, where necessary, military sanctions against would-be aggressors.
This requires that the organization be able to act on occasions of crisis
through the votes of the delegates from the various participating
nations, acting upon orders from their respective chiefs of state, and
without awaiting time-consuming specific authorization from the
legislative bodies of the member nations.
In the age of the robot bomb, rocket warfare, and the giant airplane,
the constant threat of promptness in the imposition of sanctions offers
the only hope not only of success in maintaining peace, but perhaps
even of avoiding destruction. Confronted with, the certainty that an
overwhelming force stands ready, and will promptly be used, to pre-
vent breaches of the peace or to halt attempts to overthrow by violence
obligations incurred by solemn agreement, the most aggressive of
nations may hesitate to unleash the instruments and horrors of war.
History furnishes abundant examples, on a smaller scale, which demon-
strate the effectiveness of marshalling force against an aggressor to
forestall the commencement of hostilities. Thus, Theodore Roosevelt
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impelled withdrawal of the German blockading fleet from Venezuela
in 1902 by mobilizing a fleet in the Caribbean.,3 The mobilization of
American troops along the Mexican border in 1865-1866 was one of the
factors which induced Emperor Napoleon III of France to withdraw
his army from Mexico. 44 Competent observers have suggested that the
march of the Nazi troops into the Rhineland in 1936 and the occupation
of Austria in 1938 might never have occurred if there had been an
indication that these moves would be resisted by other States.41 It is
to be expected, however, that just as the introduction of law and order
into a frontier community proceeds from the %igilante stage, where
threats of force frequently metamorphose into the actual use of force,
to the urban stage, where the mere presence of the police deters law-
lessness, so also as an international security organization develops
more efficient procedures for the speedy mobilization of its component
units, its own role will become primarily that of acting as an in tcrroren
threat to would-be aggressors. The organization will thus provide
greater security, with less actual resort to force.
Twice in 25 years the American people have seen the policy of
abstention from active participation in the councils of the peace-loving
nations and from participation in the settlement of international
disputes bring us to the brink of national disaster. We have learned
that in the twentieth century the boundaries of our safety and freedom
may sometimes be on the Rhine and the Manchurian border. In elec-
tions, in opinion polls, and in all modes of public e-xpression, the people
of the United States have indicated by large majority that they desire
this nation to play an active part in an international security organiza-
tion. Responsible leaders of both parties have united in insisting that
the representatives of the United States in such an organization must
be authorized to speak for the United States in critical situations, with-
out awaiting specific authorization from Congress as each crisis arises.A0
Absent effective American participation, moreover, it is probable
that not only will the effective operations 6f the Security Council be
greatly retarded, particularly in this hemisphere, but also that our
European and Asiatic allies will become convinced of the unwillingness
43. See 2 TH R, LiFE O JoHN HLiy (1915) 286-3; DEmas, ADvE-rTuELs rn. A=r-
iCAN DIPLOSIACY, 1896-1906 (192S) 290-1; LATA.t -,ND WINHousE, -Ae -xcL For N
PoLicY (2d rev. ed. 1941) 491-3. But see 2 VAGxs, DEC SuICHLND UND DIE VErIM=ucr
STAATEN IN DER WVELTPOLITI (1935) 1619-20.
44. See BEmiS, DIpLom sic HisoRy or THE UTNrrm STATEs (1942 ed.) 393-4. As to
the international law aspects, see LAWRENCE. PRINCIrLES or INrEra,.oNAL LW (3d ed.
1900) 124; 1 HYDE, INTERNxATiONAL LAW (1922 ed.) 119-20.
45. For other early e-xamples see LAwrENcE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 125-30.
46. See President Roosevelt's speech to the Foreign Policy A-,zciation, reprinted in
N. Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1944, p. 34; Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Let's Try to Prcrcrt
World War III, Saturday Evening Post, March 17, 1945, p. 17; statements by Senators
Ball, Burton, and Austin, U. S. News, Nov. 3,1944, pp. 36,40.
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of the United States to assume the international obligations necessary
to preserve the peace and will, perforce, return to the most naked and
transient balance of power politics.47 In this eventuality it is not un-
likely that, as in the 1920s and 1930s, there would develop a state of
discord between our erstwhile major European allies "I in which fascist
governments could once again rise to power and develop the strength
with which once more to embark upon the paths of aggression.
The representatives of more than 45 nations gathered in San Fran-
cisco and agreed upon a draft of the constitution of a general inter-
national organization. The tentative blueprints which were the start-
ing point for the Conference's work were drafted in the spring and
summer of 1944 by representatives of the leading powers at the Dum-
barton Oaks Conference and have since been the subject of discussion
in protracted exchanges of diplomatic correspondence. The proposed
organization is to include a General Assembly in which all member
States are to be represented, a Security Council to which is entrusted
the primary responsibility for the averting of war, a Social and Eco-
nomic. Council to coordinate the activities of existing and projected
international agencies in these fields, an International Court of Justice,
a Trusteeship Council, and a Secretariat.
49
The "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security" 10 is vested in the Security Council. Accordingly,
the realistic proposal is made that the present and probable future
"super-powers"-the United States, Russia, Great Britain, China, and
France-have permanent seats on the Council. In addition to the five
representatives of these nations, the Council is to include 6 delegates
elected by the Assembly.5 Building on the principle used in Article 31
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,52 it is
also recommended that any State not represented on the Council
should, "if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security
Council .. .be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the
dispute." 13 It is proposed that the permanent members of the Council,
47. Recent commentators on the Treaty of Versailles have pointed out that the reces-
sion from the original French demands for restrictions on Germany were motivated in large
measure by a belief that the United States would participate actively in the League of Na-
tions and would join with Great Britain in coming to France's aid in the event of another
Teutonic invasion. See supra, Section-VII, note 165. In effect, therefore, we urged a policy
of extreme, perhaps injudicious, moderation on the French and then withheld the support
on whose expectation they yielded to our suggestions.
48. See WOLFERS, BRITAIN AND FRANcE BETWEEN Two WARS (1939).
49. See the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1945) c. III, reprinted in N. Y. Times,
June 27, 1945, pp. 12, 13 (hereinafter cited as CHARTER).
50. CHARTER, c. V, art. 24, par. 1.
51. Id. at art. 23, pars. 1, 2.
52. P. C. I. J., Ser. D, No. 1 (3d ed. 1936) at 19.
53. CHARTER, c. V, art. 32.
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including the United States, have an absolute veto on any imposition of
military sanctions.1
4
To some degree the general scheme envisioned in these blueprints for
averting international conflicts is comparable to that already in use in
the United States to prevent industrial strife in industry.5 As the first
measure, it is proposed that the Council and the Assembly be em-
powered to investigate any situations deemed likely to flare into con-
flictY1 The grant of power in this field to the Council is broad enough to
aid "in bringing about those peaceful adjustments between states
which require something more drastic than the application of existing
law." 17 Moreover, the network of proposed international economic and
social organizations may be expected to remove or ameliorate many
of the frictions which have in the past embittered international rela-
tions. In the second place, to ensure a "cooling-off" period, it is pro-
posed that:
"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
"2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." -3
In the third place, the Security Council is empowered to require sub-
mittal of an unsettled international controversy whose continuance is
"in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security" to a mediating agency of its own designation or, if justiciable
questions are involved, to the new International Court. 9 In the case
of non-justiciable disputes, it is apparently contemplated that the
ultimate proposals for compromise may come from the Council itself.0C
In the event, however, that an aggressor State declines to follow the
paths of settlement by negotiation and mediation, the Security Council
is empowered to take any measures necessary to prevent a breach of
peace or to bring the perpetrator of such a breach to heel. The relevant
portions of the San Francisco Charter read in part as follows:
54. Id. at art. 27, par. 3.
55. See Garrison, Thee INational Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Admnislraftirc
Agency (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 567.
56. As to the functions of the Assembly see CHARTER, arts. 10-14; as to the Council
see id. at arts. 33-51.
57. CORBETT, THE DUMBARTON OAKS PIAK (Yale Institute of International Studies,
Memorandum No. 13, 1944) 6. The language is equally applicable to the San Francicco
Charter.
58. CHARTER, c. VI, art. 33, pars. 1, 2.
59. Id. at arts. 36, 37.
60. See id. at art. 38.
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"Article 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with the provisions of Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
"Article 40. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation,
the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or
deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 41, call upon
the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as
it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties
concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure
-to comply with such provisional measures.
"Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruptions of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations.
"Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that meas-
ures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, or have proved
to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United
Nations.
"Article 43. 1. All members of the United Nations, in order to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,
undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers
and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location,
and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be
concluded between the Security Council and member states or be-
tween the Security Council and groups of member states and shall
be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with
their constitutional processes.
"Article 44. When the Security Council has decided to use force
it shall, before calling upon a member not represented on it to pro-
vide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under
Article 43, invite that member, if the member so desires, to partici-
pate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employ-
ment of contingents of that member's armed forces.
"Article 45. In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent
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military measures, members shall hold immediately available na-
tional air force contingents for combined international enforcement
action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents
and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the
limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to
in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the
Military Staff Committee." r'
The detailed merits or demerits of specific items in these proposals are
not, of course, germane to the question of the constitutional procedure
by which the United States may enter into an international security
organization or even to the general policy issue of whether the United
States should adhere to some such organization.
Two general comments, however, are in order. In the first place,
the plan emerging from international conferences is hardly likely to
embody all the details of every statesman's personal blueprints, or to
be wholly pleasing to every nation or to every group in any particular
nation. Politics, it has been said, is the art of the possible, and com-
promise is as necessary in the international as in the municipal or
national sphere. But when a detailed plan for establishing an interna-
tional organization secures the imprimatur of representative delegates
from more than forty-five nations it is to be hoped that the legislative
bodies which pass upon the question of adherence will not allow minor
objectionsto frustrate the supreme cause of international cooperation. c2
61. Id. at arts. 39-45. See also arts. 46-54.
62. It may be appropriate to recall the words with which Benjamin Franklin advised
his fellow delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to sign the propozed Con-
stitution of the United States:
"I confess that there are several parts of this Constitution which I do not at
present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them. For having lived
long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information, or
fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects, which I once
thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is, therefore, that the older I grow, the
more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment
of others .... Thus, I consent, Sir, to this Constitution, because I e.xpect no
better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best.... On the whole, Sir, I
cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still
have objections to it, would, with me, on this occasion doubt a little of his ov
infallibility, and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instru-
ment."
Similarly Delegate James lcHenry of Maryland stated in part:
"Being opposed to many parts of the system, I make a remar: why I signed
it and mean to support it. Ist. I distrust my own judgment, especially as it is
opposite to the opinion of a majority of gentlemen whose abilities and patriotism
are of the first cast; and as I have had already frequent occasions to be convinced
that I have not always judged right."
WARREN, THE MAKING OF TEM CONsTITUTION (1937) 709,710-1.
One hundred years before, Oliver Cromwell had urged a group of dissident clergymen
to yield to a majority view: "Mly brethren, in the name of Christ, I be:eech you to think it
possiblethat you maybe mistaken." Id. at 709.
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In the second place, it is apparent that the general international or-
ganization and particularly the Security Council, while recognizing
the juristic equality of all States,63 will realistically accord the dominant
roles to those larger States which have borne the major burden of the
war against the Nazi-Japanese aggressors and which must, as a prac-
tical matter, assume the major responsibility for preventing future
aggressions. It should not, however, be concluded that the Organiza-
tion will represent a dictatorship of the great powers or that it will
injure the interests of the smaller nations. Against such fears, often
coming from those who until the very eve of Pearl Harbor opposed
American assistance to the United Nations, should be set the reasoned
comment of the distinguished Canadian expert, Professor Corbett:
"The proposed organization will not lessen any existing protec-
tion which the small states have against the great. No charter is
required to put the great powers on top of the heap. They are there
already.
"That is the situation in fact. As for the situation in law, the
very rule of unanimity among the permanent members of the
Security Council will tend to prevent the use of the organization
in any oppressive manner. Most small powers will find at least one
friend among the. permanent members. Moreover, if they vote
together, the small states can veto action by the Council. The
organization will not be any easy vehicle for great-power dictation.
If that were its purpose, a coalition without any setting of general
organization would be less hampered.
". .. The League of Nations was extremely kind to the formal
status of the small countries, and extremely ineffective in their
substantial protection. This time the great powers on the Security
Council will pay for a privileged position by an unequivocal ac-
ceptance of responsibility for enforcement of the new covenant." 64
Nor is the general international organization the only type of forth-
coming security organization which invites participation by the United
States. At the recent Mexico City conference of American States, a
proposal was made to extend the Monroe Doctrine and the 1940 Act
of Habana 65 by an agreement to prevent acts of aggression by any of
the Republics in the Americas against their sister States. By the Act
of Chapultepec, the various American Republics agreed to consult and,
if necessary, to join in using military force to restrain such aggressions."o
63. CHARTER, CC. II, XIV.
64. CORBETT, op. cit. supra note 57 at 6.
65. See Part I, pp. 271-2
66. See N. Y. Times, March 4, 1945, p. 25, cols. 2-6. The San Francisco Charter ex-
plicitly encourages the devisal of regional security organizations. See c. VIII. However,
Article 53 provides that
"1 .... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the
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The United States was one of the primary authors of this agreement
and naturally is expected to play an important role in its effectuationFC'
Additionally, it may be anticipated that considerable attention ill be
given in the next few years to direct bilateral or multilateral defense
agreements analogous to the recently consummated Canadian-United
States, Anglo-Russian, and Franco-Russian pacts.c" It may be ex-
pected that the United States will enter into direct agreements with
the other permanent members of the Security Council with regard to
the fulfilment of their joint obligations.
Of the general, over-all constitutional power of the United States,
by one procedure or another, to enter into security agreements with
other nations and to assume and fulfil all of the obligations that mem-
bership in an international security organization may entail, there can
appear to be no reasonable doubt.c9 As Professor Quincy Wright has
recently written:
"The United States is a sovereign state and can exercise its
sovereignty to assume any kind of obligation which is not contrary
to the powers of sovereign states under international law. The
assumption of obligations of alliance, guarantee, mutual assistance,
collective security, and sanctions has been habitual among states
and so long as these obligations aim to maintain international law
and not to deprive other states of rights under international law
they are undoubtedly consistent with that law. It is also clear that
the federal government has power without any limitations from the
'reserved powers' of the states to assume obligations on any subject
within the sphere of international relations." -0
exception of measures against any enemy state, as described below, provided for
pursuant to Article 107, or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of ag-
gressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the organization
may, on request of the governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility
for preventing further aggression by such a state.
"2. The term 'enemy state' as used in Paragraph 1 of this article applies to any
state which during the second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of
the present charter."
67. One of the advantages of the Security Council to the United States is that it would
make it possible for this government to take effective action in Latin .America to prevent
conquests by any future neo-fascist aggressors, without leading to a revival of the charge of
"Yankee imperialism," as might be the case if the United States took action on its own
initiative.
68. As to the 1940 Canadian-American defense pact see N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1940,
p. 1, col. 4; N. Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1940, p. 1, col. 1; (1940) 3 DEPT. oF STATE BUtLL., No. 61,
p. 154. The Franco-American alliance of 1778 is an earlier example of American participa-
tion in limited agreements for international military cooperation. See supra, pp. 549-50.
69. Any argument that the United States may not join a security organization becauze
it would thereby surrender a part of its "sovereignty" is sophistical. See CorWmn, TnE
CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) cc. 1-2. None of the other great powers
seems to be deterred by such considerations.
70. Wright, Constitutional Prcedure in Ite United States for Carrying out Obligatins
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Coming down to procedures, it is clear that the United States can
accept membership in a security organization, as in any other inter-
national organization, by either treaty or Congressional-Executive
agreement; that it can assume the obligations that are indispensable
to an effective security organization by either treaty or Congressional-
Executive agreement; and that it can fulfil these obligations by draw-
ing as occasion may require upon the powers of both the Congress and
the President.
1. Constitutional Procedures for Accepting Membership in a Security
Organization. The first problem, that of formal acceptance of member-
ship in a security organization, presents no new issues." It has already
been seen that there is no unique quality in an agreement establishing
an international organization which differentiates it for purposes of
constitutional validation from any other type of international agree-
ment. Nor would there appear to be any reason in law or policy for
distinguishing for this purpose an international security organization
from any other type of international organization. All of the commit-
ments which acceptance of membership in a security organization in-
volves are clearly within the combined powers of the Congress and the
President both to make and to fulfil. The constitutional investiture of
power with respect to the two principal sanctions which it is presently
proposed to make available to a general security organization-the
imposition of trade embargoes and the use of military forces "-is
clear and direct:
"The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations . . . to declare war . . . to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." 73
To these broad powers, there may be added, in the procedure of the
Congressional-Executive agreement, the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, as the Executive, and as sole organ for the con-
duct of negotiations with other governments. It is patently beyond
reason to suggest that all these powers of the Congress and the Presi-
for Military Sanctions (1944) 38 Am. J. INT. L. 678, 679. In support of his position, Pro.
fessor Wright cites Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 (1890) and his own CONTROL or AMigRI-
CAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 121-6, 247-8. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936); Mitchell, The Constitution and the Treaty to Prevent
War (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 59.
71. Exactly the same legal problems are at issue whether we consider a general security
organization or a bi-, tri-, or quadrilateral alliance. In the interests of simplicity the dis-
cussion which follows will relate explicitly only to a general security organization.
72. As will be presently demonstrated, the President has overlapping powers with
Congress in directing the extraterritorial use of American troops or naval forces to a con-
siderable degree.
73. U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8.
[Vol. 54: 534
HeinOnline  -- 54 Yale L.J. 600 1944-1945
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
dent, which explicitly include the power to declare and wage war 7 4 and
which have been held by the Supreme Court to include the power to
terminate war,7- do not also include the corollary power to authorize the
adherence of the United States to an international organization de-
signed to avert war. As Congressman Bayly of Virginia said 100 years
ago: "It has always been admitted, in the administration of the govern-
ment., that the power to declare war carries with it the power of doing
whatever tends directly to prevent it." -r
Despite the fact that the President and the Senate alone do not have
the constitutional power to fulfil all of the commitments which ac-
ceptance of membership in an international security organization may
involve, it would appear that the treaty-maldng procedure may also
be used to authorize both this government's acceptance of membership
in such an organization and its assumption of all necessary obligations.
This is the recent reasoned conclusion of former Attorney General
William D. Mitchell, who points out that securit, is an appropriate
subject matter of international agreement and that "a treaty should
not require the aid of legislation merely because it operates in a field
in which the Congress may legislate." -1 He finds that "there is plausi-
ble ground for the opinion that the treaty alone" would give the Presi-
dent the necessary authority to act, "always with the qualification
that the Congress must supply the money," and concludes realistically
that "if prevailing public opinion approves the treaty, and the Senate
by a two-thirds vote ratifies it, the House should, and doubtless would,
join in appropriate legislation to make it effective and enable the Presi-
dent to act promptly." 71
The late President Roosevelt and the Department of State indicated
that, in the first instance, the questions of adherence by the United
States to the United Nations Organization and to the Act of Chapulte-
pec would be presented in the form of a treaty, and President Truman
has -followed this procedure. 79 Since a number of Senators long com-
mitted to the cause of international cooperation have expressed belief
that the treaty clause is the appropriate constitutional method for
validating membership of the United States in a security organization,
this was undoubtedly the wise statesmanship of an attempt to avoid
a controversy over constitutional procedure. The lack of understanding
of the historical use and legal consequences of the Congressional-
Executive agreement is still pervasive. However, by including mem-
74. Ibid.
75. See Part I, pp. 2M6-7.
76. CONG. GLoBE, 2Sth Cong., 2d Sess. (1845) app., p. 122.
77. Mitchell, supra note 70, at 61.
78. Id. at 61.
79. As to the security organization see N. Y. Times, March 2, 1945, p. 12; as to the
Act of Chapultepec see N. Y. Times, March 4, 1945, p. 25.
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bers of the House of Representatives in the delegation to the San
Francisco Conference, President Roosevelt made clear his belief that
both houses have a vital interest in the role of the United States in the
proposed organization. If a Senatorial minority should seek to thwart
our membership, it is to be assumed that a contemporary President
will be as ready as were Presidents Tyler, Polk and McKinley, when
confronted with analogous problems, to take advantage of the flexi-
bility of the Constitution and to attain the goal desired by the American
people through the joint resolution process.
Indeed there are weighty considerations which make use of the
Congressional-Executive agreement a more desirable method than the
treaty for effecting United States membership in a security organiza-
tion. Since, as already indicated, the two principal weapons of such
an organization depend ultimately upon powers expressly conferred
by the Constitution upon the whole Congress, a due respect for the
prerogatives of the House would seem to necessitate giving it an equal
role in making the decision as to membership. Since, moreover, mem-
bership will be ineffective unless funds are appropriated to defray an
aliquot portion of the expenses of the organization and to fulfil this
government's other commitments-a matter upon which the House's
cooperation is indispensable-it would seem sagacious to make certain
in the first instance of that body's support." To these practical ad-
vantages should be added the fact that membership in a security
organization is one problem with respect to which sections and states
most obviously have no separate interests. Here certainly the most
democratic procedure and the procedure best calculated to serve the
interests of the whole country.would be to provide for participation in
the decision by that branch of the national legislature which, since its
representation is based on population, most accurately represents the
views of the whole nation and which most recently has been forced as a
whole to submit its stand on the issue of international cooperation to
the test of the electorate.
2. Constitutional Powers for Imposition of Preventive Sanctions
against Aggressors. It has been indicated that an indispensable pre-
requisite to an effective international security organization must be
the ability of its central executive agency to invoke sanctions including,
if necessary, the marshaling of armed forces against an aggressor, with
80. In 1897, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared: "Whenever affirmative
action of either the executive or the legislative branch of the Government may involve a
call upon the assistance of the other, the branch about to take action should, if possible,
first obtain indications of the other's desires." SEN. Doc. No. 56, 54th Cong., 2d Ses.
(1897) 5. See also GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER, FAmILY QUARRELS (1931) 4; RODINSON,
Two REcIPROcITY TREATIES (1904) 170-1; BLOOM, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER (1944)
6-7; WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 6, 226.
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the least possible delay. The participation of the United States in such
organizations will, accordingly, be a vainglorious gesture unless the
Congress is prepared to authorize the President within appropriate
limits to join in the imposition of sanctions. Former Attorney General
Mitchell has demonstrated that the required discretion can be vested
in the President either by a treaty accepting membership in a security
organization or, apart from the question of adherence, by act of Con-
gress.8' The step we take beyond Mr. Mitchell is in suggesting that the
act of Congress which grants such discretion may also authorize United
States membership in the security organization itself and that any
further requirement of going through the treaty process serves no func-
tional purpose.
On various past occasions all of the three basic types of sanctions
expected to be available to the Security Council have been used by the
United States to secure our international interests. By constitutional
theory and usage the President is vested with an almost complete con-
trol of one sanction-the exercise of the powers of diplomacy, including
the recognition or non-recognition of changes in "sovereignty" over
territory. The imposition of commercial and financial embargoes as
well as the mobilization and preventive use of armed forces are, as
pointed out above, powers vested by the Constitution in Congress.
Since it is impossible to foretell under what circumstances or in what
degree use of these sanctions may be necessary, Congress, to quote
Mr. Mitchell again, "may state the principle to be followed and the
conditions under which it is to be applied, and delegate to the President
the power to determine whether the stated conditions exist, and to act
accordingly." S2 An unbroken course of legislative precedents running
back to the eighteenth century indicates that the terms of such authori-
zation may be considerably less precise than is requisite in the case of
domestic legislation. The courts have always recognized that "the
very delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions" 83 cannot be exercised successfully if imprisoned within too nar-
row borders. This is especially true with regard to the imposition of
military sanctions; the constant changes in the technology of war make
flexibility prerequisite to national surival. Since it has long been
recognized that the President possesses powers "cognate" to those of
Congress with regard to the extraterritorial use of the armed forces, as a
matter of constitutional law especially extensive "delegations of
power" are permissible.
81. See Mitchell, The Constitution and the Treaty to Prevent War (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 59.
82. Id. at 61.
83. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936).
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a. Imposition of Diplomatic Sanctions. It is generally acknowledged
that the powers to recognize, or refuse to recognize foreign govern-
ments, and to send diplomatic representatives, or refuse to send
representatives to foreign governments, are Presidential prerogatives.
8 4
The President's power in this field stems from the fact that he is, as
Thomas Jefferson stated in 1793, when Secretary of State, "the only
channel of communication between this country and foreign na-
tions." "5 The doctrine that the President's powers in this field are
exclusive was initially asserted during the administration of President
Washington, reaffirmed during that of President Monroe, and has been
almost universally accepted since.8"
On numerous occasions various Presidents have found it expedient
to show their disapprobation of the conduct being pursued by the
governments of foreign nations by terminating diplomatic relations or
by recalling some or all of our accredited diplomatic and consular
representatives. One of the best known examples is the refusal of
President Wilson to recognize the Huerta regime in Mexico in 1915,
which in the opinion of competent scholars helped bring about its
overthrow." Similarly, President Franklin D. Roosevelt withdrew the
American ambassadors to Germany and Italy before the declaration of
war by those countries on the United States. More recently, President
Roosevelt withdrew for a time part of the American diplomatic mis-
sions to the Argentine and Bolivian republics.
Another form of diplomatic sanction is embodied in the simple act of
protesting against violations of international agreements, breaches of
international law, or any other acts deemed harmful to international
security or the interests of the United States. Such representations
become particularly potent when the President is vested with authority
to implement his protest by economic pressure.
b. Economic Sanctions. There has been a tendency in recent writings
to underestimate the extent to which the effective imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions, such as embargoes on the shipment of petroleum,
machine tools, and scrap iron, can serve to forestall acts of interna-
84. See Part I, p. 305; CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 216-8.
85. Jefferson to Citizen Genet, the French Minister, Nov. 22, 1793, 6 WRrrINGS or
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford, ed., 1895) 451.
86. See 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QuINcY ADAMS (C. F. Adams, ed., 1875) 205-6; SEN. Doc.
No. 56,54th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897); 1 MOORE, DIGEST, C. III.
Of course, Congress has power to adopt resolutions recommending that the President
initiate or terminate diplomatic relations with any particular foreign country, but under
well established precedents such resolutions are only advisory in nature. See CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT, at 199-224.
87. See id. at 222; CALLAHAN, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN MEXICAN RELATIONS
(1932) 547-51. In citing these and other examples of the use of sanctions as legal bases for
analogous conduct in the future, we are of course passing no judgment upon the desira-
bility of the past actions.
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tional aggression. The most effective answer to these contentions is
provided by the testimony of Marshal Badoglio. In his book, La Guerra
d'Etiopia, the former Italian Commander-in-Chief declared that the
effective maintenance of such sanctions would have forced cessation of
the Italian invasion of Ethiopa in 1936.1
From the constitutional standpoint, it is established beyond doubt
that Congress's power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations"
includes the power to prohibit such commerce, if deemed deleterious to
the national interest, or to give the President discretion upon the
occurrence of stated conditions to prohibit exports of all or any par-
ticular class of commodities to all or any particular countries.J This
power has been exercised from the first decades of government under
the Constitution. The earliest example of the use of a trade embargo
as a means of protecting the international interests of the United
States was the act approved June 4, 1794 giving the President power
to impose embargoes on shipments and ship movements from Amer-
ican ports when necessary to prevent depredations on American
commerce.5 0 In 1799 legislation was enacted authorizing the Presi-
dent to suspend commercial intercourse with France and its colonies,
or to re-establish trade if he deemed it desirable. 91 Embargo and non-
intercourse legislation was also adopted by the first Democrat-Repub-
lican administrations during the period of British and French violation
of American commercial rights. 2 In 1808 this legislation was held by
88. B.a.oGIo, LA GUERRA D'ETIOPIA (1936) Preface, p. ix. See also Frartcu,
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MAKING (1938) 230; I-IUBRO, How TO WIN rum Pr-,-%c (1942) 342;
Morgan, Armaments and Measures of Enforcement in AIERICAN Counci. on PuiLIC .Ar-
FAIRS, WORLD ORGANIZATION (1942) 155.
89. That the power to regulate foreign commerce includes the power to prohibit com-
merce is indicated by Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution authorizing Congrez (after
1808) to prohibit the importation of slaves. See also United States v. Marigold, 9 How.
560, 566-7 (U. S. 1850); United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, at 620-3
(D. Mass. 1808); CoRwIN, THE COmMERcE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGaTS (1936) c. 2.
In the Marigold case, 9 How. at 566-7, the Court said in part:
"Congress are, by the Constitution, vested with the power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations; and howeve&, at periods of high excitement, an applica-
tion of the terms 'to regulate commerce' such as would embrace absolute prohibi-
tion may have been questioned, yet, since the passage of the embargo and non-
intercourse laws, and the repeated judicial sanctions those statutes have received,
it can scarcely, at this day, be open to doubt that every subject falling within the
legitimate sphere of commercial regulation may be partially or wholly excluded,
when either measure shall be demanded by the safety or by the important interL-As
of the entire nation. Such exclusion cannot be limited to particular claszas or
descriptions of commercial subjects; it may embrace manufactures, bullion, bcoin,
or any other thing. The power once conceded, it may operate on any and every
subject of commerce to which the legislative discretion may apply it."
.90. 1 STAT. 372 (1794).
91. 1 STAT. 615 (1799).
92. See, e.g., 2 STAT. 379 (1806); 2 STAT. 451 (1807).
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the United States District Court in Massachusetts to be within the
ambit of Congressional authority 8 In more recent years legislation
authorizing the President to embargo exportation of munitions of war
to countries on the American coniinent to help avert warfare has
frequently been enacted.94 In 1936, the Supreme Court in the Curtiss-
Wright case affirmed the constitutionality of both the prohibition of
exports and the delegation of power in such legislation.96 In the Fondeur
case, the President's proclamation authorized by joint resolution,
banning exports of munitions to the Dominican Republic to promote
hemispheric tranquility, was enforced by injunction, although no such
remedy was established in the Resolution and Congress had not made
infractions a criminal offense.9
It has always been recognized that the imposition of economic sanc-
tions could be rendered effective only if the President's authority ex-
tended to the imposition, withdrawal, or modification of sanctions as
seemed to him desirable within prescribed conditions and limitations.
The compass of the President's discretion has been cast in the broadest
language. Thus the Act of 1794 referred to above authorized the Presi-
dent "whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require" to
lay an embargo upon all ships and vessels in the ports of the United
States, including thote of foreign nations "under such regulations as
the circumstances of the case may require, and to continue or revoke
the same, whenever he shall think proper." 17 An act passed in 1806
prohibiting commercial intercourse with portions of the island of Santo
Domingo contained a proviso making it lawful for the President to
discontinue these prohibitions "if he shall deem it expedient and con-
sistent with the interests of the United States." 98 Another embargo
act enacted in 1806 made the touchstone of Presidential discretion the
sweeping rule "if in his judgment the public interest should require
it." 11 While it may not be necessary to delegate authority to the
President to impose embargoes or other sanctions against aggressors in
93. United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, No. 16,700 (D. Mass. 1808). See
also The Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382 (U. S. 1812). For an extensive list of
early-embargo legislation see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S, 304,
311-4, (1936).
94. See 42 STAT. 361 (1922), 22 U. S. C. §§ 409-10 (1940); 48 STAT. 811 (1934), 34 U. S.
C. § 626a (1940).
95. United Statesv. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
96. United States v. Fondeur, 3 Puerto Rico Fed. Rep. 412 (D. P. R. 1908). See also
In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 584 (1895).
97. 1 STAT. 372 (1794). See also the unqualified grant of power in 1 STAT. 401 (1794).
98. 2 STAT. 352 (1806). See also 2 STAT. 341 (1805); 2 STAT. 528, 530 (1809).
For instructive summaries of the terms of Presidential discretion in acts designed to
eliminate discriminatory trade policies see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U. S. 304, 324, n. 2 (1936); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S 649 (1892).
99. 2 STAT. 411 (1806).
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such general language, this long record of legislative practice estab-
lishes an almost irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality for any
degree of "delegation" that may be appropriate and necessary.Ic)
c. The Use of 4ilitary Forces to Prent Aggression. Both the legal
power to authorize the President to use force against aggressors and the
practical necessity for creation of such authority have been explained
with great clarity by Mr. Mitchell:
"No one familiar with the decisions on this subject would doubt
the constitutionality of an Act of Congress giving the President
continuing power to use our armed forces to attack aggressor na-
tions whenever he finds that an obligation to do so has arisen under
the terms of the United Nations Treaty. Such a statute would re-
move all ground for debate as to whether Congress must declare or
authorize war. Its enactment would enable the President to act
without delay. If the matter be left in such state that he could not
act under the treaty in any case, without the delays incident to the
passage of legislation, the aggressor could complete his conquest
before we make a move. If aggressors knew such delays were
probable, the treat, would have small value as a deterrent to ag-
gression." 101
The point we add is that the requisite discretion can be equally well
vested in the President by a joint resolution or act which also author-
izes United States membership in the security organization. 112
Since the President by virtue of his constitutional duties as Com-
mander-in-Chief and his constitutional responsibilities to conduct
the foreign relations of the United States possesses "special pov.ers"
in this field independently of act of Congress,103 statutes relating to the
imposition of military sanctions may under established constitutional
doctrines validly be couched in the broadest terms. In fact, the de-
100. In the Curtiss-Wright case, 299 U.S. at 327-8, Mr. Justice Sutherland said:
"A legislative practice such as we have here, evidenced not by only occazional
instances, but marked by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a half
of time, goes a long wray in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable
ground for the constitutionality of the practice, to be found in the origin and
history of the power involved, or in its nature, or in both combined.
"In The Laura [Pollock v. Bridgeport S. B. Co.] 114 U. S. 411,416, this court
answered a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to remit or mitigate fines and penalties in certain cases, by repeat-
ing the language of a very early case (Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309) that the
long practice and acquiescence under the statute was a 'practical exporition ...
too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at
rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.'"
101. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 62.
102. Accord: VWright, Constitutional Procedure in the United States for Carrying cut
Obligations for M2ilitary Sanctions (1944) 38A0. J. -r. L. 678.
103. See Mitchell, supra note 81, at 62.
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sirability of delegation of part of the war powers to the chief execu-
tive was called to Congress's attention by President Buchanan as long
ago as 1859.104
Several distinct and well-established lines of authority establish
the President's independent powers to make protective use of the armed
forces of the United States, without awaiting a Congressional declara-
tion of war or any other specific statutory authorization.' All told,
there are more-than 100 examples of the extraterritorial use of limited
military or naval contingents on the sole responsibility of the Presi-
dent."6 The constitutional "power and obligation" of the President
to prevent invasion of American territory, to protect the interests of
American citizens, and to fulfil guarantees made in international agree-
ments or which are imposed by international law are the general sources
of the authority for such action.0 7 Moreover, since treaties and other
validly executed international agreements are the "law of the land" "0S
to the same extent as statutes, the President is equally required and
equally justified in using force, under appropriate conditions, to ensure
their observance.'09
Direct extraterritorial use of troops by the President has been found
necessary to accomplish a series of diverse objectives. In the first
104. 5 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 569-70.
105. In a letter to The New York Times (Nov. 5,1944, § IV, p. 8, cols. 5-7) Messrs. John
W. Davis, W. W. Grant, Philip C. Jessup, George Rublee, James T. Shotwell, and Quincy
Wright rely heavily upon these independent powers to find authority for the President "to
carry out a commitment for participation in international policing such as that proposed at
Dumbarton Oaks." It is unnecessary, however, to decide whether these powers alone are
adequate since the powers of the Congress may be superadded by joint resolution or act.
In his article in the American Bar Association Journal, cited supra note 81, Mr. Mitchell
questions the relevance of the precedents of the independent Presidential use of troops on
the ground that they do not establish any power to "initiate" war. On the practical level,
it may be suggested that Mr. Mitchell is making an unworkable distinction between the
purpose for which a President may use force and the possible effects of his use of force. On
the legal level, it is possible to make reference to the concept of "limited war," adverted to
by the six distinguished authors of the letter mentioned above, on the authority of the
United States Supreme Court.
106. See the statements of Senator Austin and Professor Wright, U. S. News, Nov. 3,
1944, pp. 36,38,40.
107. See WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) C. 16 and
§§ 126, 151; TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE (1925) 85-7; BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF ThE
EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (1921) c. 3; CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 240-50, See
also statements cited supra note 106.
108. See Part I, Section VI. Except when contrary to statutes, established rules of
international law are also the "law of the land." The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 700
(1900).
109. George Washington initiated preventive measures to stop aid to belligerents
prior to enactment of the Neutrality Act of 1794, "under the general rules of international
law.. . ." 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON (1872) 55-7.
The administrations of Presidents Jefferson, Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, and Taft
furnish additional examples of the doctrine that the President has the responsibility for
directing compliance with international law doctrines save where contrary statutes have
been enacted. See, e.g., 11 STAT. 759 (1807); 16 STAT. 1135 (1870); 33 SrAT. 2332 (1904);
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place, naval units have been used on various occasions to protect
American commerce and shipping. Thus President Jefferson dis-
patched a naval squadron to the Mediterranean in 1801 to quell the
Tripolitanean pirates; 11 several battles were fought before Congres-
sional approval was solicited and given.111 In 1831, President Jackson
sent a cruiser to the Falkland Islands, then an Argentinian possession,
to prevent interference -with American whaling ships.112 In 1864, the
United States joined with Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands
in sending an expedition to open to shipping, pursuant to treaty rights,
the Japanese straits of Shimonoseki."' On other occasions during the
nineteenth century it has been found necessary to land limited con-
tingents of troops, usually after naval bombardments, to destroy the
hideouts of pirate gangs which had been preying on American ves-
sels. 1
14
In the second place, on a great many occasions troops or contingents
of armed sailors have been landed in other countries to protect the
lives or property of American citizens. Such action has occurred Vith
the greatest frequency in Latin America, especially during revolutions,
but it has also been found necessary in the South Sea Islands and
Africa, prior to the incidence of European control, and in the Near and
Far East."5 Discussing the President's power to send troops overseas
to safeguard American interests in his classic treatise, The Diplomatic
Protection of Citizens Abroad, Professor Borchard declared:
"Inasmuch as the Constitution vests in Congress authority 'to
declare war,' and does not empower Congress to direct the Presi-
dent to perform his constitutional duties of protecting American
citizens on foreign soil, it is believed that the Executive has un-
limited authority to use the armed forces of the United States for
37 STAT. 1719 (1911). In all these cases, the Presidential proclamations contained prohibi-
tions upon the access of foreign vessels to American ports which exceeded those contained
in the relevant statutes.
Indeed, in the Alabama Claims arbitration, the United States tool: the position that in
the event of a deficiency of municipal law, the chief executive of a nation was charged vith
the duty of seeing that obligations incurred by international agreements or conventional
international law were respected. 3 PAPERS, supra, at 19-20.
110. See 3 AICAASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF TiE UNITED STATES (1923) 201
el seg. Jefferson's defense of his conduct is contained in the message transmitted to Con-
gress on December 8, 1801. 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES at 326 cl seg.
111. 2 STAT. 129 (1802).
112. See OFFUTT, THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE AnnED FoRcES or THE
UNITED STATES (1928) 20-2; 1 MoOORE, DIGEST, at 298-9.
113. 5 MooRE, DIGEST, at 745-50; OFFUTT, op. cit. supra note 112, at 45-S.
114. See BERD.Am, op. cit. supra note 107, at 46; DEP'T OF STATE, RIGUT TO Pnol-Ecr
CITIZENS IN FOREIGN CoUNTRIEs BY LANDING FORCES (1934) 51, 53, 57; OrrTr, op. cit.
supra note 112, at 17-20. The work last cited contains valuable summaries of many of the
situations when troops or naval vessels were used to protect American citizens or property.
115. See, e.g., DEP'T OF STATE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 57, 60, 61, 62, 65, 63, 69,71,72,
74, 77, 129-30; 2 MOORE, DIGEST, at 400-2, 414-8; CoRwIN, THE PREStM;T'S CONTROL OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917) 160-3.
1945]
HeinOnline  -- 54 Yale L.J. 609 1944-1945
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54: 534
protective purposes abroad in any manner and on any occasion he
considers expedient." 11
It is probable that few will deny that the stake of the American people
in averting the outbreak of military conflict is at least as great and
as deserving of prompt executive action as their interest in protecting
the rights of a few expatriates. In point of fact, direct Presidential
action has often had far more important purposes. Thus several Presi-
dents found it appropriate to move troops or battleships to Panama,
Cuba, and Haiti pursuant to general obligations embodied in treaties.,
In 1919, a Marine contingent was landed in Dalmatia to prevent the
outbreak of hostilities between two of our erstwhile World War allies,
Italy and the nascent Yugoslav kingdom."' The desire to "resist the
Japanese penetration of Northern Manchuria and Siberia" under guise
of combatting Bolshevism was "first and last" the purpose of the
expeditionary force sent to Siberia in 1918 by President Wilson."'
The force remained overseas for almost two. years.,'
116. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1916) 452. Professor
Borchard further stated: "It is true that President Buchanan took a contrary view of his
duties, and that Congress has on various occasions, by Act and Joint Resolution, directed or
authorized the President to employ the military forces of the United States in the protection
of the interests of American citizens abroad; yet in view of the above, it seems that such
authorizition is entirely unnecessary, if not without constitutional warrant." Ibd.
It should be noted, however, that Professor Borchard apparently believes that the
delegates to the Security Council vice the President should not be permitted to commit the
use of American troops without reference to Congress. See U. S. News, Nov. 4, 1944.
Professor Borchard's statement as to the "constitutional" duty of the President to protect
American citizens extraterritorially is, of course, sustainable only on the thesis that Ar-
ticle II, Section 1 contains a plenary grant of power to the Executive or on the "inherent"
power rationale.
117. In his message recognizing the existence of the Republic of Panama, Theodore
Roosevelt called attention to the several occasions when troops had been landed on the
Isthmus. Some of the occasions when troops were sent to Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo
are summarized in 2 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST, at 327-30.
The right to land troops in Cuba to safeguard that nation's independence and ensure
'orderly government was created by the Treaty of May 22, 1903, and abrogated by the
Treaty of May 22, 1934. 48 STAT. 1682 (1934). The right to land troops in Haiti for ap-
proximately the same reasons was created by the still operative Treaty of Sept. 16, 1915,
39 STAT. 1654 (1915).
118. See BERDAHL, op. cit. supra note 107, at 56; N. Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1919, p, 19, col. 3,
and Oct. 3, 1919, p. 17, col. 3. Authorization for the landing of troops can hardly be derived
from the fact that, technically speaking, the United States was still at war with the Central
Powers, as the conflict sought to be averted was between two of our allies. Enforcement of
rights promised the United States was involved in the Shimonoseki expedition. See note
113 supra.
119. See GRISWOLD, THE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1941) 226-7.
See also id. at 227-38; Wilson's contrary official explanation of the expedition is reported in
SEN. Doc. No. 60, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). See also GRAVES, ABIERICA'S SIBEIAN
ADVENTURE (1931) 42-9 and passim. On the other hand, our participation together with
Great Britain and France in the Murmansk expedition in 1918 seems to have been wholly
motivated by the desire to protect supplies and to assist the Russian Whites to fight the
Germans so as to relieve pressure on the western front. See GRISWOLD, supra, at 226.
120. See GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 119, at 233.
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Presidential dispatch of forces overseas without express Congres-
sional authorization has often resulted in collaboration between Aneri-
can units and contingents from other States in the protection of ship-
ping, property or treaty rights. 121 The classic example of the use of
an international police force is the Boxer expedition to China in 1900.
President McKinley did not walt for Congressional authorization be-
fore sending the American contingent of 15,000 soldiers to fight under
an internationally designated commander-in-chief, to help in "prevent-
ing a spread of the disorders or their recurrence." 122
A final and important basis for independent executive power is the
doctrine that the President possesses concurrent authority with Con-
gress to recognize the existence of a state of war imposed upon the
United States or to act in an emergency to repel or avert an invasion
of the United States. The Committee on Detail at the Constitutional
Convention originally proposed to give Congress the power "to make
war." On motion of Madison and Gerry, the word "declare" was
substituted for the word "make," for the express purpose of giving
" . . the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." 123 On sev-
eral occasions, Presidents have acted boldly to repel actual or threat-
ened invasion of the United States or threats to our national safety.
Thus, in 1793, President Washington, acting entirely on his own initia-
tive, directed General Wayne to drive out of the Northwest Territory
any British troops which might be found stationed there. In 1814,
1817, and 1818, under the orders of Presidents Iadison and Monroe, a
series of American generals invaded Florida to suppress English ma-
rauders, freebooters and Indian tribes, who periodically raided Ameri-
can settlements and were not effectively controlled by Spain, the then
nominal sovereign of the area.124 In 1846, President Polk directed
General Taylor not only to repel any Mexican invasion of disputed
territory, but to follow the invaders into admitted Mexican territory
until they were defeated; it was only after twro battles had been fought
that Congress was called upon to "recognize the existence of war." 123
121. See list in DEP'T OF STATE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 37. See also COLLu, HISTORY"
OF TE U. S MARINE CORPS (1903) 232-3.
122. See DENNExT, JomI HAY (1934) cc. 24-6; ELrau ROOT, MILITA RY MM COLONMAL
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1916) 333. 336-47. The quotation in the te.t is from a
message by President IIcKinley. FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1900 at xiv. See also FIvE YAts
OF THE WXAR DEPARTMENT, 1899-1903, AS SHOWN IN THE ANNUAL REFORTS Or THE SECrx-
TARY OF WVAR (1904) 86-96.
Other purposes of the expedition were the protection of the lives of citizens and prop-
erty in North China and the maintenance of treaty rights.
123. MADIsON, DEBATES, at 418.
124. See FISH, AMERICAN DIPLOmACY (1938) 200-1, 234: 5 Mlooa, ITEflnATxO!.A
ARBITRATIONS (1898) 4519-24, respectively.
125. 1 THE DIARY OF Juams K. POLX DRINGM HS PR ESIDEt.CY (Quaife, ed., 1910) 9-13;
BERDAHL, WAR PowERs OF THE ExEcu=rru IN THE UNITED STATES (1921) 70-4; 1 Bcvr-
RIDGE, ABRAHA.M LINCOLN, 1S09-185S (1928) 422. The year before, when Texas was still an
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In 1916, President Wilson sent troops into Mexico under command of
General Pershing in an attempt to apprehend the bandit leader Villa,
who had been raiding borer towns; the expeditionary force remained
in Mexico for eight months.12
By far the most important of the instances of direct executive action
is President Lincoln's conduct at the beginning of the Civil War. For
three months after the fall of Fort Sumter President Lincoln failed to
convene Congress; during the interregnum, he declared a blockade of
the southern states, increased the size of the army and navy without
statutory authority, and directed the commencement of retaliatory
military moves. 27 These exercises of executive power were ratified by
Congress, and approved by the Supreme Court in The Prize Cases and
other decisions.
28
Now that the technology of war has made it imperative in the in-
terests of national safety that aggressors be met with the threat of
overwhelming force before they can commence their own military
operations, it can scarcely.be doubted that the President possesses the
authority to take whatever action is necessary to protect the interests of
the United States in a threatened emergency.2 9 As long ago as 1827
the Supreme Court, in dealing with the powers of the President to call
independent nation, President Tyler had threatened to use force if any other power, i.e.,
Mexico, invaded its territory, because of the "inchoate interest of the United States." 4
RICHARDSON, MESSAGES, at 317-8.
126. See CALLAmN, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN MEXICAN RELATIONS (1932) 561-74;
2 HACKWORTE, DIGEST, at 291-8. Congressional approval was obtained by President Wil-
son, but only after Pershing's troops had crossed the border.
127. See FISH, THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1937) 303-5; RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) 36-41; CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, at 156-8.
128. The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (U. S. 1863). See also The Protector, 12 Wall. 700
(U. S. 1871); United States v. The Francis Hatch, 25 Fed. Cas. 1201, No. 15,158 (D. Md.
1864).
129. This conclusion is re-enforced by the principle-most explicitly formulated by
Lincoln during the Civil War-which authorizes the President to exercise in a period of
grave national crisis any appropriate powers not directly forbidden by the Constitution.
The doctrine and its necessity have never been more clearly phrased than in a letter sent by
Lincoln to a critic in 1864:
"I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preser-
vation of the Union."
Quoted in SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1919) 96. See also
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926) 512-5.
This principle, supported also by Presidents Jefferson [see 11 WRITINGS OF TuOMAS
JEFFERSON (Ford, ed., 1904) 146], Theodore Roosevelt [see PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT
(1931) 260, 274], and Woodrow Wilson, was approved by the Supreme Court in The Prize
Cases, 2 Black. 635 (U. S. 1863) and extended to Congressional power in 1871 by the decision
in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870). The abstract question of whether a pcace-tilme
emergency enlarges federal powers has been befogged in judicial logomachy. See, e.g.,
Schechter v..United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U. S. 398 (1934); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
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out the militia and employ the armed forces of the United States, con-
cluded that he was empowered to act not only in cases of actual inva-
sion, but also when there was "imminent danger of invasion." "-, This
latter contingency was held to be a question of fact to be determined
by the President. 131 Similarly, the logic of the Civil War Prize Cases
lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the President may recognize the
existence or imminence of a war, which threatens American interests,
before there is an actual invasion of our territory; 13. for the whole
tenor of Justice Grier's majority opinion is that the existence of war
is a question of fact and that the President must meet the danger "in
the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize
it with a name. . . . 'He must determine what degree of force the
crisis demands.' " 13
The broad powers of the Congress make it unnecessary, however, to
attempt any exact delimitation of the powers of the President to use the
armed forces of the United States on his own initiative. When to the
President's own powers are added the powers that the Congress may
delegate to him, the total is clearly sufficient to permit the most effec-
tive implementation of the United States' participation in .any inter-
national security organization.
The traditional and wise bias of the United States against inflation
of executive power necessarily impels us all to recoil to some extent at
the thought of conferring or recognizing in the President the power to
utilize military sanctions against an aggressor. "We fear to grant
power," said Mr. Justice Holmes in a memorable dissenting opinion,
"and are unwilling to recognize it xvhen it exists." 134 Yet in an age of
rampant dictatorships and galloping progress in the invention of new
instruments of destruction an increase in emergency executive power
has become a national life insurance policy. The revival, especially
by Germany and Japan, of the practice of beginning war without
benefit of a formal declaration, and sometimes even during the course
of international negotiations, intensifies the practical problem. 1' 5 In
Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
But there has been no retreat from the position that the Federal Government, through the
chief executive or otherwise, possesses almost plenary powers when the national cafety is
threatened. See Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917): Block v. Hirsch, sujra: United States
v. Gordin, 287 Fed. 565 (S. D. Ohio 1922). See also Culp, Executire Power in Emcrgcncies
(1933) 31 Mich. L. Re,. 1066.
130. 'martin v. Mlott, 12 Wheat. 19,28 (U. S. 1827).
131. 1bid.
132. Compare CoRwur, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL oF FORrEIGN rERLTIOns (1917)
141-2.
133. 2 Black 635, 669-70 (U. S. 1863).
134. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418,445 (1927).
135. The practice of initiating general hostilities without a formal declaration of war
was prevalent from 1700 to 1870. See EvNs, LEADING CkSES ON I TERNATIONAL LW
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the words of Charles Beard, "Since the United States is in no position
to limit the powers of other nations, it should set no limits to the
powers of its Government to deal with them, save that of ultimate
responsibility to the nation from which its authority is derived." "I
From a realistic standpoint, the proposal to vest in the President the
power to use economic and military sanctions is, moreover, not so
much a departure from tradition as a frank recognition of the long-
evident realities of diplomatic practice. ,The President, as the "sole
organ of the nation in its external relations" has always tended to
dominate our foreign policy, and has always possessed the power to
bring the country to war, if he so chose.'37 Yet this de facto concentra-
tion of power has actually been used to forestall declarations of war.
Thus competent scholars believe President Adams blocked the con-
version of limited naval hostilities against France in 1798 into a general
war, that Presidents Jefferson and Johnson averted war against Eng-
land in 1807 and 1868-1869; similarly President Wilson ignored the
clamor for long-term occupation of Mexico in 1916 and 1917.113
The San Francisco proposals, moreover, leave the choice of methods
whereby members shall meet the calls of the Security Council for im-
position of embargoes or provision of quarantining forces to the in-
dividual nations.139 The task of drafting the act of adherence to an
international security organization and the statutes regulating the
powers of the President so as to vest him with complete leeway in
dealing with aggression in some parts of the world or when initiated by
certain nations and with considerably less freedom of action in dealing
with other situations is by no means insuperable. If, even after such
(1922) 386. Beginning with the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, it became the custom to
precede hostilities with a declaration; this was done by all the major States in the first
World War. See id. at 387. The practice was declared obligatory by the Hague Conven-
tion of 1907. See Scoi-, HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907
(1915) 96.
However, the Japanese initiated hostilities in the 1894 war against China and the 1904
war with Russia without formal declarations. See HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1898) 115; 2 COBBETT, CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1913 ed.) 1
el seg. Subsequent to the German invasion of Poland in 1939, begun while, like the attack on
Pearl Harbor, peace negotiations were presumably being conducted, the Axis powers com-
menced hostilities against most of their present adversaries without bothering to declare
war. See GATHORNE-HARDY, A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1942) 498-9;
(1941) 4 DEP'T OF STATE BULL., No. 82, pp. 8 9 - 9 0 .
136. BEARD, THE OPEN DOOR AT HOME (1935) 298-9. See also quotation from this work
in Part I, Section II, note 67.
137. See BERDAHL, op. cit. supra note 125, at 80-95.
138. See, e.g., BASSETT, THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM (1906) 251; 3 MCMASTER, HISTORY OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (1928) 262; DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC (1907) 160-2; RHODES, HISTORICAL ESSAYS (1909) 218-9; BERDAIIL, op. cit.
supra note 125, at 83-4; NEvINs, HAMILTON FISH (1937); CALLAHAN, AMERICAN FOREION
POLICY IN MEXICAN RELATIONS (1932) 562-73.
139. See CHARTER, c. VII, art. 43, par. 3.
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draftsmanship, the ultimate check on the Executive's power is his
own sense of self-restraint," ' surely the history of the United States
affords every reason to believe that powers given to permit rapid action
in an emergency will be used as sparingly as possible. Except in case of
imperative self-defense, it is to be assumed that no President vill
commit the use of American troops without prior consultation of Con-
gress. If direct action by the President will sometimes be necessary, it
is again to be assumed that, as soon as possible, the situation will be
explained to Congress and its views sought.
Twenty-five years ago Woodrow Wilson said: "I can predict with
absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another
World War, if the nations of the world do not concert the method by
which to prevent it." ' There has been given to the generation which
saw its safety and freedom totter perilously in the balance on the
dubious battlefields of El Alamein and Stalingrad a second opportunity
to create the foundations of enduring peace and prosperity and to
prevent the recurrence of global war. If we allow ourselves to fail
again because of the obstructionist tactics of a small group of wilful
men, archeologists of the future who dig into the ruins of our civiliza-
tion will have cause for astonishment that a nation which had through-
out its history been so successful in making words serve their appro-
priate purposes should suddenly have become so hypnotized by a sin-
gle, absolutist notion of the one word "treaty" that it could not see the
full meaning, in both reason and tradition, of the many other relevant
words of its fundamental charter.
42
140. Compare dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Butler, 297
U. S. 1, 78 (1936).
141. MAHoN, OtmSEcoD CHA=E (1944)6.
142. In 4 OpnoN NEws (National Opinion Research Center) No. 3, Feb. 6, 1945, there
is summarized a poll by the American Institute of Public Opinion which indicate3 that in
response to the question, which of "these three ways would you, personally, favor as the
best way to have peace treaties approved after the war," 3% answered "Approval only by
President," 58% "Approval by President and majority of whole Congress," 22% "Approval
by President and two-thirds of Senate," and 12% "Don't know." See also American Insti-
tute of Public Opinion. Public Opinion News Service, Release, May 17, 1944; Judidary
Committee Hearings at 31.
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